State ex Inf. Mallett v. Joplin
| Decision Date | 12 June 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 32671.,32671. |
| Citation | 62 S.W.2d 393 |
| Parties | STATE EX INF. RUSSELL MALLETT, EX REL. EDGAR WOMACK ET AL. v. CITY OF JOPLIN, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jasper Circuit Court. — Hon. Emory E. Smith, Judge.
REVERSED.
R.A. Pearson and Norman Cox for appellant.
(1) The ordinance of annexation is in accordance with the provisions of the applicable section of the statutes which confers on the city council the power — with the consent of the voters of the city — to extend the city limits over adjacent territory in all cases and in such manner as in their judgment and discretion may redound to the benefit of the city. No specific power is given to the courts to review this discretion by this or any other section of the statutes. Under the plain language of the statute — which must be given full consideration — the court has no right to review the discretion of the city council as to what will redound to the benefit of the city, its right of review being limited to a determination, under established rules of law, of whether or not the council has acted unreasonably (i.e., arbitrarily, oppressively or fraudulently) in annexing particular territories, in derogation of private vested rights. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of the ordinance and of its reasonableness, the passage thereof, in itself, making out a prima facie case. The court is justified in declaring said ordinance unreasonable only when this prima facie case is overcome in the most satisfactory manner and in accordance with well established rules laid down by the Supreme Court as a guide in determining the question. Sec. 6483, R.S. 1929; State ex rel. v. Birch, 186 Mo. 221; State ex rel. v. West Plains, 163 Mo. App. 171; 2 Words and Phrases (3 Ed) p. 1072; Morse v. City of Westport, 110 Mo. 508; In re Kansas City Ordinance No. 39946, 252 S.W. 404; St. Louis v. Railway, 174 S.W. 94; Winter v. Kirkwood, 296 S.W. 232; Hislop v. Joplin, 250 Mo. 599; 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, p. 598, sec. 265; State ex rel. Morgan v. Hemenway, 272 Mo. 203; State ex rel. Sons v. Holland, 186 Mo. 222; Copeland v. St. Joseph, 126 Mo. 433; St. Louis v. Ry. Co., 263 Mo. 456; Sec. 6843, R.S. 1929; State ex rel. v. Kansas City, 233 Mo. 218; State ex inf. v. Maplewood, 193 S.W. 990. (3) Proof of the adoption of the ordinance of annexation and of its ratification by the voters of the city made out a prima facie case in favor of the legality of the annexation and the reasonableness thereof, which could be overcome only by the clearest and most satisfactory proof on the part of relators that the city council acted arbitrarily or in bad faith or fraudulently in violation of private vested rights. This prima facie case was not so overcome by proof in the record in this case. On the contrary, the record overwhelmingly proves that the annexed territories are adjacent to the corporate limits of Joplin and are of a character which makes of them, under the rules laid down as a guide by the Supreme Court, proper subjects of annexation, and which establishes beyond question the reasonableness of the annexation. The trial court failed and refused to give any consideration whatever to this proof, and failed and refused to apply to the true record in the case the true measure for determining the reasonableness of the annexation which is laid down by the Supreme Court, and the finding and judgment of the trial court is against the evidence, against the law as applicable to the record and is for the wrong party. State ex inf. v. Kansas City, 233 Mo. 214; Copeland v. St. Joseph, 126 Mo. 417; Winter v. Kirkwood, 296 S.W. 232; State ex inf. v. Maplewood, 193 S.W. 989; State ex inf. v. Fleming, 158 Mo. 565; Vestal v. Little Rock, 54 Ark. 321; 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, sec. 272; 28 Cyc. 188. (4) In determining the question of the reasonableness of the annexation ordinance, the trial court, over the objection and exception of the city, erroneously admitted and considered evidence on the part of relators to the effect that they did not want to be annexed to the city; that it would subject their property to city taxes and to special assessment for street improvements; subject the annexed territories to the police regulation of the city, and divide their school districts, none of which testimony was competent for any purpose or in any wise determinative of the question of the reasonableness of the annexation ordinance. State ex rel. Morgan v. Hemenway, 272 Mo. 203; State ex rel. Sons v. Holland, 186 Mo. 222; 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, p. 598, sec. 265. (5) The submission of the question of annexation in one act of submission and as one proposition was a matter wholly within the discretion and judgment of the city council, and was proper. State ex inf. v. Kansas City, 233 Mo. 176; State ex rel. v. Lichte, 226 Mo. 286; Wade v. Richmond, 18 Grat. (Va.) 593.
Russell Mallett, Foulke & Foulke, Roy Coyne and S.W. Bates for respondents.
