State By and Through New Bern Child Support Agency ex rel. Lewis v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 28 August 1984
• Docket Number: No. 391PA83,391PA83
• Citation: 311 N.C. 727,319 S.E.2d 145
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina By and Through its NEW BERN CHILD SUPPORT AGENCY, ex rel., Sadie W. LEWIS v. James Daniel LEWIS.

Page 145

319 S.E.2d 145

311 N.C. 727

STATE of North Carolina By and Through its NEW BERN CHILD SUPPORT AGENCY, ex rel., Sadie W. LEWIS v. James Daniel LEWIS.

No. 391PA83.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Aug. 28, 1984.

Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. by Lemuel W. Hinton and Clifton H. Duke, Asst. Attys. Gen., Raleigh, Charles H. Turner, Jr., Havelock, for the State.

Mason & Phillips, P.A. by L. Patten Mason, Morehead City, for defendant-appellant.

EXUM, Justice.

The issue raised in this appeal is whether defendant's criminal conviction for the willful neglect of and refusal to support his minor children estops him from relitigating the issue of paternity in a subsequent civil action. We hold the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars defendant from relitigating the paternity issue and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I.

In 1976 defendant, James Daniel Lewis, was charged under N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-322 with the willful neglect of and refusal to support his four minor children, then ages sixteen, fourteen, ten and seven. After a nonjury trial upon defendant's plea of not guilty, Judge J.W. Roberts found defendant guilty. On 27 April 1976 Judge Roberts entered judgment against defendant, ordering him to pay $50 to the clerk of the superior court for the use and benefit of Sadie Lewis, the children's mother, and court costs, and placing defendant on probation for five years on the condition that he remain gainfully employed full-time and pay $45 per week to the clerk's office for the support of his children. ¹

On 15 October 1976 Sadie Lewis instituted a civil action against defendant for divorce from bed and board, custody of four children, and child support. When defendant failed to answer, a default judgment was entered against him which provided, among other things, that he pay $75 per week as child support. A show cause order was subsequently entered requiring defendant to appear and explain why he should not be held in contempt for failure to comply with the terms of the default judgment. Defendant successfully moved to vacate the default judgment due to a failure of service of process. Defendant then filed an answer, alleging that he was not the father of the four children and requesting blood grouping tests.

On 14 January 1981 the state, through its New Bern Child Support Agency, filed the complaint which initiated the present case. The state sought indemnification for public assistance which it had paid for the support of the two youngest minor children allegedly born to defendant and Sadie Lewis and an order directing defendant to provide continuing support. ² Defendant answered the state's complaint and alleged that he was not the father of these two minor children, requested blood grouping tests, and counterclaimed for reimbursement of child support payments he previously had paid the state. The state moved to dismiss defendant's counterclaim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and requested the court to deny defendant's motion for blood grouping tests. The state contended that defendant's prior conviction for willful neglect of and refusal to support these children estopped him from denying paternity.

After a hearing on this motion, the trial court held that defendant was estopped from denying paternity of the two minor children, dismissed defendant's counterclaim, dismissed the state's claim for back support, and ordered defendant to pay $22.50 each week for the support of the two minor children.

Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of defendant's counterclaims and the denial of the defendant's request for blood grouping tests. ³ We allowed defendant's petition for discretionary review on 3 November 1983.

II.

We must decide whether defendant is estopped from raising the issue of paternity in this civil action by his prior conviction under N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-322 for willful neglect of and refusal to support the same children whose paternity he now questions. A determination of this issue involves both the notions of res judicata and collateral estoppel. We have previously defined these terms as follows:

Res judicata deals with the effect of a former judgment in favor of a party upon a subsequent attempt by the other party to relitigate the same cause of action. In Masters v. Dunstan, 256 N.C. 520, 124 S.E.2d 574 (1962), this Court stated:

' "It is fundamental that a final judgment, rendered on the merits, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of rights, questions and facts in issue, as to the parties and privies, in all other actions involving the same matter." Bryant v. Shields, 220 N.C. 628, 18 S.E.2d 157. "... [W]hen a fact has been agreed upon or decided in a court of record, neither of the parties shall be allowed to call it in question, and have it tried over again at any time thereafter, so long as the judgment or decree stands unreversed." Humphrey v. Faison, 247 N.C. 127, 100 S.E.2d 524, citing and quoting Armfield v. Moore, 44 N.C. 157.

