State Bar of Ariz. v. Lang

• Decision Date: 29 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA–CV 12–0629.,1 CA–CV 12–0629.
• Citation: 685 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 14,234 Ariz. 457,323 P.3d 740
• Parties: STATE Bar of Arizona, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Randy D. LANG, Defendant/Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

234 Ariz. 457

323 P.3d 740

685 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 14

STATE Bar of Arizona, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.Randy D. LANG, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA–CV 12–0629.

Court of Appeals of Arizona,

Division 1.

April 29, 2014.

State Bar of Arizona, Phoenix, By Edward W. Parker, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee.

Arthur P. Allsworth, Attorney at Law, Phoenix, By Arthur P. Allsworth, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant.

Presiding Judge PETER B. SWANN delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Judge PATRICIA K. NORRIS and Chief Judge DIANE M. JOHNSEN joined.

OPINION

SWANN, Judge.

¶ 1 Randy D. Lang, a nonmember of the State Bar of Arizona, was enjoined from practicing law in Arizona based on evidence that he repeatedly engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. We hold that a person who presents himself as an attorney based in an Arizona office engages in the unauthorized practice of law unless he has been admitted to practice before the Arizona Supreme Court, even if he has been admitted to practice in a tribal court within the boundaries of Arizona. The supreme court rules that compel this conclusion violate neither the First Amendment nor principles of tribal sovereignty. We further conclude that the superior court properly granted the State Bar of Arizona's motion for summary judgment, and that the injunction is reasonable in its scope. We therefore affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Lang holds a law degree and is admitted to practice law in the San Carlos Apache Tribal Court. He has never been admitted to the practice of law by the Arizona Supreme Court, and he is not a certified legal document preparer under section 7–208 of the Arizona Code of Judicial Administration.

¶ 3 From 2007 to 2009, the Bar, which is tasked under Ariz. R. Sup.Ct. 32(a) with regulating and disciplining persons engaged in the practice of law in Arizona, received a series of reports that Lang had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Upon receiving each report, the Bar notified Lang and demanded that he cease any activity defined as the practice of law in Arizona. When Lang did not comply with these demands, the Bar commenced an action against him in the superior court. In its amended complaint, the Bar alleged five counts of unauthorized practice of law and argued that an injunction was necessary to prevent Lang from continuing his unlawful conduct. Lang answered and asserted a counterclaim that was later dismissed for failure to prosecute.

¶ 4 In September 2011, the Bar moved for summary judgment on three counts of its complaint and notified the court that it wished to voluntarily withdraw the remaining two. Lang objected to the Bar's motion and filed a motion to dismiss Counts 1, 4, and 5 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He also objected to the Bar's request to withdraw Counts 2 and 3, arguing that the request did not state adequate legal reason for dismissal under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 41(a). Lang then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment in which he sought dismissal of Counts 2 and 3 with prejudice. The Bar agreed to dismissal of Counts 2 and 3 with prejudice, and the court entered an order to that effect. With respect to the remaining counts, the undisputed evidence showed the following.

I. COUNT 1

¶ 5 In September 2006, Lang entered an “Attorney–Client Agreement” with T.M., a former professional boxer. The agreement was printed on letterhead that showed Lang's name, the name “Integrated Legal Services & Associates,” an Arizona address not located on the San Carlos Apache reservation, and Arizona fax and phone numbers, including an “Office” number. The agreement provided that “Attorney Lang agrees to provide attorney services to Boxer [T.M.] as his personal attorney and counselary on a worldwide basis on all matters concerning Boxer [T.M.]” and that “Boxer [T.M.] acknowledges and understands that Attorney Lang is engaged in international business and law and is a licensed practicing attorney in various international for[u]ms, that Attorney Lang is not licensed with any state Bar of the United States, and that Attorney Lang practices in limited federal jurisdictions and may appear in any state court proceedings with permission from the court.” Lang signed the contract as “Attorney.”

¶ 6 According to Lang, he then acted “as scrivener” for contracts that T.M. entered with an athletic trainer and a Nevada-based promotional company. In an e-mail to the promotional company, Lang identified himself as T.M.'s “personal attorney,” stated that he had “reviewed the Agreement with Mr. [T.M.] line by line,” and requested changes to the contract. Lang signed both the promotional contract and the training contract as T.M.'s “attorney,” the promotional contract identified Lang's Arizona address, and the training contract repeatedly referred to Lang as “Attorney Lang” and provided that Lang would represent T.M. in any disputes.

