Starr v. Emory University

Decision Date15 May 1956
Docket NumberNos. 1,2,36125,Nos. 36124,s. 36124,s. 1
Citation93 Ga.App. 864,93 S.E.2d 399
PartiesMamie STARR v. EMORY UNIVERSITY. J. C. STARR v. EMORY UNIVERSITY
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court.

The petitions here, seeking recovery for injuries received by the plaintiff while a paying patient in a hospital owned and operated by the defendant, were not subject to general demurrer on the ground that the plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety, it appearing that the area of the hospital floor on which she slipped and fell was dangerously slick because one of the defendant's employees had highly buffed and polished it, and another employee had spilled some liquid which made the area more slick and dangerous, since the petitions also allege that the unsafe area was in heavy shadow from furniture on one side and a Christmas tree on another; that the room was not illuminated, and that it was impossible, because of these facts and the color of the floor, to detect the presence of any other substance on the floor without stooping over to make a minute examination thereof.

These cases represent actions filed in the Superior Court of DeKalb County by J. C. Starr and his wife, Mamie Starr, seeking damages for injuries received by the latter while a patient in the hospital of the defendant, Emory University. The petitions allege that Mrs. Starr, a patient in the hospital for purposes of observation and examination, had a bed in one of the hospital wards and, on the morning she was injured, had dressed preparatory to returning home; that the ward was about 40 by 25 feet, contained 8 beds on each side with movable curtains suspended around the beds, and an aisle 8 or 10 feet wide down the center area of the room; that in this aisle were a small library table and several chairs, also a Christmas tree about 10 or 12 feet high and 4 to 5 feet in diameter, which cast shadows on the center aisle; that the flooring was a drab black and tan squared asphalt tile; that the day was dull and overcast, there were no ceiling lights burning, and the tree and bed curtains cast heavy shadows over the aisle; that the defendant's employees had mopped and buffed the floor that morning, causing the same to become 'highly slick and dangerous'; that another employee had spilled some liquid on the floor, unknown to the plaintiff, that this liquid, 'combined with said slick and dangerous condition of said floor, made the same more hazardous, and it was impossible for plaintiff to have discovered the presence of said liquid on said area because of the shadows cast across said floor, the drawn bed curtains, and the further fact that none of the ceiling lights in said ward were burning at said time'; and also that 'the slippery and highly polished floor could not be ascertained by plaintiff and other patients, except upon very close and minute inspection,' and that 'plaintiff could not ascertain that said floor had been highly polished and that the same was very slippery and dangerous without stooping down close to the floor and making a minute and close inspection.' The trial court sustained a general demurrer to the petition, and the exception is to this judgment.

H. H. Hutchins, Lithonia, J. Hugh Rogers, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

James A. Branch, Thomas B. Branch, Jr., Atlanta, for defendant in error.

TOWNSEND, Judge.

The allegations of negligence are that (a) the defendant failed to provide safe and suitable premises for the plaintiff, a paying patient in the hospital, to walk upon or to give notice or warning of the unsafe condition; (b) the defendant, with knowledge of the defective condition of the premises, failed to warn the plaintiff as to the same; (c) defendant failed to provide adequate illumination so as to disclose the unsafe condition of the floor; (d) failed to keep the tile floor covering in a safe and unslippery condition; (e) so placed the Christmas tree as to cast shadows on the aisle; (f) so placed the beds as to cast shadows on the aisle from the curtains surrounding them; (g) so placed the table in the aisle as to cast shadows across this spot; and (h) failed to turn on the ceiling lights or otherwise illuminate the aisle.

While the duty of the owner of premises is one of exercising ordinary care for its invitees, the degree of care which constitutes ordinary care under the circumstances may vary according to the age or capacity of the invitee known to the former. 'A private hospital in which patients are placed for treatment by their physicians, and which undertakes to care for the patients and supervise and look after them, is under the duty to exercise such reasonable care in looking after and protecting a patient as the patient's condition, which is known to the hospital through its agents and servants charged with the duty of looking after and supervising the patient, may require.' Emory University v. Shadburn, 47 Ga.App. 643, 171 S.E. 192, 193, affirmed 180 Ga. 595, 180 S.E. 137; Stansfield v. Gardner, 56 Ga.App. 634, 193 S.E. 375. It is axiomatic that even a person not laboring under a disability would expect the floors of hospitals to be kept clear of slippery substances in the areas where patients are accustomed to walking because of the fact that so many of the persons using such areas are in fact under a disability. It was accordingly negligent for the defendant to allow a portion of the floor in the area between beds in a hospital ward to be polished with wax and buffed so as to become highly slick and dangerous over an area where this condition could not be ascertained 'without stooping down close to the floor and making a minute and close inspection.' It was also negligent for the defendant's employees, acting within the course of their employment, to spill a liquid on a portion of this area, 'which, combined with said slick and dangerous condition of said floor, made the floor more hazardous.' Under these circumstances, failure to have proper illumination might also be found by the jury to constitute negligence entering into the proximate cause of the injuries.

