State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs
| Decision Date | 13 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2020-P-0089,2020-P-0088 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO ex rel. BRIAN M. AMES, Relator-Appellant, v. PORTAGE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
Civil Appeals from the Court of Common Pleas Trial Court Nos. 2016 CV 00582, 2017 CV 00415
Brian M. Ames, pro se, (Relator-Appellant).
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor; Timothy J. Piero & Christopher J. Meduri, (For Respondent-Appellee).
{¶1} In this consolidated appeal, appellant, Brian M. Ames ("Mr. Ames"), appeals the judgments of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in his favor against appellee, the Portage County Board of Commissioners ("the board"); ordering the board to pay a civil forfeiture of $500 to Mr. Ames; and overruling Mr. Ames's motion for relief from judgment filed in a separate case.
{¶2} Mr. Ames asserts four assignments of error, contending that the trial court erred by (1) granting his motions for summary judgment "per directive" of this court when no such directive was made; (2) failing to consider his motions for summary judgment; (3) applying this court's decision in Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist, 11th Dist. Geauga No 2007-G-2780, 2007-Ohio-6728, to find a single "technical" violation of the Open Meetings Act ("OMA") despite the board's alleged 130 violations; and (4) issuing a judgment entry overruling his motion for relief from judgment where there was no underlying judgment or motion.
{¶3} After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, we find as follows:
{¶4} (1) Mr. Ames has not demonstrated prejudice resulting from the trial court's alleged procedural errors since the trial court granted summary judgment in his favor. Despite the lack of prejudice, Mr. Ames has also not overcome the presumption of regularity of the trial court's proceedings based on the trial court's use of the term "directive" or the lack of detail in the judgment entry.
{¶5} (2) We decline Mr. Ames's invitation to overturn Weisbarth, as it represents binding precedent that this court has continued to apply in recent cases involving civil forfeitures for "technical" violations of the OMA.
{¶6} (3) It appears that the trial court erroneously filed on the dockets of the underlying cases a judgment entry overruling Mr. Ames's motion for relief from judgment in a separate case. Since this judgment entry appears to have no actual effect in the underlying cases, much less a prejudicial effect on Mr. Ames, the trial court's error is harmless.
{¶7} Thus, we affirm the judgments of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶8} This appeal involves two civil cases that Mr. Ames filed against the board alleging multiple violations of the OMA.
{¶9} In case no. 2016 CV 00582, Mr. Ames, pro se, filed an amended verified complaint alleging the board committed 55 violations and one threatened violation of the OMA by holding executive sessions pursuant to R.C. 121.22(G)(1) without stating which one or more of the approved purposes listed in the statute were the purposes for which the executive session was held.
{¶10} In case no. 2017 CV 00415, Mr. Ames, pro se, filed a verified complaint alleging that the board committed 75 additional violations and one threatened violation of the OMA based on the same factual and legal bases. Mr. Ames alleged that the board's practice prior to entering executive sessions for matters concerning personnel was to read from R.C 121.22(G)(1) and reiterate the "laundry list" of possible matters set forth in the statute without specifying which of those purposes would be discussed.
{¶11} In both complaints, Mr. Ames sought a declaratory judgment that the board violated the OMA; an order to "permanently enjoin" the board "to comply" with the OMA; a $500 civil forfeiture for each violation and the threatened violations; an order that the board annotate the meeting minutes to reflect the approved purposes for each executive session; and court costs and reasonable attorney fees.
{¶12} In his amended complaint in case no. 2016 CV 00582, Mr. Ames sought an additional declaration that all actions resulting from executive sessions held in violation of R.C. 121.22 were invalid pursuant to R.C. 121.22(H).
{¶13} During the course of extensive pretrial proceedings [1] the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The board admitted that it read from R.C. 121.22(G)(1) prior to entering the executive sessions referenced in Mr. Ames's complaints but contended that its practice complied with the OMA.
