Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis
| Decision Date | 15 June 1906 |
| Docket Number | 14,804 - (80) |
| Citation | 108 N.W. 480,98 Minn. 329 |
| Parties | WILLIAM H. VANDERBURGH v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS and Another |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Hennepin county against City of Minneapolis and Chicago Great Western Railway Co., to recover $20,000 for damages to plaintiff's land occasioned by the vacation of certain streets by the defendant city. The following diagram shows the location of the premises. From an order, Simpson, J., sustaining separate demurrers to the complaint interposed by defendants, plaintiff appealed. Reversed as to defendant city; affirmed as to defendant railway company.
[SEE ILLUSTRATION IN ORIGINAL]
Vacation of Street.
Plaintiff owned certain lots fronting on First street in the city of Minneapolis. The city, by action of its council, vacated that portion of said street from the line of plaintiff's lots to the right of way and depot grounds of defendant railway company, thus cutting off plaintiff's right of ingress and egress from that direction and leaving his property fronting on a culde-sac or blind alley. Held, that by the vacation of the street plaintiff suffered an injury special and peculiar to his property, not common to the public at large, and is entitled to compensation under the provisions of our amended constitution which forbid the taking or damaging of private property for a public use without compensation.
Consequential Damages.
The street was not vacated immediately in front of plaintiff's lots, but from a line thereof to the west. No property was actually taken from him. The damages are consequential, and it was unnecessary, as a condition precedent to the right on the part of the city to vacate the street, that the damages be first ascertained and paid.
Liability of City.
The municipality is liable in an action for damages in such cases, and the constitutional rights of injured parties are thus fully protected.
Liability of City.
This rule does not apply in cases where private property is actually taken for a public use, but only where the damages occasioned by the act of the public authorities are merely consequential.
Complaint.
Complainant held to state a cause of action against defendant city, but not against defendant railway company.
W. H Vanderburgh, pro se.
A right of way appurtenant to a lot is property and any injury to it is injury to property. Whatever interferes with a street and permanently diminishes the value is as much a damage as injury to the land itself. Louisville v. Finley, 86 Ky. 294; Kane v. New York, 125 N.Y. 165; Lackland v. North Missouri, 31 Mo. 180; Sheehy v. Kansas City, 94 Mo. 574; Spencer v Metropolitan, 120 Mo. 154, 158; Householder v City, 83 Mo. 488; Tate v. Missouri, 64 Mo. 149; Lewis, Em. Dom. 175; Frater v. Hamilton, 90 Tenn. 661; Thurston v. City, 51 Mo. 510; Story v. New York, 90 N.Y. 122, 165; Prescott v. Edwards, 117 Cal. 298; Newell v. Sass, 142 Ill. 104; Common Council v. Croas, 7 Ind. 9; Schneider v. Jacob, 86 Ky. 101; Cole v. Hadley, 162 Mass. 579; In re St. Nicholas Terrace, 143 N.Y. 621; Moose v. Carson, 104 N.C. 431; Shields v. Titus, 46 Oh. St. 528; Ferguson's Appeal, 117 Pa. St. 426; Dobson v. Hohenadel, 148 Pa. St. 367; Hobson v. Philadelphia, 150 Pa. St. 595; Johnson v. Old Colony, 18 R.I. 642; Wolf v. Brass, 72 Tex. 133; Barbour v. Lyddy, 49 F. 896; Bennett v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 73 F. 696; Elliott, R. & S. 960, 961; Douglass v. City Council, 118 Ala. 599; In re Melon St., 182 Pa. St. 397; City v. Baker, 86 F. 753.
For a state to depreciate the value of the property of the citizen without making compensation is a deprivation of property under the constitution of the United States, and the amended constitution of Minnesota. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166; Gibson v. U.S., 166 U.S. 269; Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141; Atwater v. Trustees, 124 N.Y. 602. That which damages property or depreciates its value deprives the owner of his property. State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 173; Town v. Leopold, 106 Ind. 29; Hatch v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 1; Port Huron v. Voorheis, 50 Mich. 506; Morris v. Mayor, 10 N.J.Eq. 352; Abendroth v. Manhattan, 122 N.Y. 1, and see Fort Scott v. Fox, 42 Kan. 490; Park v. C. & S.W.R. Co., 43 Iowa 636, 639; Dairy v. Iowa, 113 Iowa 716, the constitutions of Kansas and Iowa providing for compensation for the "taking" of property, only.
The following states have inserted the word "damaged" in their constitutions in addition to the word taking. 1870 Illinois, 1872 West Virginia, 1873 Pennsylvania, 1874 Arkansas, 1875 Nebraska, Missouri and Alabama, 1876 Colorado and Texas, 1877 Georgia, 1879 Louisiana and California, followed later on by Kentucky, Mississippi, Washington, Dakotas, etc. The following states have still the word "taken" and have made no amendment thereto, viz: Iowa, Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, New York, Indiana, North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Oregon, Kansas, Michigan, Florida, New Hampshire, Vermont, Ohio, Indiana, Maine, Virginia. Texas, Minnesota, Alabama and Pennsylvania have the word "destroyed" as well as "damaged" in their constitutions.
