State ex rel. Anglin v. Mitchell
| Decision Date | 21 January 1980 |
| Citation | 596 S.W.2d 779 |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee ex rel. Randy ANGLIN, b/n/f Robert DeLaney v. Sammi MITCHELL, Superintendent, Tennessee Reception and Guidance Center; and C. Murray Henderson, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Corrections. STATE of Tennessee ex rel. Timothy Allen ANGLIN, b/n/f Robert DeLaney v. Howard G. COOK, Superintendent, Spencer Youth Center; and C. Murray Henderson, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Corrections. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Robert DeLaney, Jerry P. Black, Jr., William J. Rold, Craig Soland, University of Tennessee Legal Clinic, Knoxville, for petitioner.
William M. Leech, Jr., Atty. Gen., Robert A. Grunow, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for respondents.
These consolidated juvenile habeas corpus proceedings raise the significant issue of whether an adjudication of delinquency and a commitment to the Department of Corrections by a nonlawyer judge violate Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee. 1
The Chancellor responded in the affirmative. The Court of Appeals reversed. We affirm the Chancellor.
Timmy and Randy Anglin are two of the seven children born to John and Effie Mae Anglin of Centerville. The Anglins have been separated for more than eight years, but are not divorced. John Anglin has a record of at least one arrest, drinks heavily and has a live-in arrangement with another woman.
Effie Mae Anglin is mentally retarded, has brain damage, and is in and out of Central State Hospital for stays of from ten to twelve days. She is "totally unable to discipline or supervise her children" and her home is "unkept and inadequate for the family needs." The petitioners reside variously with their parents; however, they live primarily with their mother. Apparently, this stems from their dislike of the woman residing with their father.
Timmy was fourteen years old at the time of the offense and hearing. He has a full scale I.Q. of 76, as measured by the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, which places him in the "borderline category of intellectual functioning as classified by the W.I.S.C." The probation report asserts that he is a "constant troublemaker" and lists a rather extreme background of infractions of good order and discipline and indicates a belligerent and antisocial attitude. He is a dropout from school with no future educational plans.
Randy was thirteen years old at the time of the offense and hearing. He has a full scale I.Q. of 84, as measured by the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children. This places him low in the "Dull Normal" category and only six points above the borderline category. Randy's record of infractions is not as extensive as Timmy's. The probation report, while recognizing that he has avoided serious trouble, suggests that he seems to enjoy doing illegal acts and has no remorse for them; that his attitude and behavior is worsening and he appears to be leaning toward the delinquent and violent type crimes. It "strongly" suggests that Randy be given "a very comprehensive mental evaluation."
Petitioners were arrested on Sunday, April 4, 1976, on charges of public profanity and the burglary of three record players from the Baptist Church at Centerville. They were placed in jail and the next day were released to the custody of their father.
Their cases were disposed of on April 13, 1976. The public profanity charge was dropped or retired. On the basis of a finding that each petitioner had "Committed 3rd Degree Burglary," and was delinquent, each was committed to the Department of Corrections for an indefinite period of time. See Section 37-237, T.C.A.
The Constitution of Tennessee contains no specific requirement that judges be "learned in the law," or that they be licensed or admitted to the practice of law.
The only constitutional requirement for judges of the Supreme Court is that they must be thirty-five years of age and must have been a resident of the state for five years before election. See Article VI, Section 3. Other judges must be thirty years of age, and must have been a resident of the state for five years and of the circuit or district for one year before election. See Article VI, Section 4. Any additional requirements must be imposed by the legislature, which may supplement the minimum requirements of the Constitution so long as the additional requirements are reasonable and not inconsistent with our Constitution. LaFever v. Ware, 211 Tenn. 393, 365 S.W.2d 44 (1963).
