State ex rel. Antonsen v. Superior Court for Grays Harbor County
| Decision Date | 27 January 1948 |
| Docket Number | 30427. |
| Citation | 189 P.2d 219,29 Wn.2d 725 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. ANTONSEN v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR GRAYS HARBOR COUNTY. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2
Proceeding by the State, on the relation of B. M. Antonsen, doing business as Antonsen Painting Company, for a writ of prohibition restraining the Superior Court for Grays Harbor County, A. E. Graham, Judge, from proceeding further with trial of an action against relator after denial of his motion for change of venue.
Order denying motion reversed, and proceeding remanded with instructions to grant the motion.
Neal Bonneville & Hughes and L. R. Bonneville, Jr., all of Tacoma for relator.
Poyhonen & Stritmatter, of Hoquiam, for respondent.
In this proceeding, the relator seeks to review, by way of an application for a writ of prohibition, an order of the superior court for Grays Harbor county denying relator's motion for a change of venue. On relator's application, an order to show cause was issued, requiring the respondent judge to show cause why the superior court for Grays Harbor county should not be restrained from proceeding further with the trial of the action in which the motion for a change of venue was presented.
Briefs having been filed, and this court having heard the arguments submitted by counsel for relator and for respondent, the question hereinafter discussed is presented for decision.
Arthur Ross (to whom we hereinafter refer as respondent), as plaintiff, instituted an action Before the superior court for Grays Harbor county against the relator, B. M. Antonsen seeking recovery for damages to his automobile, occasioned while he was driving across a bridge in Grays Harbor county.
It appears that relator, a resident of Pierce county, where he is engaged in business as 'Antonsen Painting Company,' at the time the damage referred to in respondent's complaint was suffered, was operating a paint-spraying outfit painting the bridge above referred to that, while the automobile was crossing the bridge, paint was sprayed over the respondent's automobile, damaging the car, and that, to recover for such damage, this action was instituted.
The venue of the action was laid in Grays Harbor county, upon the theory that the cause of action was within the purview of Laws of 1941, chapter 81, p. 203, § 1, Rem.Supp.1941, § 205. The chapter referred to concerns the venue of actions and provides that actions based upon certain specified grounds '* * * shall be tried in the county where the cause, or some part thereof, arose: * * *.'
Subsection 3 of the act reads as follows:
'For the recovery of damages arising from a motor vehicle accident; but in a cause arising because of motor vehicle accident plaintiff shall have the option of suing either in the county in which the cause of action or some part thereof arose, or in the county in which the defendant resides, or if there be more than one defendant, where some one of the defendants resides, at the time of the commencement of the action.'
Relator moved for a change of venue, upon the ground that he, the defendant in the action, was a resident of Pierce county, and that the cause of action set forth in the respondent's complaint was not a cause '* * * arising from a motor vehicle accident; * * *.'
The question here presented is novel and not free from difficulty.
As argued by relator, it is doubtless true that the principal reason for the enactment of the statute referred to was to relieve a person suffering damages by reason of an automobile accident from the burden of suing the person believed responsible for the accident in another, and possibly a distant, county from that in which the accident occurred. Relator admits that the cause of action stated in the complaint herein constitutes an accident, but argues that the allegations of the complaint do not state a cause of action based upon 'a motor vehicle accident.'
It is not denied by counsel for respondent that relator is, in fact, a resident of Pierce county, the only question presented being the applicability of the section of the statute above quoted to the situation Before the trial court for decision. We are not here concerned with the merits of the action, but merely the question of venue.
Relator argues that, from the admitted facts, this court should hold that any damages suffered by respondent did not arise from 'a motor vehicle accident,' within the terms of the statute referred to above.
Prior to the enactment of the statute referred to, difficult factual question were frequently presented as to the proper county in which actions for damages resulting from the operation of motor vehicles should be tried. These difficulties may be illustrated by reference to the case of State ex rel. Nielsen v. Superior Court, 7 Wash.2d 562, 110 P.2d 645, 115 P.2d 142.
Counsel for relator, after searching for a definition of the term 'motor vehicle accident,' cites only the case of State v. Masters, 106 W.Va. 46, 144 S.E. 718, 719, in which the supreme court of West Virginia held sufficient an indictment, charging the defendant with a crime, drawn pursuant to a statute requiring the operator of a vehicle, in case of an accident, to stop immediately, and, upon request, give his name, address, and so forth. Referring to the word 'accident,' as contained in the statute, the court held that the word '* * * contemplates any situation occurring on the highway wherein a party so operates his automobile as to cause injury to the property or person of another using the same highway.'
In the light of the question to be decided, the statement of the court was clearly correct, but it does not appear that the court intended to comprehensively define a motor vehicle accident, as such an accident would clearly include damage done by a motor vehicle, in operation, to person or property whether on or away from the highway. In the case cited, the court was not concerned with formulating an adequate definition of the phrase 'motor vehicle accident,' but was deciding the question presented upon the facts disclosed by the record Before it.
In this state, we have no statutory definition of the phrase 'motor vehicle accident,' as contained in the statute above quoted, and, undoubtedly, other questions will, in the future, be presented for decision, in connection with which the application of the statutory phrase, 'motor vehicle accident,' to a state of facts involving the proper venue for trial of an action in which a motor vehicle was in some manner concerned, will be involved. Such questions must be answered as they arise, each case to be considered in the light of its own peculiar facts.
Decisions of other jurisdictions, construing venue statutes which differ from the statute of this state, are seldom helpful in deciding a question such as that here presented.
The procedure in bringing Before this court for review orders of the superior court granting or denying changes of venue has not been consistent. Such orders have been brought Before us by applications for writs of mandate, prohibition, and certiorari.
It is manifest that, in cases where the jurisdiction of the superior court was challenged, by a motion for a change of venue, the remedy by appeal from the final judgment was inadequate, and that the jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction of a superior court should be determined by this court by a review of the order of the superior court in question by which that court ruled that it had or did not have jurisdiction to hear the proceeding or action.
It also, in the course of time, became evident that, in many cases, questions concerning the venue of an action which did not involve jurisdictional matters should, when decided by the superior court, be promptly reviewed by this court so that the forum Before which the action should be tried might be definitely determined prior to the opening of the trial.
In the early case of State ex rel. Wyman,...
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