State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Stjernholm

• Decision Date: 07 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96SC44,96SC44
• Citation: 935 P.2d 959
• Parties: 21 Colorado Journal 506 STATE BOARD OF CHIROPRACTIC EXAMINERS; Dr. William Dold, in his official capacity; Dr. Richard Ratliff, in his official capacity; Dr. Melanie Tiahrt, in her official capacity; Michelle M. Lucero, in her official capacity; Dr. Randy Baca, in his official capacity; Linda K. Baker, individually and in her official capacity; and the State of Colorado, Petitioners, v. Alvin STJERNHOLM, D.C., and Elsie Stjernholm, Respondents.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 959

935 P.2d 959

21 Colorado Journal 506

STATE BOARD OF CHIROPRACTIC EXAMINERS; Dr. William Dold, in his official capacity; Dr. Richard Ratliff, in his official capacity; Dr. Melanie Tiahrt, in her official capacity Michelle M. Lucero, in her official capacity; Dr. Randy Baca, in his official capacity; Linda K. Baker individually and in her official capacity; and the State of Colorado, Petitioners, v. Alvin STJERNHOLM, D.C., and Elsie Stjernholm, Respondents.

No. 96SC44.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

April 7, 1997.

Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Thomas J. Lyons, Pamela Skelton, Malcolm S. Mead, Denver, for Petitioners State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, Dr. William Dold, Dr. Richard Ratliff, Dr. Melanie Tiahrt, Michelle M. Lucero, Dr. Randy Baca, and the State of Colorado.

Wood, Ris & Hames, P.C., F. Michael Ludwig, David M. Dodero, Denver, for Petitioner Linda K. Baker.

Irvin M. Kent, Greenwood Village, for Respondents.

Justice HOBBS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review whether the court of appeals was correct in determining res judicata to be inapplicable to this case and in ordering trial of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (section 1983) claims of the plaintiffs-respondents, Dr. Alvin and Ms. Elsie Stjernholm, ¹ against the State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, and William Dold, Richard Ratliff, Melanie Tiahrt, Michelle Lucero, and Randy Baca, in their official capacities (collectively "the Board"). The court of appeals also ordered trial of Stjernholm's section 1983 claim against Assistant Attorney General Linda Baker who prosecuted the state's case for suspension of the doctor's license in the quasi-adjudicatory disciplinary proceeding. ² We reverse and remand with directions to the court of appeals to reinstate the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint.

I.

This case arises out of a summary license suspension which the Board imposed on Dr. Stjernholm (Stjernholm) in the course of a quasi-judicial disciplinary proceeding under the Chiropractic Act, section 12-33-119, 5A C.R.S. (1991 & 1996 Supp.). Three administrative disciplinary proceedings, two section 1983 actions, and three decisions of the court of appeals involving the Board and Stjernholm precede our decision.

In 1987, the Board brought disciplinary proceedings against Stjernholm, a chiropractic doctor, for record keeping violations. In its Final Agency Order of December 15, 1987, the Board placed Stjernholm on probation for six months and ordered him, inter alia, to obtain a records monitor to review his patient records. In a second disciplinary proceeding, the Board found that Stjernholm had disobeyed the previous Final Agency Order of 1987 ordering him to secure a records monitor and, in an order dated July 7, 1989, the Board suspended Stjernholm's license to practice for ninety days. That order did not become effective until October 5, 1989, and apparently became final without Stjernholm filing an Administrative Procedure Act judicial review action. Stjernholm did file an action in district court against the Board, arguing that suspension of his license was in violation of section 1983. The Board filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because the Board was not a "person" for purposes of section 1983. The district court agreed and dismissed the action. The court of appeals affirmed that decision in Stjernholm v. Colorado State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 820 P.2d 1166, 1167 (Colo.App.1991) (Stjernholm I ).

A third disciplinary proceeding ensued. In November 1989, on its own motion, the Board commenced an investigation of a possible violation by Stjernholm of the Board's July 7, 1989 suspension order. According to the findings of fact entered by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which were part of the record in Stjernholm v. Colorado State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 865 P.2d 853 (Colo.App.1993) (Stjernholm II ), and are included in the record of this section 1983 action, Mary Gorham and other persons not named in the action before us acted as investigators for the Board in this investigation. In response to a request by Gorham, Attorney Baker of the Attorney General's Office (Baker) supplied Gorham with names of persons and organizations who might possess pertinent information. But Baker did not conduct or participate actively in this investigation.

