Stanton v. City of Battle Creek

• Decision Date: 17 July 2002
• Docket Number: Docket No. 115909, Calendar No. 3.
• Citation: 466 Mich. 611,647 N.W.2d 508
• Parties: Michael STANTON and Joy Stanton, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF BATTLE CREEK, and Allen Maynard Howard, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

647 N.W.2d 508

466 Mich. 611

Michael STANTON and Joy Stanton, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF BATTLE CREEK, and Allen Maynard Howard, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 115909, Calendar No. 3.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued January 24, 2002.

Decided July 17, 2002.

Harold Schuitmaker, Paw Paw, MI, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Clyde J. Robinson, Battle Creek, MI, for the defendants-appellees.

Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, P.L.C. (Ronald E. Baylor and Brad H. Sysol), Kalamazoo, MI, for the Michigan Municipal League Defense Fund.

CAVANAGH, Justice.

This case calls into question whether a forklift is a "motor vehicle" within the ambit of the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, M.C.L. § 691.1405. We hold that it is not, and, therefore, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants.

I. Facts And Proceedings

On April 28, 1995, plaintiff Michael Stanton¹ was working as a truck driver for Hover Trucking Company and delivered hardware to a site defendant city of Battle Creek owned. Defendant Allen M. Howard, a city employee, drove a forklift owned by the city to plaintiff's truck and loaded the hardware onto the forklift. After the hardware was removed from plaintiff's truck, Howard prepared to back up and drive away, and plaintiff lowered the truck door and stepped down. The brakes on the forklift stuck and the forklift stayed in neutral, rolled forward, and struck plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges he suffered numerous injuries as a result.

In August 1996, plaintiff sued the city, alleging negligent maintenance and operation of the forklift, and sued Mr. Howard, alleging negligent or grossly negligent maintenance and operation of the forklift. Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7),(8), and (10). The circuit court granted the defendants' motion for summary disposition on governmental immunity grounds, MCR 2.116(C)(7), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 237 Mich.App. 366, 603 N.W.2d 285 (1999). When the plaintiff initially appealed to this Court, we denied leave to appeal. 461 Mich. 1019, 622 N.W.2d 524 (2000). Plaintiff, thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration, which we granted.²

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo decisions on summary disposition motions. Sewell v. Southfield Pub. Schs., 456 Mich. 670, 674, 576 N.W.2d 153 (1998).

Similarly, we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. In re MCI Telecommunications, 460 Mich. 396, 413, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999).

III. Discussion

A. Liability of the City of Battle Creek

The governmental tort liability act, M.C.L. § 691.1401 et seq., provides immunity from tort liability to governmental agencies³ engaged in a governmental function.⁴ M.C.L. 691.1407(1). The act provides immunity from tort liability to governmental employees if, inter alia, the employee's conduct does not amount to gross negligence.⁵ The legislative immunity granted to governmental agencies and their employees is broad. This immunity, however, is subject to five narrowly drawn statutory exceptions.⁶Ross v. Consumers Power (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567, 593-595, 622, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984).

Plaintiff asserts that he may recover from the city for his injuries suffered as a result of the negligent operation of the government-owned forklift under the motor vehicle exception. Thus, we must examine the language of the motor vehicle exception to determine whether a forklift is a "motor vehicle" as that term is used in the exception.

Whether the Legislature intended that the term "motor vehicle" include a forklift is an issue of statutory interpretation. The primary rule of statutory interpretation is that we are to effect the intent of the Legislature. Wickens v. Oakwood Healthcare System, 465 Mich. 53, 60, 631 N.W.2d 686 (2001). To achieve this task, we must first examine the statute's language. Id. If the language is clear and unambiguous, we assume the Legislature intended its plain meaning, and the statute is enforced as written. People v. Stone, 463 Mich. 558, 562, 621 N.W.2d 702 (2001).

The motor vehicle exception does not define "motor vehicle." Further, contrary to the interpretation of the Court of Appeals, the governmental tort liability act does not refer to the Michigan Vehicle Code, M.C.L. § 257.1 et seq., for the definition. Section 1405, the motor vehicle exception, provides:

Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner, as defined in [the Michigan Vehicle Code], as amended, being sections 257.1 to 257.923 of the Compiled Laws of 1948.

The Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that the definitional phrase in § 1405 refers to the term "motor vehicle." Grammatically, the final clause of § 1405 sends the reader to the Michigan Vehicle Code only for the definition of "owner." The "last antecedent" rule of statutory construction provides that a modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent, unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation. Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 237, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999). Applying this rule, the reference to §§ 257.1 to 257.923 in § 1405 defines "owner,"⁷ not "motor vehicle," and nothing in the statute demands a different interpretation. Haveman v. Kent Co. Rd. Comm'rs, 356 Mich. 11, 18-22, 96 N.W.2d 153 (1959).⁸ Accordingly, because the motor vehicle exception does not provide a definition of "motor vehicle," we are required to give the term its plain and ordinary meaning. M.C.L. 8.3a; People v. McIntire, 461 Mich. 147, 153, 599 N.W.2d 102 (1999). When determining the common, ordinary meaning of a word or phrase, consulting a dictionary is appropriate. Horace v. City of Pontiac, 456 Mich. 744, 756, 575 N.W.2d 762 (1998).

It is possible to find varying dictionary definitions of the term "motor vehicle." For example, the Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001) defines a "motor vehicle" as "an automobile, truck, bus, or similar motor-driven conveyance," a definition that does not include a forklift.⁹ In our view, this definition appropriately reflects the commonly understood meaning of the term.¹⁰ The American Heritage Dictionary (2d College ed.), on the other hand, defines "motor vehicle" as "self-propelled, wheeled conveyance that does not run on rails," a definition, which would arguably include a forklift. Given these divergent definitions, we must choose one that most closely effectuates the Legislature's intent. Fortunately, our jurisprudence under the governmental tort liability act provides an answer regarding which definition should be selected. As previously noted, it is a basic principle of our state's jurisprudence that the immunity conferred upon governmental agencies and subdivisions is to be construed broadly and that the statutory exceptions are to be narrowly construed. Nawrocki v. Macomb Co. Rd. Comm., 463 Mich. 143, 158, 615 N.W.2d 702 (2000). Thus, this Court must apply a narrow definition to the undefined term "motor vehicle."

The definition of a "motor vehicle" as "an automobile, truck, bus, or similar motor-driven conveyance" is the narrower of the two common dictionary definitions. Therefore, we apply it to the present case. A forklift-which is a piece of industrial construction equipment is not similar to an automobile, truck, or bus. Thus, the motor vehicle exception should not be construed to remove the broad veil of governmental immunity for the negligent operation of a forklift.

B. Liability of the Employee

Plaintiff also brought claims asserting that the city's employee, Mr. Howard, negligently maintained and operated the forklift.¹¹ Mr. Howard is entitled to immunity as a city employee from the negligent maintenance and operation claims if § 1407(2) is satisfied. Section 1407(2) provides:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, and without regard to the discretionary or ministerial nature of the conduct in question, each officer and employee of a governmental agency, each volunteer acting on behalf of a governmental agency, and each member of a board, council, commission, or statutorily created task force of a governmental agency is immune from tort liability for an injury to a person or damage to property caused by the officer, employee, or member while in the course of employment or service or caused by the volunteer while acting on behalf of a governmental agency if all of the following are met:

(a) The officer, employee, member, or volunteer is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.

(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.

(c) The officer's, employee's, member's, or volunteer's conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. As used in this subdivision," gross negligence" means conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.

There is no dispute that subsections (a) and (b) are satisfied, thus, the question is whether Mr. Howard was grossly negligent in maintaining and operating the forklift under subsection (c). Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Howard was grossly negligent in failing to check the brakes after knowing the brakes were faulty and in driving the forklift without a valid license to operate the lift. We reject plaintiff's arguments. As the Court of Appeals noted, once Mr. Howard noticed the problematic brakes, he notified his supervisor. Once Mr. Howard retrieved the forklift, he thought the brakes had been fixed, as there was no indication otherwise. Moreover, once the forklift began to roll forward at the time of the accident,...