STATE, BY ROCHESTER ASS'N, ETC. v. City of Rochester
| Decision Date | 05 May 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 48166.,48166. |
| Citation | 268 NW 2d 885 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, By the ROCHESTER ASSOCIATION OF NEIGHBORHOODS, et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF ROCHESTER, Respondent, Rodney Younge, Respondent, Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis and Mr. Judson Gooding, as trustees of the trust established under the will of A. C. Gooding, Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Dayton, Herman & Graham and Philip W. Getts, Minneapolis, for appellants.
Gerald H. Swanson, City Atty., Rochester, for City of Rochester.
Patterson & Restovich, Rochester, for Rodney Younge.
Schacht & Kerr, Rochester, for Northwestern Nat. Bank of Minneapolis.
Heard before ROGOSHESKE, PETERSON and TODD, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.
The Rochester Association of Neighborhoods and individual plaintiffs appeal from an order of the trial court denying declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in their action challenging the validity of a zoning ordinance amendment enacted by the Rochester City Council which rezoned a 1.18-acre tract of land from single-family residential use (R-1) and low-density residential use (R-2) to high-density residential use (R-4) to permit the building of a 6-story, 49-unit, condominium apartment building on the land. Plaintiffs contend (1) that this rezoning of a single tract was presumptively invalid as a "quasi-judicial act" by the council not supported with written findings of fact upon substantial evidence; (2) that even if it was a legislative act, the rezoning was arbitrary and capricious because it was inconsistent with the city's land-use plan and without reasonable relation to the health, safety, and welfare of the community; and (3) that the ordinance was invalid "spot zoning." We affirm the decision of the trial court and hold that the promulgation of the Rochester ordinance was a valid exercise of the municipality's delegated legislative power and, upon the record presented, was neither proven to be without reasonable relation to the public health, safety, and welfare, nor to be invalid as "spot zoning."
The 1.18-acre tract rezoned is owned by the A. C. Gooding Trust and is situated three blocks away from the central business district in the city of Rochester. Before the rezoning challenged in this suit, the eastern two-thirds of the subject property was zoned R-2 and the western one-third was zoned R-1. The land is bounded on the west and southwest by an R-1 district of single-family houses known as the Edison Park Neighborhood. On the south is an R-2 district of low-density, multiple-family dwellings. Across the street to the east is an R-4 district with a 24-unit apartment building. Across the street to the north is an R-4 district with a 35-unit condominium. Diagonally across the street to the northeast is a vacant lot zoned "institutional" and owned by the Mayo Clinic. Visible from the rezoned tract are Mayo Clinic Complex buildings located one block north and one block east and another high-rise condominium two blocks away.
Trustees of the A. C. Gooding Trust entered into a purchase agreement to convey the 1.18-acre tract to defendant Rodney Younge contingent upon the rezoning of the property to R-4 by September 1, 1977. On December 23, 1976, the trustees and defendant Younge applied to have the property rezoned to R-4. Younge submitted a "project description" proposing to develop a 60-unit, luxury condominium, later amended to propose a 49-unit condominium building, on the site. The application was referred to the Rochester Planning and Zoning Commission, which held a public hearing on January 12, 1977. The Rochester Consolidated Planning Department recommended to the planning commission that the rezoning be tabled to permit a study to determine whether the city's land-use plan should be amended. The planning commission recommended to the city council that the rezoning application be denied as inconsistent with the city's land-use plan, which called for low-density residential use on the Gooding property. On February 7, 1977, the council rejected the planning commission's recommendation and on March 7, 1977, passed an ordinance rezoning the subject property to R-4. The council gave no written reasons or findings supporting the rezoning. Minutes of the council meetings on February 7 and February 23, 1977, however, show that the council members believed the proposed condominium was needed to serve the city's expanded housing requirements. Council members stated that the Gooding property would be an ideal site since it was located within three blocks of the central business district and since high-density residential uses already across two streets from the property would be compatible with the proposed condominium and made development of the subject property for any other use unlikely. On July 5, 1977, the council amended its land-use plan to conform to the rezoning.
