State Bank of Eagle Grove v. Dougherty
| Decision Date | 19 February 1902 |
| Citation | 66 S.W. 932,167 Mo. 1 |
| Parties | STATE BANK OF EAGLE GROVE, Appellant, v. DOUGHERTY et al |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Barton Circuit Court. -- Hon. W. L. Jarrott, Acting Judge.
Reversed (with directions.)
Thurman & Wray for appellant.
(1) The right given by section 3623 to invest the proceeds of a homestead, in a new homestead, which shall possess all the immunities of the old homestead, is confined to the homestead created by the act of which that section is a part, and refers to the homestead defined by our homestead act and not a homestead created by the laws of another State. Our homestead act can not be enlarged upon by the courts. Only such property is exempt as homestead as is specially provided for by the homestead act. Stanley v. Baker, 75 Mo 60. (2) The Iowa land of the defendant, A. H. Dougherty, was sold in the fall of 1896, for the purpose and with the intention of permanently removing from that State, and all the proceeds became personalty and subject to the payment of defendant's debts in Iowa. In other words, the sale in Iowa with intent to remove to Missouri was an abandonment of defendant's homestead right under the laws of Iowa, and subjected the proceeds of the sale to execution for the payment of all debts of the defendant. Christy v Dyer, 14 Ia. 440; Davis v. Kelley, 14 Ia. 535; Cole v. Gill, 14 Ia. 530; Ellston v Robinson, 23 Ia. 208; Orman v. Orman, 26 Ia. 361; Kimball v. Wilson, 59 Ia. 638; Windle v. Brant, 55 Ia. 221; Paine v. Means, 65 Ia. 547. The sale of a homestead with the intention of removing to another State, is not only an abandonment of the homestead right in Iowa, but in every other State in the Union, and subjects the proceeds of the homestead so abandoned to the payment of existing debts. Kaes v. Gross, 92 Mo. 647; Smith v. Bunn, 75 Mo. 559; Duffy v. Willis, 99 Mo. 132; Brewing Association v. Howard, 150 Mo. 445; Conway v. Nichols, 71 N.W. 183; Willbanks v. Untriner, 98 Ga. 801; Kuhnert v. Conrad, 69 N.W. 185; Carrigan v. Rowell, 96 Tenn. 185. (3) Homestead exemptions laws are purely statutory and are limited in their operation to the territory of the State creating them. These have no extraterritorial force. One State will not give effect to the exemption laws of another State. Thompson on Homestead, sec. 20; Smith on Homestead, sec. 526; Baykin v. Edwards, 21 Ala. 261; Morgan v. Neville, 74 Pa. St. 52; Newell v. Hayden, 8 Ia. 140; Helfenstein v. Cave, 3 Ia. 287; Railroad v. May, 25 Ohio St. 347. (4) The proceeds of a homestead in one State are not impressed with homestead exemptions when carried to and invested in another State so as to exempt them from payment of judgments of such other State. Rogers v. Raisor, 60 Ia. 355; Dalton v. Webb, 83 Ia. 479.
H. W. Timmonds for respondents.
(1) An exempt homestead in one State may be exchanged for an exempt homestead in another State. Stinde v. Behrens, 81 Mo. 254; Keyes v. Rines, 37 Vt. 260. In Iowa a homestead is the homestead of "the family," whether the title be in the husband or wife. Iowa Stat., sec. 1988. It could not be conveyed or incumbered without the concurrence of husband and wife. Ibid, sec. 1990. Its limits could be exchanged from time to time, or it might be changed entirely; but an entire change, without the concurrence of husband and wife, could not affect the rights of the husband or wife or those of the children. Ibid, sec. 2000; State v. Gaddis, 44 Iowa 537; Benham v. Chamberlain, 39 Iowa 358; Pearson v. Minturn, 18 Iowa 36; Sargent v. Chubbuck, 19 Iowa 37; Harsh v. Griffin, 72 Iowa 608; Drake v. Painter, 77 Iowa 731; Guinn v. Giller, 101 Iowa 333. (2) Where an Iowa homestead is sold, the proceeds thereof are protected from seizure by creditors. State v. Gaddis, 44 Iowa 537; Schuttloffel v. Collins, 98 Iowa 576. And this protection is guaranteed to debtors in quite a number of other States. Simpson v. Biffle, 63 Ark. 289; Watson v. Saxer, 102 Ill. 585; Brenneke v. Duigenan, 6 Kan.App. 229; Cooper v. Arnett, 95 Ky. 603; Airey v. Buchanan, 64 Miss. 181; Corey v. Plummer, 48 Neb. 481; Hewitt v. Allen, 54 Wis. 583; Bailey v. Stearn, 70 Wis. 316; Clancey v. Alme, 98 Wis. 229; Womack v. Stokes, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 648; Ins. Co. v. Chase, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 13; Keyes v. Rines, 37 Vt. 260; Nat. Bank v. Kilgore, 43 S.W. 565. (3) The wife had a vested right in the Iowa homestead, and in the proceeds thereof, which may be paid to her or reinvested in another homestead for her and the children, free from seizure and sale for the debts of her husband. Iowa Stat., secs. 1988, 1990, 1998, 2000; Schuttloffel v. Collins, supra; Helm v. Helm, 11 Kan. 19; Coughlin v. Coughlin, 26 Kan. 116; Stinde v. Behrens, supra; Nance v. Nance, 28 Ill.App. 587; Blum v. Light, 81 Tex. 414; Gatewood v. Scurlock, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 