State, Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Khurana
| Docket Number | 50027 |
| Decision Date | 29 August 2023 |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Delores Adamson, Deceased, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. PRAVEEN KHURANA, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District State of Idaho, Nez Perce County. Hon. Gregory FitzMaurice District Judge. Hon. Michelle M. Evans, Magistrate.
Decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court, affirming judgment of contempt for violating a restraining order, affirmed.
Magyar, Rauch, Assoc., PLLC.; Lawrence Moran, Lewiston, for appellant.
Hon Raul R. Labrador, Attorney General; Douglas E. Fleenor, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Praveen Khurana appeals from a decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court, affirming his judgment of contempt for violating a restraining order. We affirm.
While securing a residence in Lewiston, which was subject to a Medicaid lien and recently recovered from Khurana in a successful ejectment action, Idaho Department of Health and Welfare representatives discovered extensive damage to the residence. The Department responded by initiating contempt proceedings against Khurana, alleging he violated a restraining order that prohibited him from removing fixtures from the residence or otherwise substantially damaging it.[1]
After approximately three years of delay resulting from the voluntary withdrawal and refiling of the motion for contempt, Khurana's motions, the COVID-19 pandemic and a stay to allow resolution of a parallel criminal case, the magistrate court held a trial on the Department's contempt motion. Following the contempt trial, the magistrate court found Khurana guilty of twenty counts of contempt for damaging the residence in violation of the restraining order and entered a judgment imposing criminal sanctions of five days in jail on each count. These jail terms were ordered to run consecutively, resulting in an aggregate term of one hundred days in jail. Subsequently, Khurana filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his counsel was ineffective and a motion for reconsideration, neither of which garnered him relief. After Khurana appealed to the district court, execution of the judgment was stayed pending resolution of the intermediate appeal.
On intermediate appeal, Khurana challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings that he acted in contempt of the restraining order, the magistrate court's decision not "to evaluate [his] petition under [I.C.R.] 54," and the effectiveness of his appointed counsel in the contempt proceeding. The district court affirmed the judgment, concluding that substantial and competent evidence supported the magistrate court's findings and that Khurana had not shown his attorney's performance was prejudicial. Khurana again appeals.
For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the magistrate division, we review the magistrate court record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court's findings of fact and whether the magistrate court's conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, our disposition of the appeal will affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, we review the magistrate court's findings and conclusions, whether the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and the basis therefor, and either affirm or reverse the district court.
Khurana challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his contempt convictions, arguing that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he violated the restraining order. Khurana further argues that his appointed counsel in the contempt proceeding was ineffective and that the "the lower court erred by declining to evaluate [his] petition under [I.C.R.] 54." The Department responds that substantial, competent evidence supports the magistrate court's findings that Khurana acted in contempt of the restraining order, that he failed to demonstrate prejudice from any alleged deficiencies in his counsel's representation, and that his arguments related to I.C.R. 54 are moot. We hold that Khurana has failed to show there is insufficient evidence to support his contempt convictions or that his counsel was ineffective. Furthermore, Khurana has waived any error related to the application of I.C.R. 54.
A court has the power to hold in contempt any person who willfully disobeys a specific and definite order of the court. In re Weick, 142 Idaho 275, 281, 127 P.3d 178, 184 (2005). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75 governs contempt proceedings. The rule distinguishes civil sanctions from criminal sanctions in contempt proceedings. I.R.C.P. 75(a). A civil sanction is conditional, which means the contemnor can avoid the sanction by doing the act he or she was previously ordered to do. I.R.C.P. 75(a)(6). A criminal sanction is unconditional, meaning the contemnor cannot avoid the sanction entirely or have the sanction cease by complying with a prior court order. I.R.C.P. 75(a)(7). A criminal sanction can be imposed for any contempt. I.R.C.P. 75(a)(7). When a party disobeys a court order requiring a certain act, and no longer has the present ability to comply with that order, only criminal contempt sanctions are available. Weick, 142 Idaho at 279, 127 P.3d at 182. To find a person in criminal contempt, the trial court must find that all of the elements of contempt have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, including that the person willfully committed the contempt. State v. Rice, 145 Idaho 554, 556, 181 P.3d 480, 482 (2008).
The twenty counts of contempt for which Khurana was found guilty all entail violations of a restraining order pronounced during a December 6, 2018, hearing on the Department's complaint for ejectment against Khurana. The restraining order, which was subsequently memorialized in written orders, prohibits Khurana from "substantially damag[ing] the real property" subject to the ejectment action, "removing fixtures from the real property," or "removing personal property if such removal would cause substantial damage to the real property." In the same hearing, Khurana responded to the pronouncement of the restraining order by inquiring what items he could remove from the residence.[2] Following the contempt trial, the magistrate court found that, as of December 6, 2018, Khurana had not vacated the residence and that he was guilty of contempt for violating the restraining order by removing or destroying various fixtures and damaging the interior of the residence. Khurana concedes that his "actions could allow for an inference that he actually removed items from the property," but there is "neither sufficient, nor substantial evidence--or any evidence at all--that [his] conduct was contemptuous" of the December 6, 2018, order.
A trial court's determination that an individual is guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt is reviewed on a substantial evidence standard. Katseanes v. Katseanes, 171 Idaho 478, 486, 522 P.3d 1236, 1244 (2023). Where there is conflicting evidence, it is the trial court's task to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to weigh the evidence presented. Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 354, 357, 815 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Ct. App. 1991). Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept that evidence and rely on it to determine whether a disputed point of fact was proven. Hull v. Giesler, 156 Idaho 765, 772, 331 P.3d 507, 514 (2014); Hutchison v. Anderson, 130 Idaho 936, 940, 950 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Ct. App. 1997). On appeal from a finding of criminal contempt, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision. See Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 142 Idaho 826, 830, 136 P.3d 297, 301 (2006) (considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict when reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict); State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998) (considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution when reviewing a finding of guilt in a criminal case); see also Moore v. Moore, 576 S.W.3d 15, 17 (Ark. 2019) (); In re Williams, 818 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ga.Ct.App. 2018) ().
Khurana focuses his sufficiency challenge on the absence of an individual witness or other direct evidence placing him at the residence or the occurrence of the damage to it at a specific time following issuance of the restraining order. However, a constellation of evidence in the record supports the magistrate court's finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that both occurred after issuance of the restraining order.
During the contempt trial, the magistrate court admitted copies of documents Khurana ostensibly authored and filed in a bankruptcy proceeding that coincided with the ejectment action.[3]In one of the documents, captioned "Emergency Motion for State - Pending Appeal" and dated August 4, 2018, Khurana indicated he "fully intended[ed] to take his property if he [was] compelled" to...
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