State ex rel. Ames v. Brimfield Twp. Bd. of Trs.
| Decision Date | 02 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2019-P-0017,2019-P-0017 |
| Citation | 149 N.E.3d 933,2019 Ohio 4926 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio EX REL. Brian M. AMES, Relator-Appellant, v. BRIMFIELD TOWNSHIP BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Brian M. Ames, pro se, 2632 Ranfield Road, Mogadore, OH 44260 (Relator-Appellant).
James F. Mathews and Andrea K. Ziarko, Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, 400 South Main Street, North Canton, OH 44720 (For Respondent-Appellee).
{¶1} Appellant, Brian M. Ames ("Ames"), appeals from a decision rendered by the Portage County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, the Brimfield Township Board of Trustees ("the Board"). The trial court's judgment is reversed.
{¶2} On May 30, 2017, Ames filed a pro se "Verified Complaint in Mandamus, Injunction, and Declaratory Judgment" against the Board and the Board's three Trustees,1 alleging 14 counts in violation of R.C. 121.22, Ohio's Open Meetings Act ("OMA"). Ames' counts all allege that, on specific dates in which meetings were held, the Board entered executive sessions for matters not permissible for non-public discussion under the exceptions contained in R.C. 121.22(G). The sole basis for these claims is the meeting minutes of each meeting, which fail to detail the specific exception claimed for entering an executive session. Ames discovered these alleged violations after requesting meeting minutes for meetings held by the Board in previous years during a "general survey" of various "public bodies" undertaken by Ames.
{¶3} The Board filed an answer, denying it had violated any provisions of R.C. 121.22. Thereafter, Ames and the Board each filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting no genuine issue as to any material fact alleged in the complaint remained to be litigated. Both parties attached a copy of the meeting minutes and discovery responses to the motions for summary judgment. The Board also attached an affidavit from one of the trustees of the Board, Mike Kostensky, who was present at each of the 14 meetings. His sworn averment, through the attached affidavit, was that "when a trustee makes a motion to move into executive session, the trustee follows the language as set forth in R.C. 121.22(G)," and that at each of the 14 meetings referenced in the complaint, "the motions to move into executive session were made pursuant to R.C. 121.22(G)(1), and no discussions or deliberations as to public business were improperly held outside the public meeting."
{¶4} Ames' sole theory in support of granting summary judgment is that the meeting minutes demonstrate a violation of R.C. 121.22. The Board contends R.C. 121.22(G) requires specific reference in the motion and vote held during a meeting, but it does not require a verbatim description of the applicable exception under R.C. 121.22(G) in the meeting minutes. Further, it contends the executive sessions held on the dates cited in the complaint were compliant with the exception contained in R.C. 121.22(G)(1).
{¶5} On February 13, 2019, the trial court issued a judgment entry granting the Board's motion for summary judgment and denying Ames' motion for summary judgment. The trial court held the following:
{¶6} Ames filed a timely notice of appeal and raises one assignment of error for our review:
{¶7} "The Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment for the Board and denying summary judgment for Ames."
{¶8} The issue presented for review and argument by Ames is as follows: "Must the meeting minutes of a public body be accurate enough to show that the motions and votes to hold executive session complied with the OMA?"
{¶9} From the outset, the parties disagree on the applicable standard of review. Ames advocates for a de novo standard of review because the trial court found no violation of the OMA before denying him summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of the Board. See State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 11th Dist. Portage No. 2016-P-0057, 2017-Ohio-4237, 2017 WL 2560970, ¶17. The Board contends that, because Ames filed the action in mandamus rather than directly under the OMA, the standard of review is abuse of discretion by the trial court. See State ex rel. Scott v. City of Streetsboro , 150 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-3308, 78 N.E.3d 809, ¶18.
{¶10} While the general rule is that the standard of review in a mandamus case is abuse of discretion, where the lower court grants summary judgment, this court reviews the decision de novo. State ex rel. Manley v. Walsh , 142 Ohio St.3d 384, 2014-Ohio-4563, 31 N.E.3d 608, ¶17, citing State ex rel. Anderson v. Vermilion , 134 Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-5320, 980 N.E.2d 975, ¶8-9. This court has previously held, in accordance with the Ohio Supreme Court, that the appropriate standard of review for summary judgment on a mandamus action is de novo. State ex rel. Brannon v. Lakeview School Bd. of Edn. , 11th Dist. Trumbull, 2016-Ohio-1367, 62 N.E.3d 1003, ¶8, citing Manley , supra , at ¶17. Radtke v. Chester Twp. , 11th Dist. Geauga, 2015-Ohio-4016, 44 N.E.3d 295, ¶19, citing Beaumont v. Kvaerner N. Am. Constr. , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2013-T-0047, 2013-Ohio-5847, 2013 WL 6887969, ¶8.
{¶11} "Summary judgment is a procedural device intended to terminate litigation and to avoid trial when there is nothing to try." Frano v. Red Robin Internatl., Inc. , 181 Ohio App.3d 13, 2009-Ohio-685, 907 N.E.2d 796, ¶12 (11th Dist.), citing Murphy v. Reynoldsburg , 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358, 604 N.E.2d 138 (1992). Summary judgment is proper when (1) no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. , 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977), citing Civ.R. 56(C).
{¶12} The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt , 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). The moving party must point to some evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) () that affirmatively demonstrates there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264.
{¶13} "While summary judgment is a beneficial procedure aiding in the swift administration of justice, it must also ‘be used cautiously and with the utmost care so that a litigant's right to a trial * * * is not usurped in the presence of conflicting facts and inferences.’ " Fifth Third Mtge. Co. v. Perry , 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 12CA13, 2013-Ohio-3308, 2013 WL 3946087, ¶35, quoting Viock v. Stowe-Woodward Co. , 13 Ohio App.3d 7, 15, 467 N.E.2d 1378 (6th Dist.1983).
{¶14} The specific issue presented to this court on appeal is as follows: Does the R.C. 121.22(C) directive that the minutes "need only reflect the general subject matter of discussions in executive sessions" require the minutes to include the applicable exception under R.C. 121.22(G) for entering an executive session?
{¶15} The purpose of Ohio's OMA "is to assure accountability of elected officials by prohibiting their secret deliberations on public issues." State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty. Commrs. , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-010605, 2002 WL 727023, *1 (Apr. 26, 2002) (citation omitted). The Act "shall be liberally construed to require public officials to take official action and to conduct all deliberations upon official business only in open meetings, unless the subject matter is specifically excepted by law." R.C. 121.22(A).
{¶16} The exceptions to the public meeting requirement are contained in R.C. 121.22(G), which states, "the members of a public body may hold an executive session only after a majority of a quorum of the public body determines, by a roll call vote, to hold an executive session * * * for the sole purpose of the consideration of any of the following matters [enumerated in (G)(1)–(8) ]." R.C. 121.22(G). The exception claimed by the Board, through its submitted affidavit, in each of the 14 instances where an executive session was held is contained in R.C. 121.22(G)(1) :
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