State Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Blocker

• Decision Date: 15 December 1932
• Docket Number: 8963.
• Citation: 167 S.E. 298,176 Ga. 125
• Parties: STATE BOARD OF BARBER EXAMINERS et al. v. BLOCKER et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

167 S.E. 298

176 Ga. 125

STATE BOARD OF BARBER EXAMINERS et al. v. BLOCKER et al.

No. 8963.

Supreme Court of Georgia

December 15, 1932

Syllabus by the Court.

"Beauticians beauty culturists, beauty-culture specialists, hairdressers and operators of beauty shops" held "barbers," within statutory definition, making them subject to regulations governing "barbering" (Laws 1914, p. 75, § 2, as amended by Laws 1931, p. 159, § 2).

Laws 1914, p. 75, § 2, as amended by Laws 1931, p. 159, § 2 defining a "barber," provides that to shave or trim the beard, cut or dress the hair, to give facial or scalp massaging, facial or scalp treatment with oils or creams and other preparations made for this purpose, either by hand or mechanical appliances, to singe and shampoo the hair, or to dye the hair of any living person, for hire or pay, shall be considered as practicing the profession of a "barber" within the meaning of the act.

Act, amending statute regulating barbers, defining barbers so as to include "beauticians," etc., held not unconstitutional as containing different matter in body from that expressed in caption because omitting specific reference to "beauticians," etc., in caption (Laws 1914, p. 75, as amended by Laws 1931, p. 157; Const. art. 3, § 7, par. 8).

Act amending statute regulating barbers held not unconstitutional as denying due process (Laws 1914, p. 75, as amended by Laws 1931, p. 157; Const. U.S. Amend. 14; Const. Ga. art. 1, § 1, par. 3).

Act amending statute regulating barbers held not unconstitutional as denying equal protection (Laws 1914, p. 75, as amended by Laws 1931, p. 157; Const. U.S. Amend. 14).

Act amending statute regulating barbers held not unconstitutional as impairing obligation of contracts (Laws 1914, p. 75, as amended by Laws 1931, p. 157; Const. art. 1, § 3, par. 2).

1. The act of 1931 (Ga. Laws 1931, pp. 157, 159, § 2), amending the act of 1914 (Ga. Laws 1914, p. 75, § 2), defining a barber, is as follows: "To shave or trim the beard, cut or dress the hair, to give facial or scalp massaging, facial or scalp treatment with oils or creams and other preparations made for this purpose, either by hand or mechanical applicances, to singe and shampoo the hair, or to dye the hair of any living person, for hire or pay, shall be considered as practicing the profession of a barber within the meaning of this act." The foregoing definition of a barber is broad enough to include the plaintiffs, who allege themselves to be "beauticians, beauty culturists, beauty-culture specialists, hairdressers, and operators of beauty shops."

2. The act just cited is not unconstitutional for the reason that the body thereof contains matter different from what is expressed in the caption (Const. art. 3, § 7, par. 8). Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588, 110 S.E. 726, 20 A.L.R. 1105; Wright v. Fulton County, 169 Ga. 354, 150 S.E. 262; Banks v. State, 124 Ga. 15, 52 S.E. 74, 2 L.R.A. (N. S.) 1007; Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686 (8), 30 S.E. 759, 42 L.R.A. 181; Maynard v. Marshall, 91 Ga. 840, 18 S.E. 403; Wilson v. Dalton, 135 Ga. 240, 69 S.E. 163; McGruder v. State, 83 Ga. 616, 10 S.E. 281.

3. The act of 1931 is not unconstitutional as violative of the due process clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions, or as denying the equal protection of the laws (Const. U.S. Amend. 14; Const. Ga. art. 1, § 1, par. 3). Cooper v. Rollins, supra.

4. The act of 1931 does not violate the constitutional provision (article 1, § 3, par. 2) which declares that no law shall pass which impairs the obligation of contracts.

5. Other constitutional questions not specifically dealt with, where sufficiently raised, are without merit.

6. The court erred in overruling the demurrer and in granting the interlocutory injunction.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; Edgar E. Pomeroy, Judge.

Equitable petition by Ruth Blocker and another against C. A. Morrison and others, as the State Board of Barber Examiners, and others. General demurrer to the petition was overruled, and defendants bring error.

Reversed.

W. K. Meadow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Geo. M. Napier, Atty. Gen., T. R. Gress, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Lawrence S. Camp, former Atty. Gen., for plaintiffs in error.

