Stansfield v. Douglas County

• Decision Date: 27 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. 18553-2-III.,18553-2-III.
• Citation: 27 P.3d 205,107 Wash.App. 1
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: James A. STANSFIELD, M.D., Appellant, v. DOUGLAS COUNTY, Defendant, State of Washington, Death Investigation Council; University of Washington Directing and Acting through the State Toxicology Laboratory, Respondents.

27 P.3d 205

107 Wash.App. 1

James A. STANSFIELD, M.D., Appellant, v. DOUGLAS COUNTY, Defendant, State of Washington, Death Investigation Council; University of Washington Directing and Acting through the State Toxicology Laboratory, Respondents.

No. 18553-2-III.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3, Panel Nine.

February 27, 2001.

Publication Ordered June 26, 2001.

Robert F. Hedrick, Seattle, Mark Stansfield, Quincy, for Appellant.

Catherine Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., Seattle, for Respondents.

KURTZ, C.J.

James A. Stansfield, M.D., was tried for the murders of his wife and Fred Smith, a friend. In the middle of the trial for these murders, the prosecutor moved to dismiss the charges. Dr. Stansfield subsequently filed suit against Douglas County and the State of Washington. All claims against the State were dismissed on summary judgment. In this appeal of his case against the State, Dr. Stansfield contends the court erred by dismissing his claims because material issues of fact exist supporting his claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, negligent testing, negligent infliction of emotional distress, outrage, and defamation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

James A. Stansfield, M.D., was prosecuted for murdering his wife, Patricia Stansfield, and Fred Smith, the husband of his alleged mistress. The prosecutor's theory was Dr. Stansfield administered Valium and Haldol to his wife, which in combination with the substantial amount of alcohol she had consumed, either caused her death or would have left her "quite subdued and vulnerable to both `postural asphyxia' or a soft pillow." Additionally, the prosecutor alleged that Dr. Stansfield murdered Mr. Smith by drugging him with Haldol until he was incapacitated, beating him to death, and then placing his body in a staged car wreck.

The prosecutor had evidence that a short time before Mrs. Stansfield's death, Dr. Stansfield purchased a four-ounce bottle of the liquid form of a prescription sedative known as Haldol. Haldol is a colorless, tasteless liquid that would be undetectable when added to other liquids. Doses as low as two milligrams could induce sleepiness and high doses can lead to stupor, unconsciousness, and death.

When questioned, Dr. Stansfield told the pharmacist that the drug was to control behavior problems in his grandchildren. The pharmacist told the police that the purchase was unusual because: (1) Haldol is generally prescribed only for psychiatric patients and was not generally used for behavior modification, especially in children; (2) nearly all Haldol prescriptions are in the pill form and the liquid form is very rarely used; and (3) Dr. Stansfield had been retired since 1985.

The pharmacist informed the police that Dr. Stansfield purchased six vials of injectible Valium. Additionally, Dr. Stansfield purchased a small quantity of chlorohydrate capsules. Chlorohydrate is a tranquilizer that is commonly known as "knockout drops."

The county prosecutors requested blood testing in this case from the Washington State Toxicology Laboratory. Barry K. Logan, Ph.D., is the supervisor of the State Lab. Standard testing indicated that Mrs. Stansfield had Valium and Haldol in her system at the time of her death, along with a blood-alcohol concentration of .34.

According to Dr. Logan, the "generally accepted standard in forensic toxicology is that drug identification should be made using one chemical method and confirmed by a second method which is based on a different chemical property of the molecule. There is no requirement that confirmation be made by [Gas Chromotagraph Mass Spectrometry] or any other particular test."

Initial tests on Mr. Smith's blood revealed the presence of Haldol. Valid results were obtained from two of three tests. The two tests that indicated that presence of the drug were the High Performance Liquid Chromatography and the Gas Chromatograph with Nitrogen-Phosphorus Detection. The third test that was attempted was the Gas Chromatograph-Mass Spectrometry, a test that is generally considered the most irrefutable method of testing. The result of this test neither confirmed nor eliminated the presence of Haldol. The State Lab did not retain test results or data from this test. Dr. Logan was not aware that the mass spectrometry test had been performed on Mr. Smith's sample until the time of trial.