¶ 7 Lang also e-mailed and mailed a Nevada assistant attorney general on T.M.'s behalf. In the e-mail, Lang identified himself as T.M.'s “attorney” and “Personal Attorney,” stated legal arguments and opinions concerning a report that showed Nevada's denial of T.M.'s boxing license, and demanded that the report be amended. In the mailed letter, Lang again demanded that the license report be amended, threatened legal action, and signed as T.M/s “Personal Attorney.” The letter was printed on “I.L.S. & Associates” letterhead that identified Lang as “Attorney” and gave an Arizona address, phone number, and fax number. Using similar letterhead, Lang again identified himself as T.M/s “personal attorney” in a letter that he wrote to the Missouri parole board regarding T.M/s incarcerated brother.

II. COUNT 4

¶ 8 In March 2008, Lang met with S.J. in Arizona and agreed to represent S.J., a Washington resident, in a federal employment law matter. In connection with that representation, Lang drafted a notice of appeal in which he identified himself as S.J/s “Attorney,” “Personal Attorney,” and “counsel,” and indicated that he worked for I.L.S. & Associates in Arizona. I.L.S. & Associates charged S.J. an initial consultation fee and a flat-fee retainer for “Legal Service.”

¶ 9 Lang also wrote a settlement letter on S.J/s behalf in connection with a dispute arising from a Washington real estate transaction. The letter was addressed to a Washington attorney and was printed on “I.L.S. & Associates” letterhead that identified Lang as “Attorney” and gave Arizona contact information, including an “Ofc.” phone number.

III. COUNT 5

¶ 10 In July 2008, Lang entered an “Attorney–Client Fee Agreement” with J.C., a California resident, by which “DPL, Inc.” agreed to provide “legal services.” The agreement was prepared by Lang's assistant, who had also helped him to form an Arizona corporation named “Debt Protection, Inc.” The agreement was printed on “Debt Protection Legal, Inc.” letterhead that showed an Arizona address not on the reservation, toll-free office phone and fax numbers, and an Arizona mobile number for the “Managing Attorney,” who was identified in the signature block as Lang.

¶ 11 In representing J.C., Lang wrote a letter to a California loan consultant for the purpose of disputing debt attributed to J.C. The letter was printed on “Debt Protection Law, P.C.” letterhead that showed a California address, toll-free office phone and fax numbers, and an Arizona phone and fax number for “Senior Managing Attorney” Lang. Lang stated in the letter that his “law firm” represented J.C., and he signed the letter “For the Firm.”

¶ 12 After considering the evidence and holding oral argument, the superior court denied Lang's motion to dismiss Counts 1, 4, and 5 and granted summary judgment for the Bar on all three counts. The court ordered restitution to S.J. and J.C. and entered a permanent injunction restraining Lang from performing acts constituting the practice of law in Arizona. Lang timely appeals.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

¶ 13 As an initial matter, Lang asserts that we may not have jurisdiction over this appeal because the order dismissing Counts 2 and 3 was not signed and, over his objection, the signed judgment did not mention the dismissal or include Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(b) language. Lang's assertion has no merit. The order of dismissal preceded the judgment, and the judgment resolved all claims remaining in the case. Rule 54(b) therefore does not apply. The judgment is a final appealable order that allows appellate review of “any intermediate orders involving the merits of the action and necessarily affecting the judgment, and all orders and rulings assigned as error.” A.R.S. §§ 12–2102(A); see 12–120.22(A). We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12–2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶ 14 Lang contends that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider his conduct, that summary judgment was not warranted based on the undisputed evidence, and that the injunction is overbroad. We review challenges to subject matter jurisdiction and questions involving the application and interpretation of court rules de novo. Duckstein v. Wolf, 230 Ariz. 227, 231, ¶ 8, 282 P.3d 428, 432 (App.2012). We also review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Lang. See Andrews v. Blake, 205 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶ 12, 69 P.3d 7, 11 (2003). We review the scope of an injunction for abuse of discretion. See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, 187, ¶ 51, 181 P.3d 219, 234 (App.2008).

I. THE SUPERIOR COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE BAR'S AMENDED COMPLAINT.

¶ 15 The Arizona Constitution gives our supreme court exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law in Arizona. In re Creasy, 198 Ariz. 539, 541, ¶ 6, 12 P.3d 214, 216 (2000). The supreme court has disciplinary jurisdiction over individuals who are not members of the Arizona Bar but are licensed to practice law in a different state or possession of the United States and have engaged in the...