'An estoppel by judgment arises when there has been a final judgment or decree, necessarily determining a fact, question or right in issue, rendered by a court of record and of competent jurisdiction, and there is a later suit involving an issue as to the identical fact, question or right theretofore determined, and involving identical parties or parties in privity with a party or parties to the prior suit. Cannon v. Cannon, 223 N.C. 664, 28 S.E.2d 240; Distributing Co. v. Carraway, 196 N.C. 58, 144 S.E. 535.'

King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 355, 200 S.E.2d 799, 804-05 (1973). Essentially the doctrine of res judicata provides that a final adjudication on the merits in a prior suit bars a subsequent, identical cause of action between the same parties or their privies. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597, 68 S.Ct. 715, 719, 92 L.Ed. 898 (1948). Similarly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel operates to bar the relitigation of issues previously determined. It constitutes a much more narrow application of the principle of res judicata. Id. at 597-98, 68 S.Ct. at 719. Collateral estoppel provides that

the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel, not as to matters which might have been litigated and determined, but 'only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.' Cromwell v. Sac County [94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876) ].... Since the cause of action involved in the second proceeding is not swallowed by the judgment in the prior suit, the parties are free to litigate points which are not at issue in the first proceeding, even though such points might have been tendered and decided at the time. But matters which were actually litigated and determined in the first proceeding cannot later be relitigated. Once a party has fought out a matter in litigation with the other party, he cannot later renew that duel.

Id. at 598, 68 S.Ct. at 719.

Thus res judicata generally precludes relitigation of claims or actions. Collateral estoppel operates to preclude the parties or their privies in a former action from relitigating in a subsequent action issues necessarily determined in the former action. Settle v. Beasley, 309 N.C. 616, 619, 308 S.E.2d 288, 290 (1983).

For defendant to be collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of paternity, then, two elements must exist: (1) The issue of paternity must necessarily have been determined previously and (2) the parties to that prior action must be identical or privies to the parties in the instant case. We consider both points seriatim.

Defendant contends that a conviction under section 14-322 does not necessitate a finding that he was the father of the minor children. This position is untenable.

Section 14-322 provides, in pertinent part:

(d) Any parent who shall willfully neglect or refuse to provide adequate support for that parent's child, whether natural or adopted, and whether or not the parent abandons the child, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished according to subsection (f). Willful neglect or refusal to provide adequate support of a child shall constitute a continuing offense and shall not be barred by any statute of limitations until the youngest living child of the parent shall reach the age of 18 years.

In order to obtain a conviction under this provision, the state must prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant was the father of the children; (2) that the defendant failed to provide the children with adequate support; and (3) that such failure was willful.

It is well established in North Carolina that a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime unless the evidence adequately sustains every constituent element of the offense charged. State v. McCoy, 303 N.C. 1, 24, 277 S.E.2d 515, 532 (1981); State v. Ferguson, 191 N.C. 668, 670, 132 S.E. 664, 665 (1926); State v. Crook, 189 N.C. 545, 546, 127 S.E. 579, 580 (1925). Judge Roberts heard the evidence and found defendant guilty of the willful failure to support his minor children. This verdict necessitated a finding, express or implied, that defendant was the father of the minor children. As we noted in Tidwell v. Booker, 290 N.C. 98, 110, 225 S.E.2d 816, 823 (1976),

This Court has said on numerous occasions that the question of paternity is 'incidental to the prosecution for the crime of nonsupport.' State v. Green [277 N.C....