The amendment to our constitution inserting therein the words "damaged or destroyed" enlarged the right of compensation. It was intended to give relief in a class of cases like plaintiff's, in which a valuable legal right enjoyed in connection with his property is injuriously affected. Lewis, Em. Dom. (2d Ed.) 578, 579; Pennsylvania v. Duncan, 132 U.S. 75, affirming 111 Pa. St. 352; City Council v. Townsend, 80 Ala. 491; Hot Springs v. Williamson, 45 Ark. 429; City v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113; City v. Greene, 67 Ga. 79; City v. Kramer, 25 Neb. 489, 493; Gottschalk v. Chicago, 14 Neb. 550; Reardon v. City, 66 Cal. 492, 500; Galveston v. Fuller, 63 Tex. 467; Griffin v. Shreveport, 41 La. An. 808; Dickerman v. City of Duluth, 88 Minn. 288; Rigney v. City, 102 Ill. 64, 68; Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161, 167; City v. Union, 102 Ill. 379; Chicago v. Ayres, 106 Ill. 511, 518.
Where access to private property has been materially impaired or destroyed by the vacation of a street, and there has been consequent depreciation in the value of property, the owner is entitled to compensation therefor under the constitutional provision. In order that the owner may recover it is not necessary that the property should abut upon the obstruction or vacation. Lewis, Em. Dom. (2d Ed.) 535; Mellor v. City, 160 Pa. St. 614; Gargan v. Louisville, 89 Ky. 212; City v. Lockhead, 7 Brad. 82; Johnston v. Old Colony, 18 R.I. 642; City v. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200, 212; Pennsylvania v. Stanley, 10 Ind.App. 421; City of Chicago v. Baker, 86 F. 753; Chicago v. Hazels, 26 Neb. 364; Jaynes v. Omaha, 53 Neb. 631; City v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103; Village v. Clifford, 201 Ill. 475, 478; City v. Webb, 102 Ill.App. 332; Caledonian v. Walker's Trustees, L.R. 7 App. Cas. 259. The leading case on the subject of injuries to adjacent property by street vacation, is In re Melon St., supra.
The injury and right of action accrued to plaintiff upon the enactment of the ordinance of vacation. It was the extinction of the legal right to use the highway that depreciated the value of his property. Angell, Highways, § 326; Brook v. Horton, 68 Cal. 554; Whetherill v. Pennsylvania, 195 Pa. St. 156; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 195 Pa. St. 160.
The defendant city rendered itself primarily and directly liable by destroying the mode of ingress and egress and turning First street into a cul de sac, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Parker v. Catholic Bishop, 146 Ill. 158, 165; Heinrich v. City, 125 Mo. 424, 427; Knapp v. St. Louis, 153 Mo. 560, 571; In re William Street, 7 Pa. Dist. 1. Every abutting owner has a property right in the maintenance of the highway in full use. This property right is not merely that the abutting owners may get in and out. It also embraces the right to have their highway open as a thoroughfare for the purposes of travel, convenience, publicity and trade. Peace v. McAdoo, 92 N.Y.S. 369; New England v. Everett, 189 Mass. 145.
Frank Healy and L. A. Dunn, for respondent city of Minneapolis.
Assuming that the plaintiff had a private easement in the streets attempted to be vacated for access, light and air, which might be considered "property" within the meaning of the constitutional provision as contended by plaintiff, yet he is not entitled to recover in this action for the following reasons: First, the complaint does not show a taking or damaging of private property for a public use. Second, the complaint does not show that the city has in any way deprived the plaintiff of his private right of easement in the streets vacated, if any, or interfered with or obstructed, impaired or trespassed upon any such private rights. Lewis, Em. Dom. § 134; Thelan v. Farmer, 36 Minn. 225, 235; Hielscher v. City of Minneapolis, 46 Minn. 529, 530.
The resolution passed by the city council vacating the street, compensation not having first been paid or secured, cannot have the effect of closing First street south to travel as against the plaintiff and to give it such effect would be to permit the city to contravene the constitution. Bigelow v. Ballerino, 111 Cal. 559; Hielscher v. City of Minneapolis, supra; Langford v. County Commrs., 16 Minn. 333 (375); Brown v. City, 5 Wash. 35; Chambers v. Cincinnati, 69 Ga. 320.
A. G. Briggs and T. P. McNamara, for respondent Chicago Great Western Railway Company.
The complaint does not state a cause of action for damages against either of the defendants. City v. O'Flynn, 119 Ill. 200; Parker v. Catholic Bishop, 146 Ill. 158; McGee's Appeal, 114 Pa. St. 470; Clemens v. Connecticut, 184 Mo. 46, 55.
Appellant's damage is not special, and he should not...
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