Zylka v. City of Crystal

• Decision Date: 03 April 1969
• Docket Number: No. 41462,41462
• Citation: 167 N.W.2d 45,283 Minn. 192
• Parties: Michael E. ZYLKA, Respondent, v. CITY OF CRYSTAL, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 45

167 N.W.2d 45

283 Minn. 192

Michael E. ZYLKA, Respondent, v. CITY OF CRYSTAL, Appellant.

No. 41462.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 3, 1969.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The power of municipalities to enact special-use permit ordinances is implicit in the provisions of Minn.St. 462.357.

2. Under an ordinance which permits the construction of a gasoline service station in a commercial district upon obtaining a special-use permit from the city council, the trial court's finding that the denial of plaintiff's application for such permit was arbitrary must be affirmed where the city council at the time of the denial made no findings of fact and gave no reasons for its decision, and where the evidence submitted upon trial does not establish as a matter of law that the service station, if located at the proposed site, would endanger the public health or safety or general welfare of the area affected or the community as a whole.

3. Since, under the city's comprehensive zoning ordinance, a gasoline service station is a use specifically permitted within a commercial district if a special-use permit is obtained, the issuance of such a permit to construct a gasoline station in a commercial district does not amount to a rezoning.

William J. McPherson, Crystal, for appellant.

William A. Soules, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and NELSON, ROGOSHESKE, SHERAN, and FRANK T. GALLAGHER, JJ.

OPINION

ROGOSHESKE, Justice.

Defendant, city of Crystal, appeals from a judgment declaring that the city council was arbitrary and unreasonable in denying plaintiff landowner a special-use permit to construct a gasoline service station on property located within an area of the city zoned for commercial use, and from an order denying a new trial.

Plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of land located on the northwest corner of 32nd Avenue North and Douglas Drive in the city of Crystal. Under the city's comprehensive zoning ordinance, this land is within in an area classified as a 'Commercial C--1' district, within which a gasoline service station may be constructed and operated upon issuance of a special-use permit by defendant's governing body, the city council. The neighborhood adjoining plaintiff's land is largely residential. Plaintiff, together with Clark Oil & Refining Corporation as vendee of the property under a conditional sales contract, applied for a special-use permit to construct a service station on the property. In conjunction with this application and as required by the ordinance, plaintiff and his coapplicant submitted a detailed plot plan for the proposed construction to defendant's city engineer, who reviewed it, modified it, and ultimately approved it as complying with all of the city's building construction regulations. Defendant's planning commission held a hearing on plaintiff's application. Without preserving any record of the proceedings, making any findings of fact, or giving any reasons for its decision, the commission recommended to the city council that it deny the application. The city council reviewed this recommendation and, without itself making any findings of fact or giving any reasons for its decision, denied plaintiff's application.

Plaintiff then brought this action for declaratory relief, enjoining the city of Crystal from interfering with construction of the service station in accordance with the plans approved by the city engineer and the state fire marshal. After a hearing, the trial court found that the planning commission had recommended denial, after which the city council denied the application without making findings or giving any reasons; that the property was 'zoned * * * for commercial purposes including gasoline service stations'; that it 'is entirely suitable for the construction and operation of a gasoline service station' that such a use of it would not constitute a nuisance or 'unduly interfere with the health, morals, safety or welfare of the neighborhood or the community'; and that the 'City Council, acting administratively and not legislatively, has under the authority granted to it under its zoning ordinance over a period of years granted special use permits for the construction and operation of retail gasoline service stations in the City of Crystal under circumstances substantially the same as those under which plaintiff's application for such permit was denied.' The court therefore held that 'the action of the City Council * * * in denying plaintiff's Application for a special use permit was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, discriminatory, confiscatory and void' and 'denied plaintiff equal protection under the law in violation of the Constitutions of the State of Minnesota and the United States of America.'

The city makes four basic arguments on appeal: (1) That Olsen v. City of Minneapolis, 263 Minn. 1, 115 N.W.2d 734, relied on heavily by the trial court, is not in fact controlling; (2) that plaintiff failed at trial to make out a prima facie case of arbitrariness; (3) that even if he had, his case was rebutted by the evidence presented by defendant showing that the denial was based 'upon a consideration of the welfare of the neighborhood and the orderly development of the city'; and (4) that the city could not have granted a special-use permit without, in effect, illegally rezoning plaintiff's property.

The trial judge, in holding that the city council acted arbitrarily, relied upon Olsen v. City of Minneapolis, Supra. Read broadly, that opinion appears to support plaintiff's position that a city council may not deny a special-use permit for a gasoline service station in a commercial zone unless it specifically finds that the station in question would constitute a nuisance. Read this way, Olsen would require an affirmance, since the city council at the time it denied plaintiff's application made no such finding, nor indeed even suggested that the station would constitute a nuisance. We believe, however, that such an interpretation of the Olsen case is unjustified, as it would render special-use-permit provisions of zoning ordinances virtually useless.

Even before the advent of zoning, municipalities had the power to prevent the construction of nuisances. This power, however, was not enough to permit effective municipal land-use planning. ¹ Consequently, zoning ordinances which go far beyond the mere control of nuisances were developed and have long been held to be a legitimate exercise of the police power. ² Provisions such as the one contained in defendant city's ordinance providing for special-use permits, sometimes called 'special exception permits' or 'conditional use permits,' were introduced into zoning ordinances as flexibility devices. They are designed to meet the problem which arises where certain uses, although generally compatible with the basic use classification of a particular zone, should not be permitted to be located as a matter of right in every area included within the zone because of hazards inherent in the use itself or special problems which its proposed location may present. ³ By this device, certain uses (e.g., gasoline service stations, electric substations, hospitals, schools, churches, country clubs, and the like) which may be considered essentially desirable to the community, but which should not be authorized generally in a particular zone because of considerations such as current and anticipated traffic congestion, population density, noise, effect on adjoining land values, or other considerations involving public health, safety, or general welfare, may be permitted upon a proposed site depending upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Unlike a variance provision which permits particular property to be used in a manner forbidden by the ordinance by varying the terms of the ordinance, a special-use provision permits property, within the discretion of the governing body, to be used in a manner expressly authorized by the ordinance. ⁴ In theory, if not in practice, provisions authorizing the issuance of special-use permits are intended to provide more flexibility in land-use control than provisions authorizing a variance. While the administering body, be it the council itself or a planning commission to which power to act is delegated, has broad discretionary power to deny an application for a special-use permit, it cannot do so arbitrarily. A denial would be arbitrary, for example, if it was established that all of the standards specified by the ordinance ⁵ as a condition to granting the permit have been met. Where the ordinance does not specify standards, as is usually the case when final authority to determine whether a permit shall be granted is retained by the council, an arbitrary denial may be found by a reviewing court when the evidence presented at the hearing before the municipal governing body and the reviewing court establishes that the requested use is compatible with the basic use authorized within the particular zone and does not endanger the public health or safety or the general welfare of the area affected or the community as a whole.

While our zoning enabling statutes do not expressly confer upon municipalities the power to provide for special-use permits, such power is clearly implicit in Minn.St. 462.357, subd. 1, which provides in part:

'For the purpose of promoting the public health,...