Angell v. Hennepin County Regional Rail Authority, C6-97-75

• Decision Date: 07 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. C6-97-75,C6-97-75
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: Kathy Ruth ANGELL, Respondent, v. HENNEPIN COUNTY REGIONAL RAIL AUTHORITY, petitioner Appellant.

Page 343

578 N.W.2d 343

Kathy Ruth ANGELL, Respondent, v. HENNEPIN COUNTY REGIONAL RAIL AUTHORITY, petitioner Appellant.

No. C6-97-75.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 7, 1998.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The Hennepin County Regional Rail Authority is not entitled to statutory immunity under Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6 (1996) for failing to restrict access to, post warning signs at, or erect a barricade across a former railroad loading dock on its property.

2. Because the Hennepin County Regional Rail Authority improved its land, it is not protected by unimproved property immunity under Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 13 (1996).

Peter A. Koller, Moss & Barnett, Minneapolis, for appellant.

John M. Steele, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

GILBERT, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision of the court of appeals reversing a summary judgment order in favor of appellant, Hennepin County Regional Rail Authority. Respondent, Kathy Ruth Angell, was seriously injured while riding her bike on property owned by the Authority. Angell sued the Authority, ¹ and the Authority moved for summary judgment, asserting statutory immunity under Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6 (1996), and unimproved property immunity under Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 13 (1996). The district court held that statutory immunity applied in this case, and having determined that was sufficient to grant summary judgment, the district court declined to rule on whether the Authority was immune based on unimproved property immunity. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that neither theory of immunity applied in this case. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

On the afternoon of July 16, 1995, respondent, Kathy Ruth Angell, and her friend, Michael McGowan, rode their mountain bikes from their home in southwest Minneapolis to a restaurant in downtown Minneapolis. To get into downtown, Angell and McGowan rode their bikes on various public bike trails around Lake Harriet, Lake Calhoun, and Cedar Lake. After spending the afternoon downtown, they began their bike ride home as dusk was approaching. On their way home, as they approached Cedar Lake, Angell veered off the paved public trail and onto a dirt path to take what she believed would be a short-cut. The dirt path ran along the east side of Cedar Lake. The path appeared to be well-traveled and as Angell rode onto it, another rider was just coming off. Angell was seriously injured when she biked off the loading dock which was located at the end of the dirt path. She fell four feet, and her face struck the concrete slab on the ground. There were no access restrictions or warning devices near the loading dock.

Angell's accident occurred on land owned by the Authority. The Authority was established in 1980 under Minn.Stat. ch. 398A (1996). Chapter 398A contains enabling legislation permitting counties, cities, and towns to establish regional railroad authorities. The purpose of such railroad authorities is "to provide for the preservation and improvement of local rail service for agriculture, industry, or passenger traffic and to provide for the preservation of abandoned rail right-of-way for future transportation uses." Minn.Stat. § 398A.02 (1996). The Authority's initial responsibility was to implement a light rail transit system (LRT) in Minneapolis. To accomplish this, it purchased various pieces of property in and around Minneapolis. At the time of Angell's accident, the Authority owned and managed several properties in Hennepin County and Carver County that it was holding for future use in transportation projects. In all, these properties consisted of approximately 41 miles of railroad corridors and eight other properties totalling 46 acres. The Authority generated revenues as a landlord from leasing some of its property.

The Authority acquired the property on which the accident occurred, which it refers to as the Hopkins to Minneapolis corridor (Hopkins corridor), in 1984 as part of a potential linkage for the LRT between some of the southwestern suburbs and Minneapolis. The previous owner of the Hopkins corridor was Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company. At the time the Authority purchased the Hopkins corridor, the loading dock was on the property as well as the remains of old railroad tracks and structures. The Authority had several of the structures demolished and removed, including a structure near the loading dock. The Authority also removed debris left from illegal dumping. The Authority claims that it posted "No Trespassing" signs on roads crossing the Hopkins corridor but that vandals have often removed them. On the day of the accident, neither Angell or McGowan saw any "No Trespassing" signs nor is there anything in the record to show that signs were posted around the loading dock.