Nearly a year later, on December 6, 1990, the Board voted to summarily suspend Stjernholm's license to practice for violations of the earlier suspension order and directed Baker to prepare the necessary pleadings, including the Order of Summary Suspension, and other advocatory actions in the disciplinary proceedings. The Board issued its Order of Summary Suspension on February 8, 1991. The Board's order recited that it had reasonable grounds to believe that Stjernholm "has been guilty of deliberate and willful violation of the Chiropractic Practice Act" within the ambit of section 24-4-104(4), 10A C.R.S. (1988), of the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA) regarding summary license suspension. The Board, however, did not enter a finding under the Chiropractic Act, § 12-33-119(5), 5A C.R.S. (1991), and the APA, § 24-4-104(4), that there existed an emergency justifying the summary license suspension.

After suspending Stjernholm's license, the Board then caused an adjudicatory hearing ³ to be held before an ALJ, who held a five day hearing in May and then issued her Initial Decision in June of 1991. The ALJ found that Stjernholm had violated the Board's July 7, 1989 Order, and section 12-33- 117(1)(f), 5A C.R.S. (1991), of the Chiropractic Act, ⁴ by sending a letter on his office letterhead to an insurance company for a patient while under suspension. However, the ALJ considered this violation to be relatively insignificant and recommended to the Board that Stjernholm not receive additional discipline.

By its Final Agency Order of December 20, 1991, the Board adopted the ALJ's findings of fact. The Board found that Stjernholm had violated section 12-33-117(1)(b), 5A C.R.S. (1991), of the Chiropractic Act, ⁵ which provides for revocation or suspension of a chiropractic license based on "[u]nprofessional, incompetent, or negligent conduct." The Board determined that Stjernholm had acted unprofessionally by practicing while under the prior suspension and by failing to secure a records monitor, as the Board had ordered. Agreeing with the ALJ's recommendation, the Board did not impose any further disciplinary sanction against Stjernholm. The Board also acted to lift the previously imposed summary suspension pending review of its agency actions.

Under the judicial review provisions of the APA, § 24-4-106(11), 10A C.R.S. (1988), Stjernholm appealed the Board's summary suspension order and its Final Agency Order to the court of appeals alleging that (1) the Board had acted contrary to law in summarily suspending Stjernholm's license, and (2) the Board had erred in finding that he had engaged in unprofessional, incompetent, or negligent conduct for practicing while under the prior suspension and failing to secure a records monitor. ⁶ In Stjernholm II, 865 P.2d at 856, the court of appeals upheld the Board's unprofessional conduct determination but also held that the Board did not have authority to summarily suspend Stjernholm's license without a finding of emergency.

Interpreting section 24-4-104(4) of the APA and section 12-33-119(5) of the Chiropractic Act, the court of appeals concluded that these sections, when read in conjunction, do not provide for summary license suspension merely for a deliberate and wanton violation of the Chiropractic Act. Rather, summary suspension by the Board must also be accompanied by a finding of emergency justifying license suspension in the interest of the public health, safety, or welfare. See Stjernholm II, 865 P.2d at 855. ⁷ Because the Board made no finding justifying emergency action in the issuance of the suspension, the court set aside the suspension: "We hold that, in construing the two sections together, the Chiropractic Act does not provide for summary license suspension for a deliberate and willful violation of the act, but rather limits summary suspension to those situations in which the public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency action." Id. at 855.

Prior to the resolution of Stjernholm II, and approximately two weeks before the Board issued its Final Agency Order lifting the summary suspension, Stjernholm filed his second section 1983 action, this case, against the Board and Baker in district court. The second amended complaint, at issue here, seeks the following relief against the Board for violation of federal constitutional rights and section 1983:(1) injunctive relief preventing continuous irreparable injury for violating Stjernholm's due process rights; (2) declaratory relief holding unconstitutional the summary suspension of Stjernholm's license to practice; (3) declaratory relief determining that section 24-4-104(4) is unconstitutional and that the Board's actions are in violation of section 1983; and (4) declaratory relief determining that section 24-4-104(4) as applied to Stjernholm is unconstitutional and in violation of section 1983.

With respect to Baker, Stjernholm alleged the following three claims for relief: (1) Baker had violated Stjernholm's constitutional rights through her investigation of him in violation of section 1983; (2) Baker owed him compensatory and punitive damages for malicious prosecution in violation of section 1983; and (3) Baker owed him compensatory and punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Both the Board and Baker filed motions for summary judgment; on July 27, 1993, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and against Stjernholm on all claims, and dismissed the complaint. Stjernholm filed a notice of appeal with the court of...