State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Commission

• Decision Date: 08 December 1959
• Citation: 1 Cal.Rptr. 73,176 Cal.App.2d 10
• Parties: STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION of the State of California and Gaylord B. Wallin, Respondents. Civ. 18651.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 73

1 Cal.Rptr. 73

176 Cal.App.2d 10

STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION of the State of California and Gaylord B. Wallin, Respondents.

Civ. 18651.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Dec. 8, 1959.

Hearing Denied Feb. 3, 1960.

T. Groezinger, Loton Wells, San Francisco, for petitioner.

E. A. Corten, Melvin S. Witt, San Francisco, for Industrial Accident Commission.

TOBRINER, Justice.

An award of compensation for a carpenter's loss of a finger in using his power saw at home after sustaining an industrial injury to his eye must be sustained if substantial evidence supports the Commission's finding that the injury to the eye proximately caused the loss of the finger. Petitioner defines causation narrowly and maintains the carpenter's 'negligence' destroyed it. We do not believe that, as a matter of law, this court, accepting petitioner's definition of causation, can on this record upset the Commission's finding. As an alternate reason in support of the award we submit that this definition is too narrow; the broader concept that the first injury need be only a contributing factor as to the second, rather than the sole proximate cause, is the test truly appropriate, and, under it, the award should not be set aside. We discuss these propositions infra.

We are concerned here with two injuries, their incidence and interrelationship. The first occurred on February 15, 1957, when the respondent Wallin, a carpenter by occupation, born in 1904, suffered an industrial injury to his left eye. A rusty nail which he was driving into the floor flew up and penetrated his eyeball. The next day an iridectomy ('[t]he cutting out of a part of the iris'--New Gould Medical Dictionary, p. 519) was undertaken. On May 5, 1957, the doctor released Wallin to return to work. Pursuant to the initial prognostication, however, further surgery became necessary, and a discission of the secondary membrane of the injured eye was performed. Later the attending doctor told Wallin he could return to work on April 7, 1958. At the hearing of November 12, 1958, Wallin testified that the physician did not tell him absolutely he could thus commence work but that 'you could not go to work until you get yourself adjusted. He said you wouldn't be able to get yourself adjusted for a couple of months.' Transcript, Hearing 11-12-58, p. 21, lines 21-24.

The second injury occurred on April 11, 1958. Wallin had not returned to work because he continued to suffer after-effects from the operation which he described in these bizarre terms: '* * * I could not go back to work then because I was so badly boozed up, walk[ed] around like I am half drunk.' Idem, p. 22, lines 21-23. The Commission concluded, however, that the reference was not to the effects of alcohol but to those of the eye condition. At this point the employee 'still * * * [had] a double vision * * *.' P. 15, 1. 20. He further stated that at this time 'things were diffused' and 'being out of the hospital does something to you mentally. I don't know what it is.' P. 13, lines 21-23.

On this date, Wallin was making rough cuts of 'junk' lumber at his home for use in his fireplace. Because the wood was too large, he used an electric power hand saw to cut it to proper size. He placed the pieces of lumber on a saw horse and held the longer end of the plank with his knee. After cutting off a piece he would move the board over to sever the next piece. While Wallin was thus sawing the lumber, the saw 'jumped and kicked,' amputating one of his fingers.

When asked at the hearing, '[Y]ou don't really recall what happened?' Wallin answered: 'Why no. I had the saw horse. You put the lumber on saw horse. You do these things automatically * * * the same way--' Idem, p. 24, lines 1-5. To the question, 'As far as how your hand slipped or what--you really don't know?' he answered, 'I do not know.' P. 24, lines 12-14. The employee, likewise, confronted by the question, 'Do you think that your eye affected you in any manner or the condition of your injured eye affected you in any manner in the use of the saw on April 11, 1958?' answered, 'I believe so.' And again when asked, 'Were you suffering from double vision at that time?' he said, 'Well, certainly.' P. 15, lines 12-26.

The referee found that the injury to the eye on February 15, 1957, proximately caused further disability in the loss of the finger. In the petition for reconsideration petitioner for the first time raised the defense of Wallin's negligence. Upon denial of the petition, petitioner filed his petition for a writ of review.