The only remaining question is whether the plaintiff, a patient in the hospital but well enough to be in the course of being discharged therefrom, was so lacking in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety as to preclude her recovery. The plaintiff alleges that the slick condition of the floor was not apparent; the spilling of the liquid was not apparent, and this was due in part to the fact that the day was cloudy, a Christmas tree on one side of the aisle and a table and chairs on the other cast deep shadows over slipperty area; the floor was of a mottled color, and the defendant failed to have its ceiling lights burning. This court has frequently held similar allegations as to the slickness of a floor resulting from the use of wax, either alone or combined with other conditions such as poor lighting, to be sufficient to state a cause of action. Bryant v. S. H. Kress & Co., 76 Ga.App. 530(1, 2), 46 S.E.2d 600; Haverty Furniture Co. v. Jewell, 38 Ga.App. 395(1, 2), 144 S.E. 46; Caroway v. City of Atlanta, 85 Ga.App. 792, 798(2), 70 S.E.2d 126, and cases therein cited. While every negligence action must in the last analysis be decided on its own particular facts, these cases contain facts more closely related to the situation here alleged than do those relied upon by the plaintiff in error, such as Mottox v. Atlanta Enterprises, Inc., 91 Ga.App. 847, 87 S.E.2d 432, where a woman descended a dark flight of stairs in a theater and tripped over some torn carpeting on which a greasy substance had been allowed to accumulate. That decision held that the plaintiff was not in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety because the petition alleged that the atairway was dark and the plaintiff could not safely descend it, but that she nevertheless continued to descend while knowing it to be unsafe. No such allegations appear in the petition here under consideration. There was nothing whatsoever, so far as appears, to warn the plaintiff that any possible defect might exist on the floor between the aisles of the hospital beds in her ward where she was a patient, or that it would be unsafe for her to traverse the area. Accordingly, the petition does not affirmatively reveal that she failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety, either in not detecting the slippery substance on the floor before stepping there or in proceeding along the floor after becoming award that it was in any manner unsafe.

Neither is this petition controlled on its facts by Holman v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 201 Ga. 454, 462, 39 S.E.2d 850, 856, cited by the defendant in error. In that case an employee descended a flight of steps leading to the employees' cafeteria and slipped as she stepped from the last step onto the waxed floor of the restaurant area. That decision is based on the fact that 'There is no allegation that she was not familiar with the floor of the cafeteria and how it was ordinarily kept, and no contention as to insufficient lights. 'An excessive and unnecessary amount of wax on the floor which should have been wiped up and removed' must have been patent and obvious; and there is no allegation that it was not.' In the present case there are full and complete allegations as to insufficient lights; there is no allegation as to excess wax, and there are statements affirmatively showing that the slick place was not patent and obvious, and that because of the shadows the highly polished floor did not appear to be such. The Holman case is based on a line of cases dealing with patent defects; this case does not fall within that group.

The assignments of error on the rulings on special demurrer are not argued, but from what has hereinabove been said it is obvious that the paragraphs objected to as conclusions are sufficient, when considered with the remaining allegations of fact in the petition,...

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5 cases
  • Emory University v. Lee
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 14 Mayo 1958
    ...v. Claxton, 62 Ga.App. 526, 533, 8 S.E.2d 657; Piedmont Hospital v. Anderson, 65 Ga.App. 491, 497, 16 S.E.2d 90; Starr v. Emory University, 93 Ga.App. 864, 866, 93 S.E.2d 399; Wills v. Emory University, 94 Ga.App. 734(1), 96 S.E.2d There was in our opinion sufficient evidence to support the......
  • Nuckles v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 21 Diciembre 2020
    ...in the record, and no other description of those documents is provided.13 Although Nuckles asserts that under Starr v. Emory University , 93 Ga. App. 864, 93 S.E.2d 399 (1956), Dempsey was merely an invitee, not an occupier, of the rehab facility, that case has no application here. In Starr......
  • Redding v. Sinclair Refining Co.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 26 Enero 1962
    ...v. Hanson, 89 Ga.App. 703, 81 S.E.2d 18; Whitsett v. Hester-Bowman Enterprises, 94 Ga.App. 78, 93 S.E.2d 788; Starr v. Emory University, 93 Ga.App. 864, 93 S.E.2d 399. Also, there are facts which may be pleaded by the plaintiff to excuse her from exercising that degree of care under the cir......
  • Butts v. Academy of Beauty, Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 12 Febrero 1968
    ...v. Rich's Inc., 86 Ga.App. 30, 70 S.E.2d 546; Whitsett v. Hester-Bowman Enterprises, 94 Ga.App. 78, 93 S.E.2d 788; Starr v. Emory University, 93 Ga.App. 864, 93 S.E.2d 399. 4. The petition alleges that plaintiff entered the defendant's premises to have her hair shampooed and set; that after......
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