{¶14} The trial court issued judgment entries granting the board's motions for summary judgment and denying Mr. Ames's motions for summary judgment. The trial court determined that the board's practice did not violate the OMA and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
{¶15} Mr. Ames appealed both judgments. In Ames I and II, this court affirmed the trial court's judgments in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
{¶16} First, we determined that Mr. Ames's appeal with respect to count 55 in case no. 2016 CV 00582 was moot because it alleged the same violation as count 1 in case no. 2017 CV 00415. Ames II at ¶ 51.
{¶17} Second, we determined that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to the board on count 75 in case no. 2017 CV 00415 because it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata based on this court's prior decision in State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 11th Dist. Portage No. 2016-P-0057, 2017-Ohio-4237. See Ames I at ¶ 40-47.
{¶18} Third, we determined that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the board on the remaining counts in both cases. See Ames I at ¶ 48-65; Ames II at ¶ 52-71. We found that the trial court erred in holding that the board necessarily stated an acceptable purpose under R.C. 121.22(G)(1) by reading the entire list of permissible purposes verbatim. The statute mandates that the board specifically state in its motions and votes the particular permitted purpose or purposes that the board reasonably intends to discuss during executive session. Ames I at ¶ 63; Ames II at ¶ 69. We acknowledged that "given the litigation history between Mr. Ames and the [b]oard, the [b]oard, in good faith sought to insulate itself from more litigation by erring on the side of inclusiveness." Ames I and II at ¶ 4. However, we stated that "for future meetings, the [b]oard must be more precise." Id.
{¶19} Finally, we determined that the trial court did not err by denying Mr. Ames's motions for summary judgment. See Ames I at ¶ 66-76; Ames II at ¶ 72-82. We explained that based on the record before us, the actual purpose or purposes that the board intended to discuss during each executive session was unclear. Ames I at ¶ 75; Ames II at ¶ 81. There was no evidence in the record demonstrating that the board did not reasonably intend to discuss all of the permissible purposes listed in the meeting minutes. Id.[2]
{¶20} Thus, we remanded both cases to the trial court for further proceedings. Ames I at ¶ 87; Ames II at ¶ 94.
{¶21} The record reflects extensive proceedings following remand.
{¶22} Relevant to this appeal, Mr. Ames served requests for admission on the board that it "did not intend to discuss all of the permissible purposes listed in the meeting minutes" with respect to each executive session identified in his complaints. In response to each request the board answered,
{¶23} In November 2019, Mr. Ames filed motions for summary judgment, attaching the board's answers to his requests for admission. The board filed a memorandum in opposition.
{¶24} In December 2019, this court issued its decision in State ex rel. Ames. v. Brimfield Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 2019-Ohio-4926, 149 N.E.3d 933 (11th Dist.) ("Ames III"). In that case, Mr. Ames filed a complaint against a township board of trustees, alleging that it violated the OMA by entering executive sessions for matters not permissible for non-public discussion under the exceptions in R.C. 121.22(G). Id. at ¶ 2. The sole basis for Mr. Ames's claims was the board's meeting minutes, which failed to detail the specific exception claimed for entering executive session. Id. This court held that Id. at ¶ 24.
{¶25} On March 18, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on Mr. Ames's motion for relief from judgment filed in a separate case involving the board (case no. 2018 CV 00283). The hearing transcript, which is part of the record of this appeal, indicates that Mr. Ames and the trial court engaged in some discussion regarding the pending issues in the underlying cases.
{¶26} Following the hearing, the trial court filed a judgment entry, which listed, in typeface, the case number for the separate case and, in handwriting, the case numbers for the underlying cases. The entry stated that the matter was before the trial court on Mr. Ames's motion for relief from judgment; the parties reached an agreement on the material issues of the case in the presence of the court on August 30, 2019; and Mr. Ames's motion for relief from judgment was overruled.
{¶27} Mr. Ames filed notices of appeal.[3] This court...
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