State by Lord v. Hayden Miller Company

• Decision Date: 08 June 1962
• Docket Number: No. 38304--5,38304--5
• Citation: 263 Minn. 29,116 N.W.2d 535
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, by Miles LORD, its Attorney General, Appellant, v. HAYDEN MILLER COMPANY et al., Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 535

116 N.W.2d 535

263 Minn. 29

STATE of Minnesota, by Miles LORD, its Attorney General Appellant, v. HAYDEN MILLER COMPANY et al., Respondents.

No. 38304--5.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 8, 1962.

On Appeal from Clerk's Taxation of Costs

Aug. 17, 1962.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. Where part of a tract is taken by eminent domain, the owner is entitled to the difference between the market value of the tract immediately before the taking and the market value of what is left after the taking, excluding from consideration general benefits and deducting from the difference special benefits.

2. The measure of damages in condemnation cases comprehends that the award shall be a single award for the entire damage for the land actually taken, including as well the harm resulting to the remainder because of the taking; and damage which the landowner may sustain by reason of inconvenience affecting the use and enjoyment of the remainder may be considered by the jury not as an independent item of loss but as an element which affects the market value of the remaining area.

3. In construing the charge as a whole, its adequacy in correctly setting forth controlling principles of law is to be measured by the meaning it reasonably conveys to the jurors who hear it only once and have no opportunity to examine it in written form.

4. Where, after the rendition of a verdict, it appears that a juror's untruthful answer to questions put to him on voir dire examination may have prevented a fair trial, the better practice is to take the matter up with the trial court so that the juror may be examined in the presence of counsel for all parties and the court under the proper safeguards and a record made of the examination that will adequately present the matter to the supreme court on appeal.

5. The well-recognized principle that affidavits of a juror or any other person relating to what a juror has said will not be received to impeach the verdict where the facts sought to be shown inhere in the verdict itself does not protect deliberations of the jury from exposure under circumstances where statements of jurors may establish bias and prejudice falsely concealed on voir dire examination.

Walter F. Mondale, Atty. Gen., Rolf O. Slen, Deputy Atty. Gen., William J. Young, Paul J. Doerner, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellant.

Richard H. Plunkett, Rochester, for respondents.

MURPHY, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order denying a new trial in a highway condemnation proceedings. Two tracts are involved, one is owned by the respondent Hayden Miller Company and the other is owned by the respondent Kruse Company. The appellant, State of Minnesota, claims that the verdicts are excessive and not justified by the evidence and that there was prejudicial error in the court's instructions and misconduct on the part of certain members of the jury.

It appears from the record that the property involved in these proceedings is located in an area where there has been considerable development and where the urban community of Rochester is reaching out beyond the city limits. The Hayden Miller property is located just north of 37th Street Northwest, which marks the northern limits of the city. The Kruse Company property is located south of 37th Street Northwest and is within the city limits. Trunk Highway No. 52 runs generally north and south and is adjacent to the western boundaries of both tracts. The purpose of the taking was to widen the right-of-way of Trunk Highway No. 52, which is an important thoroughfare serving traffic between the city of Rochester and the metropolitan area of Minneapolis and St. Paul. By these proceedings 2.18 acres were taken from the Hayden Miller property while 1.52 acres were taken from the Kruse property.

Trunk Highway No. 52 has been a divided highway for some time, and prior to the taking involved in this action ramp or service roads had been established on each saide of the highway. Because of industrial and residential development in this area and consequent increase in traffic, it was felt necessary to make certain changes at the point where Highway No. 52 is intersected by 37th Street Northwest. It appears that the overall improvement involved an extension of 37th Street Northwest across Highway No. 52 by an overpass and the construction of a new one-way ramp and a new two-way frontal road on the east side of the highway. The land involved here was taken for the construction of the new frontal road. The frontal road extends along the western boundary of the property which remains after the taking. The principal errors asserted to have occurred in these proceedings center upon the issue as to whether or not this frontal road resulted in a damage or benefit to the property which was not taken.

It is contended by the property owners that prior to the taking there was direct access from the Hayden Miller property to Highway No. 52 by Pennington Road, which is located about 1,500 feet north of 37th Street Northwest. It is also asserted that prior to the taking the Kruse Company had access to Highway No. 52 by 33rd Street Northwest, which is located at the south boundary of its property. It is the contention of the property owners that they have sustained damage as a result of the construction of the frontal road because of circuity of travel necessary to reach their property.

Because of the disposition we make of this appeal, it is not necessary for us to discuss the issue of damages. It is sufficient only to observe that the property is obviously of considerable potential value. The Kruse property is zoned commercial and the construction of a shopping center upon it had been under consideration. A large industrial plant employing 2,500 people is located west of Highway No. 52, across from the property in question. At the time of the condemnation, 82 homes had been built on land adjoining the east side of the Kruse property. While the Hayden Miller land is acreage property, it appears that adjoining the tract on the east is an area platted for residential purposes.

1. While portions of the trial court's instructions correctly stated the law, we agree with the state that on the whole they were inconsistent and misleading. At one point the jury was correctly told that '(w)hen part of a tract is taken the owner is entitled to the difference between the market value of the tract immediately before the taking and the market value of what is left after the taking, excluding from consideration general benefits and deducting from the difference special benefits.' ¹ At other places in the long and complicated instructions the rule was qualified and contradictory instructions were given. The difficulty arose from an attempt to explain and perhaps overrefine the rule as it applied to the conflicting claims of the parties. The owners contended that because of inconvenience of access the frontal road was a detriment to the property which should result in an increase in the award. ² The state, on the other hand, claimed it was a special benefit to the property and a deduction should be made therefor. At various times during the instructions the jury was told that there was no special benefit from the frontal road; that if they found there was a special benefit they could not deduct it; that if they found there was damage to the property because of circurity of travel they could make an 'additional allowance' therefor; the jury was later told that they could deduct special benefits from the award and later instructed to the contrary. There was language in the instructions from which the jury might well have gained the impression that such damages as they might find because of inconvenience of access could be added to the total...