State Dept. of Highways and Public Transp. v. King
Decision Date | 24 April 1991 |
Docket Number | No. D-0385,D-0385 |
Citation | 808 S.W.2d 465 |
Parties | STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, Petitioner, v. Edna KING, et al., Respondents |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Cynthia L. Hooper, Dan Morales, Mary F. Keller, Lou McCreary, Austin, for petitioner.
John W. Newton, III, Gilbert I. Low, Beaumont, for respondents.
Cecil King was killed and his wife and two daughters were injured when their car collided head-on with a car driven by Ronald Wright. King was driving in the right direction down a one-way access road toward a freeway entrance. Wright, who had been drinking, was headed the wrong way on that access road after having gone past a pair of "DO NOT ENTER" signs facing him. King's wife and daughters sued Wright and the State Department of Highways and Public Transportation. The jury found that both defendants' negligence caused the collision, attributing 15% to Wright, who settled with the Kings during trial, and 85% to the State. The Kings obtained favorable jury findings against the State on four theories: failure to place non-discretionary traffic signs or warning devices on the roadway; failure to correct the absence or condition of traffic signs or warning devices within a reasonable time after notice; failure to warn Cecil King of a dangerous condition or make the condition reasonably safe; and failure to warn King of hazards not normally connected with the use of the roadway. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict for the Kings against the State. The court of appeals affirmed. 795 S.W.2d 888 (1990).
Regarding the first of the Kings' four liability theories referred to above, their sign placement theory, the court of appeals recognized that the State would be immune from liability if its failure to place a sign were discretionary. See TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE §§ 101.056, 101.060(a)(1). 1 The court concluded, however, that the State had a non-discretionary duty to install a "Lane Use Control" sign facing the direction from which Wright entered the one-way access road, based upon section 2B-17 of the 1980 Texas Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (State Dep't of Highways and Public Transp.), which provides: "Lane Use Control signs shall be used where turning movements are required or unconventional turning movements are permitted from specific lanes at an intersection." The court of appeals held that section 2B-17 is mandatory, based upon section 1A-5 of the Manual which defines "shall" as:
[a] mandatory condition. Where certain requirements in the design or application of the device are described with the "shall" stipulation, it is mandatory when an installation is made that these requirements be met.
Assuming that section 2B-17 applied to the accident site in this case, other provisions of the Manual indicate that it is not mandatory in the legal sense used by the court of appeals. For example, section 1A-4, another of the general provisions like section 1A-5, states:
The decision to use a particular device at a particular location should be made on the basis of an engineering study of the location. Thus, while this Manual provides standards for design and application of traffic control devices, the Manual is not a substitute for engineering judgment. It is the intent that the provisions of this Manual be standards for traffic control devices installation, but not a legal requirement for installation. 2
Moreover, the statute authorizing adoption of the Manual affords the State discretion...
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...damages. Cf. Department of Highways & Public Trans. v. King, 795 S.W.2d 888, 894 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1990) writ denied per curiam 808 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.1991) ("trial court given broad discretion in determining sufficiency of instructions and definitions"). We previously have said "that trial ......
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...A violation of the MUTCD is not negligence per se, as compliance with MUTCD is not mandatory. See State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. King, 808 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tex.1991) (per curiam) (holding that MUTCD does not establish a mandatory duty under law). Moreover, alleging negligence per......
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