Plaintiffs, individual owners of residences abutting the subject property and their incorporated Association of Neighborhoods, appeared at the January 12, 1977, public hearing and were heard in protest at a February 23, 1977, meeting of the council. On April 8, 1977, plaintiffs filed this suit challenging the validity of the March 7, 1977, rezoning ordinance and seeking declaratory judgment and injunction. The trial court denied the requested relief.
1. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the council's action in rezoning a single 1.18-acre tract should be subject to close judicial scrutiny as an administrative or quasi-judicial act. This standard of review would place upon the municipality the burden of supporting the ordinance as a valid exercise of the police power by findings of fact based upon substantial evidence. Absent such findings, the ordinance would be presumed invalid. Plaintiffs rely upon Fasano v. Board of County Commrs. of Washington County, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973), and Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash.2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972), in which the Oregon and Washington courts characterized the rezoning of a single tract of land as a quasi-judicial act affecting the rights of a few individuals more than the public generally. Those courts placed the burden of justifying the zoning change as reasonable upon the proponents, including the adopting city council.
We decline to follow the rule applied in those jurisdictions, for we have consistently held that "when a municipality adopts or amends a zoning ordinance, it acts in a legislative capacity under its delegated police powers." Beck v. City of St. Paul, 304 Minn. 438, 448, 231 N.W.2d 919, 925 (1975). See, also, Sun Oil Co. v. Village of New Hope, 300 Minn. 326, 333, 220 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1974); Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 267 Minn. 155, 125 N.W.2d 583 (1963). As a legislative act, a zoning or rezoning classification must be upheld unless opponents prove that the classification is unsupported by any rational basis related to promoting the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, or that the classification amounts to a taking without compensation. This rule applies regardless of the size of the tract of land involved. See, e. g., Sun Oil Co. v. Village of New Hope, supra (1 acre); Beck v. City of St. Paul, supra (33½ acres). Our narrow scope of review reflects a policy decision that a legislative body can best determine which zoning classifications best serve the public welfare. In Beck v. City of St. Paul, 304 Minn. 438, 448, 231 N.W.2d 919, 925, and Sun Oil Co. v. Village of New Hope, 300 Minn. 326, 334, 220 N.W.2d 256, 261, we said:
"Even where the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is debatable, or where there are conflicting opinions as to the desirability of the restrictions it imposes * * *, it is not the function of the courts to interfere with the legislative discretion on such issues."
Plaintiffs note that we have not accorded the same presumption of validity to city council action denying special-use permits as we have to adoption or amendment of zoning ordinances. In Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 167 N.W.2d 45 (1969), we adopted the rule that where a special use which conforms with the zoning ordinance is requested, a city council's denial of a special-use permit to a single landowner is proved prima facie arbitrary and unreasonable if it is shown that the council failed to support its action by written findings of substantial evidence showing the use impermissible under the permit standards of the ordinance. See, also, Holasek v. Village of Medina, 303 Minn. 240, 226 N.W.2d 900 (1975); Metro 500, Inc. v. City of Brooklyn Park, 297 Minn. 294, 211 N.W.2d 358 (1973); Inland Construction Co. v. City of Bloomington, 292 Minn. 374, 195 N.W.2d 558 (1972). Plaintiffs ask that zoning amendments be reviewed under a like standard and suggest that the only distinction between special-use permits and the rezoning in this case is the label "rezoning" chosen by the council to describe its action. We do not agree. While an amendment of the zoning ordinance can permit particular property to be used in a manner formerly forbidden by the ordinance, "a special use provision permits property, within the discretion of the governing body, to be used in a manner expressly authorized by the ordinance." Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 195, 167 N.W.2d 45, 49. In passing a zoning or rezoning ordinance, a city council is required to make a legislative judgment that a certain zoning classification will promote the "public health, safety, morals and general welfare." Minn. St. 462.357, subd. 1. In granting or denying a special-use permit, a city council is not altering the legislative judgment as to the zoning classification. Rather, it has the function, adjudicative in nature, of applying specific use standards set by the zoning ordinance to a particular individual use and must be held strictly to those standards.
The proposed high-density use of the subject land was not in conformity with...
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