98. (4) Under "that enlightened comity existing between sister States," the courts of one State have been protecting citizens of a sister State by enforcing in his favor the exemption laws of his State. Mason v. Bebee, 44 F. 556; Teager v. Landsley, 69 Iowa 725; Railroad v. Cunningham, 7 Kan.App. 268; Railroad v. Gough, 35 Kan. 1; Drake v. Railroad, 69 Mich. 168; Railroad v. Smith, 70 Miss. 344; Wright v. Railroad, 19 Neb. 175; Railroad v. Moore, 31 Neb. 629; Singer Co. v. Fleming, 39 Neb. 679; Martin v. Railroad, 50 Hun (N. Y.) 347; Pierce v. Railroad, 36 Wis. 283. (5) "The homestead was not established for the benefit of the husband alone, but for the benefit of the family and society -- to protect the family from destitution and society from the danger of her citizens becoming paupers." Morris v. Ward, 5 Kan. 239. Missouri courts have never lost sight of the humane character and beneficent object of exemption laws, and have always been as liberal as the law toward the family of a poor debtor. Blandy v. Asher, 72 Mo. 27; Finnegan v. Prindeville, 83 Mo. 517; Creath v. Dale, 84 Mo. 349; Smith v. Enos, 91 Mo. 579; Goode v. Lewis, 118 Mo. 357; Macke v. Byrd, 131 Mo. 682; Ailey v. Burnett, 134 Mo. 313.
On November 6, 1895, the defendant, A. H. Dougherty, became indebted to the plaintiff bank on a promissory note on which the bank obtained judgment against him in the Barton Circuit Court for the sum of $ 273.30 at the January term of said court, 1898.
At the time this indebtedness was incurred the said defendant owned three hundred and twenty acres of land in Iowa on which he resided with his family, and which he afterwards sold, and invested $ 2,000 of the proceeds thereof in the eighty-acre tract in Barton county described in the petition, his deed for which was filed for record on March 7, 1896, about which time he moved with his family on said eighty-acre tract and has ever since occupied the same as a homestead. Afterwards on August 25, 1897, he conveyed the same by deed to his co-defendant, Napper, who on the same day by deed conveyed the same to the defendant, Mary N. Dougherty, wife of the said A. H. Dougherty. These deeds were duly executed, acknowledged and recorded, but were without consideration, and this suit is brought to set them aside and subject the land to the payment of plaintiff's judgment. On the facts the judgment was for the defendant and the plaintiff appeals.
The only question in the case is, Is the Barton county homestead exempt from execution on plaintiff's judgment by reason of the fact that it was bought with the proceeds of land in Iowa, in which the defendant Dougherty under the laws of that State had a homestead? The plaintiff's cause of action having accrued before the said defendant acquired the Barton county homestead, and before his deed therefor was filed for record, it was subject to execution upon the judgment (R. S. 1899, sec. 3622), unless exempted therefrom by the provisions of section 3622, Revised Statutes 1899, by which it is provided that, "Whenever such housekeeper or head of a family shall acquire another homestead in the manner provided in section 3622, the prior homestead shall thereupon be liable for his debts, but such other homestead shall not be liable for causes of action against him to which such prior homestead would not have been liable: Provided, that such other homestead shall have been acquired with the consideration derived from the sale or other disposition of such prior homestead."
The right of homestead is purely a creature of statute, and while such a right has been created by statute in all or most of the States, such statutes can have no extraterritorial force and must be construed to apply to homesteads within the State of the enactment. The section quoted is a part of the chapter entitled "Homesteads," by which such right is created in this State. The Legislature in section 3623, is dealing with homesteads in Missouri, two of them, a prior and a subsequent one, acquired in accordance with the provision of that act. The prior homestead which is to become subject to the housekeeper's debts is a homestead in Missouri and the subsequent one acquired with the consideration derived from the sale of the prior one, is a homestead in Missouri, which is not to be liable for debts to which the prior homestead in Missouri would not have been liable. With a prior homestead in Iowa or any other State this statute has nothing to do. Of course the Legislature never attempted to subject a prior homestead in Iowa or any other State to a housekeeper's debts, or intended to make the liability of a subsequent homestead in Missouri depend upon the liability of a prior homestead in another State. Upon no principle of statutory construction or interstate comity, so eloquently invoked by counsel for respondent, could the homestead laws of Iowa have that effect, as is well illustrated by the decisions of the Supreme Court of...
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