State Division of Human Rights v. Village of Spencerport

• Decision Date: 12 December 1980
• Parties: STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Susan Howarth), Petitioner, v. VILLAGE OF SPENCERPORT, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 52

434 N.Y.S.2d 52

78 A.D.2d 50

STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Susan Howarth), Petitioner, v. VILLAGE OF SPENCERPORT, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Dec. 12, 1980.

Ann Thatcher Anderson, New York City, for petitioner (Alan Saks, New York City, of counsel).

Robert L. Fraser, Spencerport, for respondent.

Before CARDAMONE, J. P., and SIMONS, HANCOCK, CALLAHAN and MOULE, JJ.

SIMONS, Justice:

This is an original proceeding pursuant to section 298 of the Executive Law in which the State Division of Human Rights seeks an order enforcing a prior determination of the Commissioner of Human Rights that the respondent Village unlawfully discriminated against complainant, Susan Howarth, by discharging her from employment because of her marital status. In responding, the Village has addressed the merits of the prior proceeding and the Division contends that since the Village failed to appeal the Commissioner's order we are now foreclosed from reviewing it. That contention has been urged before and rejected by the Court of Appeals (see dissenting opn State Div. of Human Rights v. Bystricky, 36 A.D.2d 278, at 281, 320 N.Y.S.2d 684, affd. State Div. of Human Rights v. Bystricky, 30 N.Y.2d 322, 333 N.Y.S.2d 398, 284 N.E.2d 560). Accordingly, we have reviewed the merits and although the points raised by the Village do not warrant denial of the application and dismissal of the petition, we nevertheless grant that relief based upon our finding that as a matter of law complainant's discharge was not motivated by conduct proscribed by section 296 of the Executive Law.

In 1973 complainant was hired as a part-time secretary by the former Mayor of Spencerport. She continued her employment through two different Village administrations until she was discharged on February 16, 1977. At the hearing, the Village advanced a number of reasons for her discharge, but the Commissioner found that she was fired because she was married to James Howarth and that, but for the controversy in the Village over real property tax assessments and her husband's role in increasing them, she would have been continued in her employment.

Mr. Howarth was the Director of the Department of Taxation and Assessment of the Town of Ogden, the agency that established tax assessments for the Town and also for the Village of Spencerport which was within the geographic boundaries of the Town. In 1976-1977, he increased the assessments of several real properties in Ogden because of improvements made by the owners. Considerable public resentment followed and in January 1977 Mr. Howarth was required to appear before the Village Board to explain the increases. He later appeared at a "heated" public hearing in February. Shortly after this hearing the Mayor discharged complainant and ultimately the Village decided not to adopt the changes in assessment for Village tax purposes. The evidence in the record discloses that at the time all this occurred, the Mayor was campaigning for re-election. He stated at the hearing that he found the employment of complainant "somewhat of an embarrassment" and that he had been urged by others to discharge her.

On this evidence, fully supported by the record and not seriously challenged by the Village, the Commissioner found that Susan Howarth was unlawfully discharged from her employment because of her marital status.

The Legislature has declared that the State has the responsibility to "assure that every individual within this state is afforded an opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life" and that equal opportunity for employment is basic to that enjoyment (Executive Law, §§ 290, 291; City of Schenectady v. State Div. of Human Rights, 37 N.Y.2d 421, 424, 373 N.Y.S.2d 59, 335 N.E.2d 290; State Div. of Human Rights v. Kilian Mfg. Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 201, 207, 360 N.Y.S.2d 603, 318 N.E.2d 770). To that end, the Legislature enacted the Human Rights Law, created the Division of Human Rights to enforce it (Executive Law, § 293), and directed that the statute be construed liberally (Executive Law, § 300; Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 183, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183).

The underlying purpose of the Human Rights Law is to insure that decisions involving employment, housing and similar advantage rest upon individual qualifications and not be the product of prejudice or unlawful bias. The statute originally forbade discrimination based upon race, creed and national origin, but it soon became clear that there also existed widespread discriminatory practices based on sex, age, disability and marital status. Bias with respect to marital status was particularly evident in financial matters where women, because they were single, divorced or separated, or conversely because they were dependent on their husbands, frequently encountered difficulties in obtaining credit not similarly experienced by men. The Human Rights Law was amended to eliminate that discrimination in 1974 (L.1974, ch. 173; Executive Law, § 296-a) and in 1975 the Act was further amended also to prohibit discrimination based upon marital status in employment and housing matters (L.1975, ch. 803). Senator Smith, the sponsor of the amendment, stated that the amendment was intended to extend the jurisdiction of the Division of Human Rights to complaints of discrimination resulting "from sex, or from the status of divorced, separated, widowed or single persons or from other status related to marriage" (N.Y. Legis. Ann. 1975, p. 65).

The amendment has apparently not been interpreted by the courts, but typically it should be construed to prevent such...