State ex rel. Arbaugh v. Richland County Bd. of Com'rs

• Decision Date: 30 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 84-1377,84-1377
• Citation: 14 OBR 311,14 Ohio St.3d 5,470 N.E.2d 880
• Parties: , 14 O.B.R. 311 The STATE ex rel. ARBAUGH, Judge, Appellant, v. RICHLAND COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 5

14 Ohio St.3d 5

470 N.E.2d 880, 14 O.B.R. 311

The STATE ex rel. ARBAUGH, Judge, Appellant, v. RICHLAND COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Appellee.

No. 84-1377.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Oct. 30, 1984.

John W. Allen, Prosecuting Atty. and Donald C. McGee, Mansfield, for appellant.

Squire, Sanders & Dempsey and John R. Gall, Columbus, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The issue raised by the court of appeals below is whether appellant must follow legislative budget procedures in the submission of a budget and further, whether such budget can later be modified in the absence of a change in statutory responsibility or the occurrence of an unforeseen event or emergency. We reaffirm today that a court may modify its budget at any time presupposing such modification is otherwise reasonable and necessary. We urge, however, that every reasonable effort be made, in the interests of intergovernmental cooperation, to adhere to the conventional legislatively promulgated budget process.

This court has held without equivocation that " '[t]he public interest is served when courts co-operate with executive and legislative bodies in the complicated budgetary processes of government. However, such voluntary co-operation should not be mistaken for a surrender or diminution of the plenary power to administer justice which is inherent in every court whose jurisdiction derives from the Ohio Constitution.' " State, ex rel. Johnston v. Taulbee (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 417, 422, 423 N.E.2d 80 (citing State, ex rel. Giuliani, v. Perk [1968], 14 Ohio St.2d 235, 237, 237 N.E.2d 397 ). Consequently, appellee's assertion that the court of common pleas, as a co-equal partner in government, is constitutionally obliged to follow the budget process of the county board of commissioners is simply wrong.

We recognize that the power to control what a court spends, or to totally regulate the process of obtaining funds, ultimately becomes the power to control what the court does. Such a principle is an anathema to an independent judiciary. On the other hand a tripartite balance of power exists that must be respected. To this extent it is axiomatic that a court should cooperate, whenever possible, with the legislative budget process. Moreover, a court does not have unfettered discretion to act without reason in making its budget. In the spirit of separation of powers we have promulgated a test of "reasonableness and necessity" to maintain the sovereignty of our respective powers when a budget conflict arises. The burden is on the party who opposes the allocation of funds to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in promulgating a budget which is both unreasonable and unnecessary. State, ex rel. Musser, v. Massillon (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 42, 465 N.E.2d 400; State, ex rel. Durkin, v. Youngstown City Council (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 132, 134-135, 459 N.E.2d 213.

A review of appellee's motion and affidavit, however, does not indicate a cognizable dispute over issues outside the discretionary purview of the court of common pleas. As we have noted in prior decisions, claims of governmental hardship, while relevant to a determination of reasonableness and necessity, are not solely determinative of the issue. State, ex rel. Durkin, v. Youngstown City Council, supra.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and allow the writ of mandamus.

Judgment reversed and writ allowed.

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, C.J., FORD, SWEENEY, LOCHER, CLIFFORD F. BROWN and JAMES P. CELEBREZZE, JJ., concur.

HOLMES, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

FORD, J., of the Eleventh Appellate District, sitting for WILLIAM B. BROWN, J.

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, Chief Judge, concurring.

I concur fully in the majority opinion which allows the requested writ of mandamus to issue. I write separately only to add my observation that perhaps the time has arrived to consider transferring funding of county judicial operations from the auspices of county governments to the state government, in the manner of most other states. The specter of closing courts due to inadequate funding and the resultant deleterious effect on the administration of justice within that jurisdiction is both shocking and abhorrent. Unfortunately, those potentially suffering the most are the citizens of this state who have a right to depend on access to an open and adequately staffed court system. Whatever details ultimately comprise the solution to this problem, I believe that something must be done to alleviate the situation presented by the case at bar.

HOLMES, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

There is no question that this court has previously determined in a series of cases the basic law that it is within the inherent power of courts of common pleas in this state to require funding of their services and programs at a level that is "reasonable and necessary" to the conduct of their business; and that it is the duty of the county commissioners to provide such funds absent a finding that the judge is guilty of an abuse of discretion in his request for funds. State, ex rel. Clarke, v. Bd. of County Commrs. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 16, 46 N.E.2d 410 ; State, ex rel. Motter, v. Atkinson (1945), 146 Ohio St. 11, 63 N.E.2d 440 ; State, ex rel. Ray, v. South (1964), 176 Ohio St. 241, 198 N.E.2d 919 ; State, ex rel. Moorehead, v. Reed (1964), 177 Ohio St. 4, 201 N.E.2d 594 ; State, ex rel. Foster, v. Bd. of County Commrs. (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 89, 90, 242 N.E.2d 884 ; State, ex rel. Giuliani v. Perk (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 235, 237, 237 N.E.2d 397 ; State, ex rel. Johnston, v. Taulbee (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 417, 422, 423 N.E.2d 80 ; State, ex rel. Durkin, v. Youngstown City Council (1984...