State by Lord v. Kohler, 38619

• Decision Date: 24 April 1964
• Docket Number: No. 38619,38619
• Citation: 268 Minn. 77,128 N.W.2d 90
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota by Miles LORD, its Attorney General, Respondent, v. Mary A. KOHLER et al., Respondents-below, Rose Building Corporation, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 90

128 N.W.2d 90

268 Minn. 77

STATE of Minnesota by Miles LORD, its Attorney General Respondent, v. Mary A. KOHLER et al., Respondents-below Rose Building Corporation, Appellant.

No. 38619.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 24, 1964.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where in connection with the construction of a grade interchange the commissioner of highways has taken from an abutting property owner direct and immediate access to controlled-access highway, a fact question is presented as to whether or not the property owner has sustained damage by denial of reasonably convenient and suitable access within purview of rules stated in Hendrickson v. State, --- Minn. ---, 127 N.W.2d 165.

2. In condemnation proceedings a landowner's plan of a proposed development is admissible for the limited purpose of illustrating a way in which the land in question could be adapted to its highest and best use, provided it appears that the likelihood of such a demand for that purpose is such as to affect market value. The admissibility of such evidence rests largely within the discretion of the trial court and should be received with caution so as to exclude plans or designs which might mislead the jury or which are calculated to establish proof of noncompensable elements of damage.

Richard E. Kyle, B. C. Hart and David C. Forsberg, Briggs & Morgan, St. Paul, for appellant.

Walter F. Mondale, Atty. Gen., Gerald Geheren, Asst. Atty. Gen., Rolf O. Slen, Deputy Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent.

MURPHY, Justice.

This case is before us on an appeal from an order of the district court denying a motion for a new trial. The dispute grows out of a condemnation proceeding by which the state took .36 of an acre of property and closed off the owner's direct access to Highway No. 51 (Snelling Avenue) in Ramsey County. We consider two assignments of error: (1) Did the trial court err in refusing to permit recovery of damages for loss of direct access to Highway No. 51? (2) Did the trial court err in sustaining objections to the admission in evidence of plans and drawings showing the potential use of the property?

From the record it appears that prior to February 4, 1957, the date of the final report of the commissioners in these condemnation proceedings, appellant, Rose Building Corporation, owned 14.6 acres of property in Ramsey County. The layout of the property appears on the accompanying sketch. It is bounded on the south by County Road B and on the north by property owned by the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, which in turn is adjacent to limited-access Highway No. 36. The west boundary of appellant's property is adjacent to a frontage or service road which constitutes the outer lane of Highway No. 51. This frontage road runs parallel to the main lanes of travel of Highway No. 51 to a point approximately 511 feet north of the intersection of County Road B and Highway No. 51, at which point it turns slightly to the east, continuing along the boundary of appellant's property until it ends at the State Farm Mutual property.

On February 29, 1956, the state commenced condemnation proceedings against a part of appellant's property containing 36 of an acre. This particular part consisted of a strip of land on the west side of appellant's property, beginning at a point approximately 511 feet north of County Road B and running thence in a northeasterly direction. The commissioners appointed by the court awarded appellant $4,000 for this taking. On appeal to the district court, the jury awarded $5,000 to appellant for the value of the land taken. As we understand the briefs and arguments of appellant, there is no particular complaint as to this award. The errors upon which this appeal is predicated are based upon asserted damage resulting from a loss of access to Highway No. 51.

Prior to these proceedings there was an entrance from Highway No. 51 to appellant's property provided by a crossover between the service road and the northbound lane of the highway. This crossover was located at a point where the service road turns northeast to enter the property of State Farm Mutual. By his petition in these proceedings, the commissioner of highways stated that it was necessary 'to take the right of access to said highway from the owners whose lands front thereon.' Apparently, this action was a traffic-control measure taken in connection with the construction of a grade interchange at the intersection of Highway Nos. 51 and 36.

It appears that the service road had been constructed at a time when Highway No. 51 was widened, making it a divided highway. Its purpose apparently was to provide access to appellant's property as well as to that of the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. It is not clear from the record whether, at the time of this earlier improvement, appellant received any compensation for damages to access. In any event the direct access to Highway No. 51, which the property owner previously had, is now taken away.

It was the view of the trial court that the action of the commissioner of highways in closing the entrance from appellant's property to Highway No. 51 was a reasonable exercise of the police power in the interest of public safety and therefore not compensable.

The issue as presented by appellant in its brief is this: 'May the state close off an abutting property owner's direct access to the traveled lanes of a highway, leaving to the landowner as its only access to the highway a narrow frontage road which ends in a cul-de-sac, thereby substantially impairing the owner's ingress to and egress from the property, without compensating the landowner for the resulting reduction in value of his land?' The appellant in its brief and argument relies on authorities to the effect that a property owner left abutting on a cul-de-sac may recover damages, citing Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329, 108 N.W. 480, 6 L.R.A.,N.S., 741; Maletta v. Oliver Iron Min. Co., 135 Minn. 175, 160 N.W. 771; Locascio v. N.P. Ry. Co., 185 Minn. 281, 240 N.W. 661. We are not persuaded by these authorities. The service road here has always been a dead-end street. If the property owner has sustained damage, it results from the loss of direct access to the east lane of traffic of Highway No. 51 and not from any change in the service road.

1. The issue raised by appellant has been fully considered by this court in Hendrickson v. State, --- Minn. ---, 127 N.W.2d 165. We there held that where in the construction of a controlled-access highway an owner of abutting property is denied reasonably convenient and suitable access to the main traveled portion of a highway reconstructed on an existing right-of-way which previously was entirely accessible to such property, compensable damage may be sustained notwithstanding the availability of a frontage road from which the property has circuitous access to the main thoroughfare at interchanges. We said, --- Minn. ---, 127 N.W.2d 172:

'What is reasonable ingress and egress is a fact question. If the jury decides that the location of the proposed interchange substantially impairs plaintiffs' right to reasonably convenient and suitable access to the main thoroughfare, plaintiffs are entitled to damages. Not every denial of immediate or...