By 1995, the Hopkins corridor was no longer considered part of the proposed LRT, and the Authority suggested that it might be opened for bike and trail use. The Authority considered leasing it to the Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board as part of the park and recreation and trail systems, but that plan never materialized. There is, however, a paved trail that runs along part of Cedar Lake and is adjacent to the Hopkins corridor. The area where the Hopkins corridor and the paved trail meet was an open area and there were no signs or other markings distinguishing the two properties.

Both Angell and McGowan gave uncontradicted testimony that the area in which Angell was injured was commonly used by joggers and bicyclists and appeared to be open to the public. Immediately after Angell fell off the loading dock, while McGowan administered first aid to Angell, at least three other bicyclists happened by within 15 minutes of each other. McGowan testified "that [the] area is literally crisscrossed with bike trails." In fact, the trail that he and Angell were riding on was paved with artificial surfaces in some parts, including the portion leading up to the four-foot drop-off of the loading dock.

In February 1995, approximately five months before Angell's accident, the Authority developed and officially adopted a Land Use Management Plan, which applied to all of its property, including the Hopkins corridor. The plan gives background information about the Authority's property and addresses property management issues. Specifically, the plan establishes recommendations and guidelines for Authority staff to use in evaluating and making decisions regarding maintenance, access, use and sale of Authority's properties. The recommendations are intended to preserve property for future LRT use, provide for interim uses, maintain cooperative relationships with affected property owners, provide for maximum return on the Authority's investment, and protect the environment.

I.

The Authority asserts that it is immune from liability for Angell's accident. The Authority is a local governmental unit and a political subdivision of the state. Minn.Stat. § 398A.04, subd. 1 (Supp.1997). As a regional railroad authority, the Authority has tort liability to the extent a municipality would be liable under Minn.Stat. §§ 466.01 to 466.15 (1996). Minn.Stat. § 466.01, subd. 1 (Supp.1997); Minn.Stat. § 398A.04, subd. 6(a) (1996). While municipalities are generally liable for their torts, the legislature has provided for limited exceptions of immunity. See Minn.Stat. §§ 466.02, 466.03. One such exception applies when the municipality's alleged tortious conduct constitutes a discretionary function, whether or not that discretion was abused. Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6. This type of immunity, called "statutory immunity," ² protects policy-making, or discretionary activities that are legislative or executive in nature. Johnson v. State, 553 N.W.2d 40, 46 (Minn.1996).

Determining whether statutory immunity applies requires a careful examination of the challenged governmental activity. Nusbaum v. County of Blue Earth, 422 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn.1988). The analysis may involve some difficulty because "almost every act involves some measure of discretion, and yet undoubtedly not every act of government is entitled to [statutory] immunity." Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Minn.1982). This court has consistently interpreted the statutory immunity narrowly. See, e.g., Zank v. Larson, 552 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Minn.1996); Holmquist v. State, 425 N.W.2d 230, 231 (Minn.1988).

The rationale underlying statutory immunity is that the judicial branch of government should not second guess the policy-making activities of other branches of government, thereby disrupting separation of powers. Nusbaum, 422 N.W.2d at 718. Statutory immunity applies only when the challenged government activity originated from a balancing of political, social and economic factors. See id. at 722; Zank, 552 N.W.2d at 721. In contrast, operational or day-to-day decisions involving the application of scientific or technical skills are not protected by statutory immunity. Nusbaum, 422 N.W.2d at 722.

Merely labeling an activity as policy-based or operational, however, is insufficient. Courts must focus on the nature of the government decision, "applying the exception only where the decision involved a balancing of policy objectives rather than merely a professional or scientific judgment." Id. at 719-20. Implementing a policy, in contrast to formulating the policy itself, is often not subject to statutory immunity. Holmquist, 425 N.W.2d at 234.

The first step in our analysis of the Authority's statutory immunity claim is to identify the conduct at issue. Steinke v. City of Andover, 525 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn.1994). Angell claims that the Authority was negligent in failing to (1) maintain its property; (2) place warning signs around the loading dock; and (3) install a barricade in front of the loading dock. The issue is whether this conduct was the result of a discretionary function and thus is immune, or an...