State Dept. of Highways and Public Transp. v. Dopyera

• Decision Date: 31 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. 08-90-00087-CV,08-90-00087-CV
• Citation: 799 S.W.2d 469
• Parties: STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, Appellant, v. Emil DOPYERA, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 469

799 S.W.2d 469

STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, Appellant, v. Emil DOPYERA, et al., Appellees.

No. 08-90-00087-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas El Paso.

Oct. 31, 1990.

Rehearing Overruled Dec. 12, 1990.

Don B. Morgan, Cynthia L. Hooper, Asst. Attys. Gen., Highway Div. Austin, for appellant.

Terry P. Ayre, Houston, for appellees.

Before OSBORN, C.J., and FULLER and KOEHLER, JJ.

OPINION

FULLER, Justice.

In a suit for property damages over the collision of a yacht with a drawbridge, the jury verdict was favorable to the yacht owner. We affirm.

The Dopyeras, Appellees, were owners and operators of the charter yacht, the "Rachel B. Jackson." In June 1985, the yacht collided with the Kemah drawbridge which was owned and operated by the State of Texas, through its agent, the State Department of Highways and Public Transportation, Appellant. The Kemah drawbridge, a motor-driven bridge, spanned the Clear Lake Channel and was being lowered at the time of the collision. Comparative negligence issues were submitted to the jury which placed sixty percent (60%) of the fault on the Dopyeras and forty percent (40%) of the fault on the operator of the drawbridge, the State Department of Highways and Transportation. Damage to the yacht was found to be $130,000.00. Applying the comparative negligence findings of the jury, the trial judge entered judgment for the Appellees in the amount of $52,000.00 plus interest and costs.

Point of Error No. One asserts challenges that the trial court erred by basing its judgment on federal admiralty law when the case was tried under the Texas Tort Claims Act ("TTCA").

Point of Error No. Two asserts that the trial court erred in applying maritime pure comparative negligence law to the jury findings tried under the TTCA and by doing so the trial court created two classes of plaintiffs.

Addressing the first point of error, it must be noted that if Texas contributory negligence law is applied, the Dopyeras would not recover under the jury verdict due to the fact that the jury found Appellees to be in excess of the fifty percent (50%) liability limit under Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.001(a) (Vernon Supp.1990). This, however, is a maritime tort action where a governmental unit of the State of Texas was sued under the TTCA. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.021 (Vernon 1986). Under maritime law, unlike the recovery allowed under the Texas contributory negligence scheme, a plaintiff's negligence is not an absolute bar to recovery and a comparative negligence standard is implemented to mitigate the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 258-59, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 61 L.Ed.2d 521, 526 (1979), reh. denied, 444 U.S. 889, 100 S.Ct. 194, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1980).

The TTCA provides that a governmental unit in the state is liable for property damage arising from the operation or use of "motor-driven equipment." Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.021. If Section 101.021 is applicable, the TTCA provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity which permits a claimant to bring a lawsuit and subject a governmental unit of the State of Texas to liability for claims specified in the TTCA. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 101.021, 101.025 (Vernon 1986). Although the TTCA does encompass a property damage claim arising from the operation of a motor-driven vehicle such as the motor-driven bridge in the case at hand, the liability for an accident arising from a maritime accident is not specified in the chapter regarding tort claims under Texas law. See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.023 (Vernon 1986). Thus, once Texas waived its sovereign immunity pursuant to the TTCA in an admiralty case, then maritime law and remedies apply. Kamani v. Port of Houston Authority, 702 F.2d 612, 613-14 (5th Cir.1983); see also Young v. Kilroy Oil Company of Texas, 673 S.W.2d 236, 244 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (where there is a judicially established federal administrative rule on issue at hand, the court should look to federal rule versus state jurisdiction to resolve the matter).

The general rule is that any tort which occurs in navigable waters of the United States falls within admiralty jurisdiction and maritime law applies. McCormick v. United States, 680 F.2d 345, 347 (5th Cir.1982). The yacht owned by Appellees was operating in navigable waters, therefore admiralty jurisdiction applies. The maritime cause of action may be brought either in state court pursuant to the "saving to suiters" clause or in federal court. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1333 (1986). Generally, if a maritime tort occurs, then maritime law governs regarding the rights and liabilities of the parties, regardless of whether the case could be brought in either a federal or state forum. 2 C.J.S. Admiralty § 70, at 173-74 (1972). Substantive remedies, however, afforded by the states must conform to the governing federal maritime standards. This remedy is called the "reverse-Erie" doctrine which requires the application of state law to conform to the governing federal law. Exxon Corporation v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 316 (5th Cir.1987), rev'd on other grounds, 486 U.S. 140, 108 S.Ct. 1684, 100 L.Ed.2d 127 (1988). Thus, even though state law may be used to supplement maritime law when maritime law is silent on an issue, or where there is a local matter in issue, state law may not be used when it would conflict with maritime law. See Exxon Corporation v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 316. In light of the fact that the TTCA does not contain a provision as to whether contributory negligence would bar...