Stanton v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Essex Cnty.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1908
• Citation: 191 N.Y. 428,84 N.E. 380
• Parties: STANTON v. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF ESSEX COUNTY.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

191 N.Y. 428

84 N.E. 380

STANTON

v.BOARD OF SUP'RS OF ESSEX COUNTY.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 31, 1908.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Action by Merritt C. Stanton against the board of supervisors of the county of Essex. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (112 App. Div. 877,98 N. Y. Supp. 1059) affirming a judgment of dismissal entered at Special Term (48 Misc. Rep. 415,96 N. Y. Supp. 840), plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Francis A. Smith and Richard L. Hand, for appellant.

Edward T. Stokes, for respondent.

HAIGHT, J.

The plaintiff, as a taxpayer of the county of Essex, brings this action to restrain the board of supervisors from carrying into effect a resolution passed by the board removing the county seat from Elizabethtown to Westport. Various questions are raised with reference to the regularity of the proceedings under which the removal of the county seat was authorized which we think were properly disposed of by the trial court, and further discussion of them we deem unnecessary. There remains, however, one question of public importance which requires consideration, and that is the contention that the provision of the county law with reference to the removal of county seats is unconstitutional.

The provisions of the county law, so far as now material, are as follows: ‘The board of supervisors may, except in the county of Kings, by a majority vote of all the members elected thereto, fix or change the site of any county building, and the location of any county office; but the site or location of no county building or office shall be changed when the change shall exceed one mile, and shall be beyond the boundaries of the incorporated village or city, where already situated, except upon a petition of at least twenty-five freeholders of the county, describing the buildings or office, the site or location of which is proposed to be changed, and the place at or near which it is proposed to locate such new buildings or office; which petition shall be published once in each week for six weeks immediately preceding an annual or special meeting of such board. * * * On the presentation of such petition and notice, with due proof of their publication, if a majority of all the members elected to such board vote in favor of a resolution for the removal of the site of the buildings described in such petition, to the site also therein described, * * * said board shall thereupon direct that such resolution, together with the notice that the question of such removal will be submitted to the electors of the county at the ensuing general election, be published in at least two newspapers published in the county to be designated by the board, once in each week for six consecutive weeks immediately preceding such general election. * * * The question of the removal of the site of such buildings or the change of the location of any such office, shall thereupon be voted on by the electors of the county at such general election by ballot. If a majority of the ballots cast shall be in favor of such removal, the proceedings of such board of supervisors shall be deemed ratified by the electors, and the change of the site of such buildings, or the removal of such offices, shall be made accordingly.’ County Law, Laws 1892, p. 1753, c. 686, §§ 31-33. The contention is that these provisions are violative of the Constitution, for the reason that by requiring a vote of the people to determine whether the action of the supervisors in authorizing the removal of the county buildings shall be ratified is a delegation of the legislative power to the people.

Article 3, § 1, Const., provides that ‘the legislative power of this state shall be vested in a senate and assembly.’ The government, as organized under the Constitution, was designed to be that of a representative republic. Under the clause of the Constitution referred to the Legislature is prohibited from converting it into a pure democracy, under which the people frame and enact their own laws. The organization of the lawmaking power is one of the principal purposes of a constitutional charter, and this is effected by means of a system of representation by which the people at stated periods delegate to citizens chosen by them the power of enacting laws by which all are to be governed. The senators and assemblymen are selected by the electors of their respective districts to represent them in the Legislature of the state, and to enact such laws as shall be requisite and advisable. The people, who have intrusted them with legislative power have the right to demand the exercise of their knowledge, judgment, and discretion in the framing and in the enactment of laws, and, in so far as their duties are strictly legislative, have prohibited them from delegating that power to others. It was consequently held in Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483, 59 Am. Dec. 506, that an act establishing free schools throughout the state was unconstitutional and void, for the reason that the fact of its becoming a law was made to depend upon the result of a popular vote. See, also, People v. Stout, 23 Barb. 350;Thorne v. Cramer, 15 Barb. 112;Bradley v. Baxter, 15 Barb. 122. It will be observed, however, that, while the provision of the Constitution in question vests in the Senate and Assembly legislative power, it does not prohibit the Legislature from exercising powers or of enacting laws which are not strictly legislative. As was said by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 42, 6 L. Ed. 253: ‘It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the courts or to any other tribunal powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative; but Congress may certainly delegate to others powers which the Legislature may rightfully exercise itself. * * * The courts, for example may make rules directing he return of writs and process, the filing of declarations and other pleadings, and other things of the same description. It will not be contended that these things might not be done by the Legislature without the intervention of the courts, yet it is not alleged that the power may not be conferred on the judicial department.’

It is not our purpose, nor shall we here attempt, to define the powers of the Legislature, or to determine which powers are strictly legislative and which are not, further than the necessities of this case require. We have only to refer to the history of legislation which has been sanctioned by the courts to establish the fact that its powers have been extended over a wide field covering all the departments of government, the administrative or executive branch, as well as that of the...