The State Lab was asked to conduct tests on embalmed liver samples from Mr. Smith. Dr. Logan attempted to use the mass spectrometry test on the liver samples. However, the test again did not produce a valid result, and the result and data were not saved.

Subsequently, the liver samples were sent to a highly regarded, independent laboratory, the Chemical Toxicology Institute in California, for additional testing. The Institute conducted both the gas chromatography with nitrogen test, as well as the mass spectrometry test. The gas chromatography confirmed the presence of Haldol, but the mass spectrometry could not generate a valid result. The doctors at the Institute explained that an embalmed liver was not an ideal sample to test using the mass spectrometry, and that mass spectrometry was not the optimum technique to test for Haldol.

Prior to conducting the tests, Dr. Logan received and reviewed a prescription drug profile for Mr. Smith. The drug profile listed all the medications that Mr. Smith might have in his system. Dr. Logan did not recognize any drugs on that list that would potentially interfere with or invalidate the tests for Haldol. One drug on the list was Cardizem, a heart medication.

As the trial began, Dr. Logan asked Dr. David Predmore, the laboratory supervisor, to attempt the mass spectrometry test again. After he testified, Dr. Logan learned that Dr. Predmore was able to identify Haldol in Mr. Smith's liver sample. However, Dr. Predmore had also identified Cardizem, a drug that exhibits retention properties similar to Haldol. Dr. Logan explained that "[t]his created a problem, in that while [Cardizem] was on the list of prescribed drugs I had been given for Fred Smith, it was not previously recognized that [Cardizem] could interfere with testing for Haldol." The court excluded the results of these last tests at trial, due to the fact they had been conducted the week of trial.

As a result of this information, Dr. Logan theorized that the presence of the Cardizem could have been responsible for the early problems in obtaining a valid result. Moreover, Dr. Logan was now concerned that the presence of Cardizem may have interfered with the earlier tests that did confirm the presence of Haldol. He contacted the Institute, and they informed him that Cardizem could not have interfered with their testing.

The defense presented expert witnesses who testified that because there was no mass spectrometry of Mr. Smith's blood, the tests must be considered negative. The expert concluded, "The State proved that Fred Smith's blood did not have Haldol in it." Another expert was asked if Haldol was present in Mr. Smith, and he replied it was not.¹ After the defense presented its case, the State wanted to call a toxicologist in rebuttal. Dr. Logan was not available. The only toxicologist from the State Lab available was Dr. Pat Friel. Dr. Friel's opinion, in contrast to Dr. Logan's, was that the tests confirming the presence of Haldol were compromised by the failure to control for Cardizem. As a result of this situation, combined with other evidentiary problems encountered at trial, the prosecutor concluded that he could not satisfy his burden of proof and dismissed the charges.

Procedural History. Initially, Dr. Stansfield filed a complaint in federal court, alleging a variety of claims, including Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent training and supervision, false imprisonment, and defamation. While that lawsuit was pending, Dr. Stansfield filed a second lawsuit in Douglas County, alleging negligent investigation and the tort of outrage. Thereafter, the federal court dismissed all state-based causes of action without prejudice. More than two years after the dismissal of the federal suit, Dr. Stansfield was allowed to amend his state lawsuit to add new causes of action. These new causes of action were the same claims dismissed from the federal lawsuit-false arrest, malicious prosecution, infliction of emotional distress, and defamation.

The State moved for summary judgment. The court granted the State's motion and dismissed all claims against it. Dr. Stansfield appeals.

Standard of Review. This court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo. The court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court-is there a genuine issue as to any material fact and is the moving party entitled to judgment as a matter of law? The court considers the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wash.2d 658, 663, 958 P.2d 301 (1998). A party is entitled to summary judgment if the party can show that there is an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Young v. Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 112 Wash.2d 216, 225-26, 770 P.2d 182 (1989).

Malicious Prosecution. In order to maintain an action for malicious prosecution in this state, Dr. Stansfield must plead and prove the following elements: (1) that the prosecution was instituted or continued by the defendant; (2) that there was want of probable cause for the institution or continuation of the prosecution; (3) that the proceedings were instituted or continued through malice; (4) that the proceedings terminated on the merits in favor of the plaintiff, or were abandoned; and (5) that the plaintiff suffered injury or damage as a result of the prosecution. Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 121 Wash.2d...