It is an historic fact that the Tennessee Legislature did not deem it necessary or appropriate until 1961 to superimpose upon the constitutional requirements any qualifications which Tennessee judges must meet. In 1960, a layman became a candidate for the Tennessee Supreme Court, running against one of Tennessee's most distinguished justices. Then, as now, statewide judicial contests for the appellate judiciary attracted little voter attention; issues were virtually non-existent; financial considerations precluded any significant outlay of funds for campaign purposes, and voter participation left much to be desired. In the ensuing election, the layman's name appeared on the ballot in only 27 of 95 counties, 2 and he carried 13 of them.
This startling development galvanized the Tennessee General Assembly into action. The result was Chapter 283, Public Acts of 1961. By preamble, the Legislature declared:
Whereas, It was and is the purpose and intent of this provision (Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution) to provide that the judicial power of the State shall be exercised by persons qualified so as to act ; and
Whereas, The qualifications of judges as prescribed in §§ 3 and 4 of said Article 6 do not purport to be exclusive of any qualifications necessarily implied in the Constitution in the creation of the Judicial Department; . . .. (Emphasis supplied).
Thereafter, the General Assembly ordained that:
judges of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chancery Courts, Circuit Courts, and courts exercising the jurisdiction imposed in one or more of the last three named courts, shall be learned in the law, which must be evidenced by said judge being authorized to practice law in the courts of Tennessee.
This exact language was carried forward into our Official Code and appears as a part of Section 17-119, T.C.A. It, of course, has no application to county judges, as such; 3 nor does it purport to apply to county judges holding juvenile court. However, its rationale is commanding. Any juvenile judge must be "qualified so to act" and this imperative is "necessarily implied in the Constitution" of Tennessee.
Prior Tennessee cases are not helpful on the precise question we address.
In 1926, this Court, in considering an act creating the office of county judge in Sequatchie County and requiring that he be a person "learned in the law," held that this phase did not mean that the occupant must be a licensed attorney, but merely was a directive to the voters, a majority of whom settled the question. Heard v. Moore, 154 Tenn. 566, 290 S.W. 15 (1926). See also Morrison v. Gower, 154 Tenn. 624, 288 S.W. 731 (1926).
LaFever v. Ware, supra, dealt with the General Sessions judgeship of White County. The pertinent private act provided that the incumbent "shall be a licensed attorney." The Court held the phrases "learned in the law" and "licensed to practice law" to be synonymous and sustained the constitutionality of the act. While perhaps dicta, the Court made these significant and courageous observations. We do not see how it reasonably could be presided over by a layman. The duties are many and varied, including the power to hear and dispose of divorce cases. It is universally known that the trial and disposition of such cases touch nearly every facet of the law and it is beyond the understanding of this Court that any person untrained in the law could think himself competent to discharge the complex duties of this office. (Emphasis supplied). 211 Tenn. at 408, 365 S.W.2d at 50
This was over sixteen years ago thirty-nine days before Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), requiring the state courts to appoint counsel for indigent defendants in felony cases. The relentless march of due process was just reaching the line of departure. Even then, our Supreme Court denounced the concept of lay judges handling matters of complexity.
In State v. Freshour, 219 Tenn. 482, 410 S.W.2d 885 (1967), this Court held that the General Sessions judge of Cocke County need not be authorized to practice law if otherwise qualified.
While not exhaustive, this enumeration of cases is sufficient to show the general nature of our decisional law. All were decided under statutory enactments. None even alluded to the "law of the land" or "due process" requirements of Article I, Section 8 of our Constitution. This is the only question we face.
This issue is not completely new to our courts; however, it has heretofore evaded review.
In 1975, the case of Perry v. Banks, 521 S.W.2d 549 (Tenn.1975), came before this Court. This was a declaratory judgment action wherein the basic question was whether the county judge of Knox County must be a lawyer. As a result of an election intervening between the judgment in the lower court and the hearing in this Court, the "questions presented had been deprived of practical significance." Therefore, three members of this Court dismissed the appeal as moot, and did not pass upon the issue.
Two members of the Court expressed the view that:
this case presents issues of overriding, recurring and substantial public importance. Potentially the vast majority of county election commissions may face this question at any given general election. It demands resolution lest it...
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