State ex. inf. Noblet ex rel. McDonald v. Moore
| Decision Date | 10 June 1941 |
| Docket Number | 37576 |
| Citation | 152 S.W.2d 86,347 Mo. 1170 |
| Parties | State of Missouri on the information of Russell S. Noblet, Prosecuting Attorney of Nodaway County, ex rel. Hugh D. McDonald, Relator, v. Mattie E. Moore |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Judgment for respondent.
Livengood & Weightman for relator.
(1) Respondent is disqualified from holding the office of county treasurer by reason of the fact that she was township collector on November 5, 1940. Sec. 12137, Laws 1937, p. 427 now Sec. 13799, R. S. 1939; State ex rel. McAllister v Dunn, 277 Mo. 38. (2) Respondent's eligibility must be determined at the time of her election and not at the time of taking office. State ex rel. McAllister v. Dunn, 277 Mo. 38; State ex rel. Mitchell v. McDonald, 164 Miss. 405, 145 So. 508, 86 A. L. R. 295; Finklea v Farish, 160 Ala. 309, 49 So. 366; Davis v. Teague, 220 Ala. 309, 125 So. 51, 281 U.S. 695, 74 L.Ed. 1123, 50 S.Ct. 248; Searcy v. Grow, 15 Cal. 117; Spitzer v. Martin, 130 Md. 428, 100 A. 739; State ex rel. McKelvie v. Wait, 95 Neb. 806, 146 N.W. 1048; State ex rel. Nourse v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566; People v. Purdy, 154 N.Y. 439, 48 N.E. 821, 61 Am. St. Rep. 624. (3) The word "Collector" in Section 12137, Laws of 1937, page 427 includes respondent as "Township Collector." Sections, 12130, 12130a, 12130c, Laws 1937, pp. 425, 426; State ex rel. K. C. Power & Light Co. v. Smith, 111 S.W.2d 515; State ex rel. Dean v. Daues, 14 S.W.2d 1002.
Emmett Bartram, C. G. Vogt and C. B. DuBois for respondent.
(1) The statutes imposing respondent's qualifications will receive a liberal construction in favor of the right of the people to exercise freedom of choice in the selection of respondent to the office of treasurer and disqualifications asserted by relator will not be extended to cases not clearly within their scope. 46 C. J. 937, sec. 32; State ex rel. Goodman v. Heath, 345 Mo. 226, 132 S.W.2d 1001; State ex rel. Harris v. Menengali, 307 Mo. 447; State ex rel. Circuit Attorney v. Macklin, 41 Mo.App. 339; State ex rel. Ryors v. Breuer, 235 Mo. 240. (2) The word "collector" in Section 12137, Laws 1937, page 427, and in Section 13799, Revised Statutes 1939, does not refer to township collectors. Secs. 5404, 7429, 7445 R. S. 1879; Sec. 45, R. S. 1865, Laws 1879, p. 318; Sec. 12137, R. S. 1929; Sec. 12132a, Laws 1933; Sec. 13933, R. S. 1939; Harrison and Mercer County Drain. Dist. v. Trail Creek Twp., 317 Mo. 933, 297 S.W. 1; Sec. 12, Art. VI, Mo. Const.; Liquidation Bank v. Moberly, 127 S.W.2d 669; Wright County v. Bank, 30 S.W.2d 32; Township v. Bank, 12 S.W.2d 763; State ex rel. McAllister v. Dunn, 277 Mo. 38; Sec. 8057, R. S. 1909, now Sec. 655, R. S. 1939; State ex rel. v. Breuer, 235 Mo. 250; Secs. 1400, 14014, 14016, R. S. 1939. (3) The fact that respondent was township collector of Polk township, Nodaway County, Missouri, on November 5th, 1940, does not disqualify her from holding the office of County Treasurer of Nodaway County, Missouri. Under the statutes of this State, respondent's eligibility will be determined on April 1st, 1941, at the time of taking the office of treasurer. Sec. 19, Art. II, Mo. Const.; Sec. 11068, R. S. 1939; State ex inf. Goodman v. Heath, 345 Mo. 226, 132 S.W.2d 1001; State ex inf. Major v. Breuer, 235 Mo. 240, 138 S.W. 515; State ex inf. Bellamy v. Menengali, 307 Mo. 447, 270 S.W. 101; State ex rel. Circuit Attorney v. Macklin, 41 Mo.App. 335; 46 C. J. 949, sec. 58, p. 943; 22 R. C. L. 403, sec. 43; 24 R. C. L. 571, sec. 16; 88 A. L. R. 812; State ex rel. Harris v. Menengali, 307 Mo. 447; State ex rel. Circuit Attorney v. Macklin, 41 Mo.App. 335; State ex rel. Ryors v. Breuer, 235 Mo. 240; Sec. 9287, R. S. 1929; State ex rel. Owens v. Draper, 45 Mo. 355; Mosby v. Armstrong, 290 Pa. 517; 41 L. R. A., (N. S.) 1119; Spitzer v. Martin, 130 Md. 428; Neelley v. Farr, 61 Colo. 485; Bradfield v. Avery, 16 Idaho 769; People v. Hamilton, 24 Ill.App. 609; Smith v. Moore, 90 Ind. 294; Vogel v. State, 107 Ind. 374; Brown v. Goben, 122 Ind. 113; State ex rel. Thornburg v. Huegle, 135 Iowa 100; Demaree v. Scates, 50 Kan. 275; Kirkpatrick v. Brownfield, 97 Ky. 558; Jones v. Williams, 153 Ky. 822; Powell v. Hart, 132 La. 287; People ex rel. Martin v. Kenyon, 134 N.Y.S. 1007; People v. Purdy, 154 N.Y. 439; State ex rel. West v. Breckenridge, 34 Okla. 649; State ex rel. Perkins v. Edwards, 99 Vt. 1; State v. Trumpf, 50 Wis. 103; State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Dammann, 201 Wis. 84; Ward v. Crowell, 142 Cal. 587; Widincamp v. Wood, 167 Ga. 57; Sunder v. Collins, 27 P.2d 382; State ex rel. Railroad v. Macon County, 41 Mo. 458; State v. DeBar, 58 Mo. 397; State v. Greene, 87 Mo. 583; Secs. 1335, 1487, R. S. 1879; State ex rel. Tax Comm. v. Crawford, 303 Mo. 662.