Jones, Fuller, Russell & Clapp and W. A. McClain, all of Atlanta, for defendants in error.

HILL J.

Mrs. Ruth Blocker and Mrs. Lola McKee brought an equitable petition against C. A. Morrison, H. W. Kitchens, and P. A. Meyer, as the state board of barber examiners, R. C. Coleman, general secretary of examining boards of Georgia, John Wilson, secretary of state of Georgia, alleging, among other things, that plaintiffs will suffer a loss of time and incur burdensome expenses in their business and will be deprived of the opportunity of complying with their contracts with their employers to perform their services, and the loss to the plaintiffs will be irreparable, unless the defendants are enjoined; and they pray that the defendants be enjoined from enforcing or taking any steps whatsoever to enforce the provisions of the Barbers Act of 1931 as applied to the plaintiffs, the rules and regulations promulgated by the board of barber examiners of Georgia, and from levying tax executions, or from arresting the plaintiffs or their employees and all others similarly situated, or from prosecuting the plaintiffs or their employees, or from interfering with the operations of plaintiffs and their employees in any manner whatsoever; and that the Barbers Act of 1931 be declared unconstitutional and void, etc. A general demurrer to the petition was overruled by the court, and the defendants excepted.

The first act passed by the Legislature of Georgia regulating the occupation of "barbering" was in 1914 (Ga. Laws 1914, p. 75). The caption of that act is: "An Act to regulate the practice of the occupation of a barber in certain cities within the State of Georgia and to provide for the registering and licensing of persons to carry on such practice and to insure the proper sanitary conditions in barber shops, and prevent the spreading of disease in the State of Georgia, to establish a State board of barber examiners, to carry out the purposes of this Act. To make any penal violations of the terms of this Act, and to prescribe punishments therefor and for other purposes." This court in Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588, 110 S.E. 726, 20 A.L.R. 1105, declared that act constitutional. Similar attacks are made upon the amendatory act of 1931 as were made on the act of 1914; and the principles there ruled with respect to those attacks are controlling in the instant case. Other attacks on the constitutionality of the act of 1931 are without merit. In the Cooper Case, this court held: "1. This court will not declare an act of the Legislature unconstitutional, unless the conflict between the act and the Constitution is clear and palpable. 2. What trades or occupations shall be regulated, and the nature and extent of the regulations to be applied, are questions for the Legislature to determine, and fall within the proper exercise of the police power of the state; and, unless the regulations are so unreasonable and extravagant that the property or personal rights of the citizen are unnecessarily and arbitrarily interfered with, without due process of law, they do not extend beyond the power of the state to pass. 3. The act of the Legislature 'regulating the occupation of barbers,' approved August 17, 1914 (Acts 1914, p. 75), as amended by the act of 1920 (Acts 1920, p. 109), is not unconstitutional, (a) because it violates the provision of our state Constitution (art. 1, § 4, par. 1), which provides that 'laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the state,' or (b) because it violates the equal-protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and of the Constitution of this state." The caption of the act of 1931, amendatory of the act of 1914 (Ga. Laws 1931, p. 157), after setting out in full the title of the act of 1914, proceeds to state the various provisions of the act, including the following: "and defining the practice of barbering." The act of 1914 thus defines a barber: "Be it further enacted that to shave any living person, or trim the beard, or cut or dress the hair of any such person for hire or pay to the person performing any such services or to any other person, shall be construed as practicing the occupation of barbering within the meaning of this Act." Section 2. The act of 1931 gives the following definition: "Be it further enacted that section 2 of said Act be and the same is hereby repealed, and the following definition substituted therefor, to wit: 'To shave or trim the beard, cut or dress the hair, to give facial or scalp massaging, facial or scalp treatment with oils or creams and other preparations made for this purpose, either by hand or mechanical appliances, to singe and shampoo the hair, or to dye the hair of any living person for hire or pay, shall be considered as practicing the profession of a barber within the meaning of this Act."' Section 2.

In arriving at the meaning of the words of an act we must ascertain, if possible, the legislative intent. This legislative intent by amending the act of 1914 appears to be to remove any doubt, if any existed, as to hairdressing and any other feature of barbering which is a specialized branch of that vocation. What other purpose or intent could the Legislature have had than to put beyond question what the language of the act of 1914 meant? In Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. State, 104 Ga. 831, 31 S.E. 531, 533, 42 L.R.A. 518, this court said: "A legislative body should always be presumed to mean something by the passage of an act. *** It would be difficult to conceive...