(1) Respondent raises no question of irregularity or infirmity in the ordinance in question, in this court; the action is a direct proceeding in quo warranto on the familiar theory that the attempted extension of the city limits, covered by Section 1 of the ordinance in question, being an act legislative in its nature, its reasonableness is thereby a fit subject for judicial inquiry and the action is proper. State ex inf. Atty-Genl. v. Kansas City, 233 Mo. 162, 134 S.W. 1007; Kansas City v. Stegmiller, 151 Mo. 209, 52 S.W. 723; State ex rel. v. Birch, 186 Mo. 220, 85 S.W. 361; State ex inf. v. Fleming, 158 Mo. 565, 59 S.W. 964. The action is one at law and not a suit in equity. State ex rel. v. Wright, 270 Mo. 387, 194 S.W. 39; State ex rel. v. Peoples Ice Co., 246 Mo. 168, 200 S.W. 101; State ex inf. v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 345, 116 S.W. 902. (2) While the exercise of delegated power by a municipal body is presumed to be reasonable, and the enactment of an ordinance, followed by a vote of approval by the electorate, makes a prima facie case, nevertheless such legislation and action is in no wise conclusive and contains no particular virtue different from a like presumption prevailing in any other case. Municipal corporations have none of the elements of sovereignty, the city council being neither omnipotent nor its action of such sacredness in undertaking to extend municipal limits that it is beyond the field of inquiry by the court, or requires any greater or different proof, or weight of evidence, than any other corporate legislation in determining the question of its reasonableness or its unreasonableness. State ex rel. v. Mining Co., 262 Mo. 505, 171 S.W. 356; Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 72 Mo. 220; Kelley v. Meeks, 87 Mo. 401; Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 544; Copeland v. St. Joseph, 126 Mo. 431, 29 S.W. 281; Stoltman v. City of Clayton, 205 Mo. App. 583; Hislop v. Joplin, 250 Mo. 588, 157 S.W. 625; Warren v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 115 Mo. 572, 22 S.W. 490. (3) The court did not err in the admission of evidence. Evidence of a vast area of unoccupied, unplatted and undeveloped territory within the city, available and adaptable for city purposes, was properly admitted. State ex inf. v. Kansas City, 233 S.W. 196; 43 C.J. 121, par. 78; 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, par, 279, p. 632; Stoltman v. City of Clayton, 205 Mo. App. 586; Vestal v. Little Rock, 15 S.W. 893; Jones v. City of Clayton, 7 S.W. (2d) 1022. (4) Wherever an ordinance, whether for the purpose of extending the municipal limits, or for any other purpose, is so clearly oppressive, unjust and unwarranted on the facts, our courts have many times declared such municipal legislation unreasonable and therefore void. Plattsburg v. Riley, 42 Mo. App. 18; City of Kansas v. Cook, 38 Mo. App. 660; Chillicothe v. Brown, 38 Mo. App. 660; Cape Girardeau v. Rile; 72 Mo. 220; Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541; St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547; Railroad v. Springfield, 85 Mo. 674; Kelly v. Meeks, 87 Mo. 401; Jones v. City of Clayton, 7 S.W. (2d) 1024.
This is a quo warranto action, commenced by the Prosecuting Attorney of Jasper County at the relation of certain interested landowners, to oust the city of Joplin from certain territory over which it had assumed jurisdiction in 1929, under Section 1, of ordinance No. 15162 of the city extending its boundaries. The contention of the relators was that this extension of the city's boundaries was "wholly unreasonable, unnecessary for any city purposes whatsoever, unjust, illegal and invalid, not attempted in good faith ... and of no benefit whatsoever to said territory included." The circuit court upheld the relators' contention and entered a judgment of ouster against the city. The city appealed to the Springfield Court of Appeals and that court reversed the judgment. [State ex inf. Mallett v. City of Joplin, 52 S.W. (2d) 602.] Upon motion for rehearing, one of the judges dissented and the cause was certified here under the provisions of Section 6 of Amendment of 1884 to the Constitution.
It was shown that the last prior extension of the boundaries of the city was made in 1908. Prior to that time the city extended north from the Jasper County-Newton County line to Turkey Creek, a distance of almost four miles at the longest place. The width, east and west, was about two and one-fourth miles. In 1908 the city limits were extended both east and west. On the east three sections were added, making a strip a mile east and west and extending three miles north from the county line. On the west an extension of the same dimensions was made except that a 120-acre strip, now sought to be included, was not taken in then. The strip on the west included the west three-quarters of the sections, into which the city already extended a quarter of a mile, and a quarter of a mile strip off of the east side of the next row of sections, with the exception of the above-referred to 120 acres. This extension of 1908 made...
To continue reading
Request your trial