Douglas, J. All concur except Ellison, J., not sitting.
This is an original proceeding in quo warranto to oust the respondent from the office of County Treasurer of Nodaway County. The office is claimed by Hugh D. McDonald, the incumbent County Treasurer at the time of respondent's election, on the ground that respondent is ineligible for the office and is incapable of qualifying so that he holds over until a successor can duly qualify.
The interested parties have agreed upon the facts which show that Nodaway County is a county under township organization. Respondent was elected, in 1939, township collector of Polk township in Nodaway County for a two-year term expiring March 28, 1941. She was the nominee of her party for county treasurer at the General Election in 1940 and was elected by a plurality of 137 votes for a term to commence April 1, 1941. She furnished the proper bond which was approved and she received her commission for the office.
The only attack on her right to the office involves the question whether a township collector is included within the prohibition of the statute making a "collector" ineligible to the office of county treasurer. The statute reads: "No sheriff, marshal, clerk or collector, or the deputy of any such officer, shall be eligible to the office of treasurer of any county." [Sec. 13799, R. S. 1939, Mo. Stat. Ann., sec. 12137, p. 6438.] Respondent contends that the officers named in the statute refer only to county officers and particularly, in the case of a collector, to the county collector only and not to a township collector. The relator argues to the contrary and that the term collector includes a township collector as well as a county collector.
Investigating the history of the statute involved, we find it in the Revised Statutes of 1835 on page 153 in substantially the same form except that no "marshal" was mentioned. It is included in an article entitled "County Treasuries" in which article the duties of collectors, clerks and other officers are also prescribed. The clerk referred to in the statute is without a doubt the county clerk, or the clerk of a court of record; the sheriff, the county sheriff; and the collector, the county collector. It should be noted that when the statute was enacted all the officers made ineligible for office of treasurer were at the least county officers. As a matter of fact township officers were not provided for until many years later.
In the Revised Statutes of 1855 on page 1467 we find that the office of marshal, likewise a county office, was established for the County of St. Louis and this officer was added to the statute in question and made ineligible to the office of county treasurer. [R. S. 1855, p. 529.]
At the outset we should observe that statutes prescribing requirements of eligibility to an elective office must be given a liberal construction. This is so because in our democratic form of government the greatest possible freedom of choice in the selection of their officers is a natural right of the people and this right must be zealously guarded by the courts. This court has heretofore announced this rule in State ex inf. Mitchell v. Heath, 345 Mo. 226, 132 S.W.2d 1001.
We recognize the rule of statutory construction that ordinarily a statute expressed in general terms will be given a prospective interpretation and will be construed to apply not only to things and conditions existing at its passage but will also apply to such as come into existence thereafter. [State ex rel. St. Joseph Lead Co. v. Jones, 270 Mo. 230, 192 S.W. 980.] But necessarily the prospective application of a statute must be limited to such new things only as come within the logical and natural intent of the statute.
The relator argues that a township collector, although the office was created long after the statute was enacted, falls naturally within the logical intent of the statute. He admits that the sole basis and support for this argument is the reasoning expressed in State ex rel. McAllister v. Dunn, 277 Mo. 38, 209 S.W. 110.
That case was also an action in quo warranto involving the same statute. The respondent in that case had been a deputy collector of the City of St. Louis and while such he was elected city treasurer. It was contended that he was ineligible to hold such office in view of the prohibition of the statute. It was conceded that the statute was applicable to officers of the City of St. Louis as county officers because of the classification of St. Louis as a county rather than a city. We held that respondent was ineligible to the office of treasurer and ousted him on the sole ground that the purpose of the statute was to obviate the situation where "one could be chosen treasurer and take and hold the office when, in all probability, public money in his hands in his former official capacity would have to be received and receipted for by himself in his new official capacity."
In considering this finding as to the purpose of the statute it must be borne in mind that a county treasurer...
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