The role of the appellate court in passing upon the Commission's award, as in reviewing the judgment of a trial court, is limited. In discussing the instant problem of proximate causation, the court in Limited Mut. Compensation Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 1940, 37 Cal.App.2d 50, 53, 98 P.2d 827, 828, said: 'It is the function of the commission, as the trier of the facts, to determine, as a fact, the proximate cause of the injury. Its finding in this regard, if supported by any evidence, cannot be disturbed by this court.' Likewise in Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 1939, 36 Cal.App.2d 96, 96 P.2d 1009, the court held: '[I]t is incumbent upon the commission to determine as a fact the proximate cause; that is, whether a second injury is an independent occurrence, or the proximate and natural result of the first injury.' 36 Cal.App.2d at page 98, 96 P.2d at page 1010. (Emphasis added.)

Applying these canons of interpretation we must determine if the record supports the Commission's conclusion that '[s]aid injury proximately resulted in further disability consisting of amputation of the index finger of applicant's right hand on April 11, 1958' (Findings and Award, 12-18-58, p. 2, paragraph 5) and whether or not Wallin was negligent. Finally, assuming such negligence, we must determine if it broke the chain of causation.

To rule as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to support this finding we would be compelled to disregard: (1) the testimony that Wallin was suffering from defective vision at the time; (2) the fact that this condition offers at least a more reasonable explanation of the accident than any other, particularly when the employee, an expert in the use of the saw, had never in the many years he had used it undergone any trouble with it, and that he manipulated it here in the usual manner; and (3) his own explanation of the accident. The Commission could properly give weight to the employee's testimony on this subject. Swanson v. Williams & Co., 1951, 278 App.Div. 477, 106 N.Y.S.2d 61, 63-64. We conclude that we cannot superimpose our judgment upon that of the Commission in the light of the rules of interpretation and the facts in the record.

We turn to the problem of the alleged intervening negligence of the employee. Here the Commission states upon the petition for reconsideration that '[i]t was not even charged that applicant was guilty of negligence or misconduct, much less proved.' Report of Referee on Petition for Reconsideration, 1-5-59, p. 2, lines 7-8. The substance of the Commission's complaint is that petitioner's failure to raise the issue prevented the primary investigative body from making any finding on this vital question. Nevertheless we shall examine the record to determine if this court, pursuant to the decisions, should rule that the finger injury did not proximately result from the eye injury but from the claimant's intervening fault.

Again, in this determination we cannot 'substitute our views for those of the commission * * * unless there is no substantial evidence to support the findings and order.' State Employees' Retirement System v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 1950, 97 Cal.App.2d 380, 382, 217 P.2d 992, 993. In Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 1957, 47 Cal.2d 903, 905, 306 P.2d 425, 426, the Supreme Court stated: 'When a finding of fact of the Industrial Accident Commission is attacked on the ground that there is not any substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding of fact.' To the same effect: Reinert v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 1956, 46 Cal.2d 349, 358, 294 P.2d 713; Gonzales v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 1958, 50 Cal.2d 360, 364, 325 P.2d 993; Labor Code, § 5953.

The early case of Pacific Coast Casualty Co. v. Pillsbury, 1915, 171 Cal. 319, 153 P. 24, upon which petitioner heavily relies for its proposition that Wallin's negligence here broke the chain of causation, does not upon close analysis, rule upon a situation in which, as here, the Commission made a specific finding on causation. In that case the employee sustained an industrial injury consisting of a broken arm and a dislocated wrist. During the healing process, the employee took a trip and a 'slip or shift of the partly knit bone was caused by something other than natural causes, either by carelessly using the arm or by a new accident.' 171 Cal. at pages 320-321, 153 P. at page 25. As the court points out, 'The commission made no finding concerning the cause of the slipping of the bone * * * other than the general finding that by reason of said accident and injury the applicant sustained a temporary, total disability * * *.' 171 Cal. at page 321, 153 P. at page 25. (Emphasis added.) There was no finding that 'it was due to natural causes.' The employee 'said nothing about it [the cause of the slipping], and he was not asked to do so.' Idem. Although the court set aside the award of compensation for an additional disability due to the slipping of the broken parts of the bone, the case certainly does not question the rule that the Commission's specific finding of proximate causation supported by evidence should...