Starr v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 December 1905
• Citation: 83 P. 113,41 Wash. 199
• Parties: STARR v. AETNA LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

83 P. 113

41 Wash. 199

STARR v. AETNA LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 27, 1905

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Wm. A. Huneke, Judge.

Action by Amelia Starr against the AEtna Life Insurance Company. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Jas. A. Williams and Denton M. Crow, for appellant.

Post Avery & Higgins, for respondent.

DUNBAR, J.

The appellant is the beneficiary named in a certain accident insurance policy issued to her husband, Martin Luther Starr. This action was brought by appellant, as such beneficiary, to recover the principal sum of $5,000, by reason of the loss of the life of said Martin Luther Starr as the proximate result of external, violent, and accidental means. Some of the facts were stipulated between appellant and respondent, and appear as follows: On December 6, 1903, the insured, Martin Luther Starr, was at Hatton, Adams county, Wash. At about 4 o'clock in the morning of said day said Starr, with some companions, started from the hotel for the Northern Pacific Railway Depot. The train for Spokane was then due, and came in shortly after said Starr and his companions arrived at the depot. It was then still dark. Starr left his companions before the arrival of the train, and when the train arrived he could not be found by his companions, who made some search for him. Shortly after the train pulled out for Spokane some men at the depot heard Starr calling from a direction opposite to that it which the train had gone and in a few moments said Starr came to the depot the direction opposite to that the train had gone--that is, from down the track toward Tacoma--with both arms hanging limp and in a crushed condition. Within two days after said Starr was discovered as aforesaid he died from the effect of such injuries. Before his death his arms were amputated for the purpose of saving his life. Said Starr had not received said injuries before leaving his companions at the depot. The evidence shows that prompt notice was given the respondent of said injuries and the subsequent death of the insured, and that within the time limited by the policy proper proofs of death were furnished. Respondent denied any liability under the policy of insurance, and thereafter this action was brought.

The complaint set up the death by accident, the provisions of the policy, etc., and all the allegations usual in such a case. The answer admitted the issuance of the policy by the defendant, but alleged that there were other conditions and requirements in the policy, not mentioned in the complaint wherein it was provided that the failure to comply with such provisions would work a forfeiture and loss of all rights under the policy; affirmatively alleged that the policy of insurance, described in the complaint and sued upon contained the following provision: 'This insurance does not cover disappearance nor suicide, sane or insane, nor the result, fatal or otherwise, of injuries of which there is no visible mark upon the body (except ashereinbefore provided) nor in event of accident or death, loss of limb or sight, or disability resulting, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, from bodily or mental infirmity, or disease in any form, nor from sleepwalking, medical or surgical treatment, war, or violating the law; nor for injuries intentionally inflicted upon the insured by himself; nor does it cover (except as incident to the occupation of railway employés) entering or trying to enter or leave a moving conveyance, using steam or electricty as a motive power (except cable and electric street cars) being in any place in or on any such conveyance which has not been provided for the occupation of passengers during transit, or being on any railroad bridge or right of way, except at established crossings of such roads with public highways.' The answer further averred that the insured was, at the time of said injury, trying to board a moving railroad train at a place other than a station, or trying to commit suicide, and at said time was one, and said injury occurred on, the right of way of the Northern Pacific Railway Company's railroad, and at a place that was not then an established, or any, crossing of such railroad with a public highway; that said railroad right of way at the place where said injury occurred was at the time 400 feet wide, and that the said railway company's railway tracks ran approximately in the center of said right of way. The reply admitted the exceptions specified in the answer in the affirmative defense, but denied the other allegations. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony, upon motion of defendant, the case was taken from the jury on the ground that there was not sufficient testimony to sustain a verdict, and an order of dismissal was made. From the judgment following this order, this appeal is prosecuted.

It is alleged that the court erred in sustaining respondent's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and in refusing to permit certain testimony which we will hereafter refer to. It appears from the record and the statements made by the court that the court was of the opinion that the burden of proof was upon the appellant to show that the death of the insured did not occur by reason of some of the exceptions incorporated in the policy. From an examination of all available authority on that subject we are forced to the conclusion that the court erred in this particular. It is the established and universal law that insurance policies are to be construed in favor of the insured, and most strongly against insurance companies. This is a reasonable rule, considering the fact that these policies are prepared by men who are learned in the law and trained in preparing contracts of this kind, and who have studied the legal effects of all the multifarious provisions in the ordinary insurance policies, whether accident or life; while the insured are frequently men and women of limited understanding, of simple methods of thought, and who, as a rule, would not be capable of technically construing doubtful provisions in a contract. Speaking of this proposition, it was said by the Supreme Court of Alabama, in Equitable Acc. Ins. Co. v. Osborn, 9 South. 869, 13 L. R. A. 267, 269: 'Exceptions of this kind are construed most strongly against the insurer, and liberally in favor of the insured. This is now the settled rule for construing all kinds of insurance policies, rendered necessary, especially in modern times, to circumvent the ingenuity of the insurance companies in so framing contracts of this kind as to make the exceptions unfairly devour the whole policy.' In conformity with this rule, an examination of the subject shows that almost universal authority imposes upon the insurance company the burden of establishing the fact, in an action on an accident insurance policy, that the accident happened by reason of something that was excepted from the provisions of the policy, and that the burden is not imposed upon the insured to affirmatively show that the accident did not occur by reason of any or all of the exceptions incorporated in the policy. The rule is thus announced in 1 Cyc. 289: 'As to Accidental Character of Injury. On an issue as to whether the injury to or death of the insured was caused by accidental means, or by some cause excepted by the policy, the legal presumption is against the insanity of insured, intentional injuries by third persons, lack of due care and deligence, self-inflicted injuries, and suicide. These presumptions may be overcome, however, by facts and circumstances establishing the contrary.' Further, under the head of 'Burden of Proof:' 'The burden of proof is on plaintiff to show that the injury or death was due to accidental or other means specified in the policy. * * * (b) The burden rests on the defendant to show that the policy has been avoided by reason of a breach of some condition precedent, or that the injury or death was caused by some act which is made an exception to the risk in the policy, or that the action was not brought within the time required by the policy.'

Meadows v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. (Mo. Sup.) 31 S.W. 578, is a case almost identical in circumstances and in principle with the one at bar. There it was shown that the deceased left the depot for the purpose of boarding a freight train standing at the station, and was soon after found mangled on the railroad track; and it was held that under such proof, in the absence of other evidence, the death was accidental....