State Ex Rel. Smith v. Culliver
| Decision Date | 28 January 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2009-CA-0125.,2009-CA-0125. |
| Citation | 186 Ohio App.3d 534,2010 Ohio 339,929 N.E.2d 465 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. SMITH, Appellee,v.CULLIVER et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
David L. Remy, Mansfield City Law Director, for appellee.
Frantz Ward L.L.P., Keith A. Ashmus, and Jay R. Carson, Cleveland, for appellants.
{¶ 1} This case comes to us on the accelerated calendar. The appeal will be determined as provided by App.R. 11.1. App.R. 11.1, which governs accelerated calendar cases, provides:
{¶ 2} “(C) Briefs shall be in the form specified by App. R. 16. Appellant shall serve and file his brief within fifteen days after the date on which the record is filed. The appellee shall serve and file his brief within fifteen days after service of the brief of the appellant. Reply briefs shall not be filed unless ordered by the court.
{¶ 3} “ * * *
{¶ 4}
{¶ 5} Additionally, Loc.App.R. 6 of the Fifth District Court of Appeals provides:
{¶ 6}
{¶ 7} One of the important purposes of an accelerated calendar is to enable an appellate court to render a brief and conclusory decision more quickly than in a case on the regular calendar where the briefs, facts, and legal issues are more complicated. Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn . (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 158, 11 OBR 240, 463 N.E.2d 655.
{¶ 8} This appeal shall be considered in accordance with the aforementioned rules.
{¶ 9} This case originated in the court of common pleas on the complaint in mandamus of appellee, Daniel Smith, Clerk of Court of the Mansfield Municipal Court. Appellee sought a writ of mandamus compelling appellants, the mayor and city council of Mansfield, to fund his 2009 department budget request of $1,056,866. Appellants answered, asserting in principle that appellee's request was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion in light of (1) the city's financial condition, (2) the conditions in the economy, (3) comparable public and private wages, hours, and working conditions, (4) the limited resources available, and (5) appellants' duties to fund other essential or statutorily required city services.
{¶ 10} The parties submitted stipulated facts and exhibits and prehearing briefs to the trial court. The trial court heard oral argument on September 9, 2009. The trial court also allowed the parties to file supplemental briefs relating to budgetary comparisons between the Mansfield Clerk of Court's Office and similar municipal court clerks throughout the state.
{¶ 11} On September 30, 2009, the trial court granted the writ of mandamus on the basis that, as a matter of law, appellee's requested appropriation was presumed to be reasonable, and that the mayor and city council had not demonstrated that appellee's request was unreasonable or an abuse of discretion, since it was not impossible for the city to fund the request.
{¶ 12} On February 10, 2009, the appellee submitted to the mayor a proposed budget for his office that contained a staff salary request of $879,000 and a total request of $1,079,866. This figure provided an across-the-board one-dollar-per-hour raise to his employees. The pay increase was instituted following a meeting that took place in 2006 between the appellee and the director of human resources for the city of Mansfield. Appellee sought at that time to bring the salaries of his employees in line with the salaries of city workers in comparable positions. The parties discussed a possible pay increase that would improve the compensation of deputy clerks without placing undue stress of the city's budget. The one-dollar-per-hour increase for the 2009 budget year was the culmination of a three-year graduated increase in compensation begun following the appellee's 2006 consultation with the city's director of human resources.
{¶ 13} On February 17, 2009, the mayor proposed a budget that showed a reduction of 40 percent in appropriations to be allotted to select city departments, including the clerk of court. On February 19, 2009, appellee submitted a revised budget proposal to the mayor that was broken down as follows:
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||Salary |$ 96,986 ||
||-------------|----------||
||Staff Salary |856,000 ||
||-------------|----------||
||Longevity |28,400 ||
||-------------|----------||
||Training |5,000 ||
||-------------|----------||
||Jury |500 ||
||-------------|----------||
||Supplies |70,000 ||
||-------------|----------||
||TOTAL |$1,056,886||
----
{¶ 14} The actual expenditures of the clerk's office in 2008 were as follows:
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||Salary |$ 96,986 ||
||-------------|----------||
||Staff Salary |790,025 ||
||-------------|----------||
||Longevity |26,350 ||
||-------------|----------||
||Training |4,076 ||
||-------------|----------||
||Jury |157 ||
||-------------|----------||
||Supplies |83,117 ||
||-------------|----------||
||TOTAL |$1,000,710||
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{¶ 15} Built into the 2009 salary request was an anticipated $56,000 1 retirement-benefit payout to a deputy clerk who was scheduled to retire in November 2009. Discounting this one-time payment, at best, the appellee's 2009 salary request was an increase of only $9,975 over his salary expenditures for 2008.
{¶ 16} On March 11, 2009, a proposed budget was submitted to city council that reflected a reduction of 30 percent in the total appropriations to the appellee. This proposed budget allotted the appellee a total appropriation of $697,336. The final version of the budget, as presented to council, on March 25, 2009, allotted the sum of $697,336 for the operation of the appellee's office. Council approved this budget on March 31, 2009.
{¶ 17} On April 17, 2009, appellee submitted a modified budget request that contained a staff salary request of $823,514 and a total request of $995,000. That modified request was never acted upon and the total appropriations allotted to the clerk of court for 2009 remained at $697,336. On May 13, 2009, this writ of mandamus action was filed.
{¶ 18} The appellant contends that this court's review of the trial court's grant of the writ is de novo. See Cincinnati Entertainment Assocs., Ltd. v. Bd. of Commrs. (2001), 141 Ohio App.3d 803, 809-810, 753 N.E.2d 884. We disagree.
{¶ 19} The case at bar involves a mixed question of law and fact. A standard of reasonableness and necessity entails a determination as to whether a clerk of municipal court abuses its discretion in requesting budgetary amounts. The reasonableness-and-necessity test seeks to maintain the respective sovereignty of each branch of government when a budget conflict arises. State ex rel. Arbaugh v. Richland Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 5, 6, 14 OBR 311, 470 N.E.2d 880. It necessarily entails a determination as to whether, in this case, the clerk of the municipal court abused his discretion in requesting budgetary amounts. State ex rel. Britt v. Bd. of Cty. Commrs. of Franklin Cty. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 18 OBR 1, 480 N.E.2d 77. Since granting or denying a writ necessarily requires the lower court to exercise discretion, an appellate court must review its decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Leland v. Lima, 3d Dist. No. 1-02-59, 2002-Ohio-6188, 2002 WL 31529029, ¶ 10, citing State ex rel. Ney v. Niehaus (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 118, 515 N.E.2d 914. See also Truman v. Clay Center, 160 Ohio App.3d 78, 2005-Ohio-1385, 825 N.E.2d 1182, ¶ 16; State ex rel. Hrelec v. Campbell (2001), 146 Ohio App.3d 112, 117, 765 N.E.2d 402, citing State ex rel. Ney v. Niehaus (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 118, 515 N.E.2d 914.
{¶ 20} The term “abuse of discretion” has been applied in a somewhat rote manner by the courts without analysis of the true purpose of the appellate court's role in the review of a trial court's discretionary powers. State v. Firouzmandi, Licking App. No. 2006-CA-41, 2006-Ohio-5823, 2006 WL 3185175, at ¶ 54.
{¶ 21} As we noted in Firouzmandi, an excellent analysis of the misconception surrounding the concept of “abuse of discretion” was set forth by the Arizona Supreme Court sitting en banc: “The phrase ‘within the discretion of the trial court’ is often used but the reason for that phrase being applied to certain issues is seldom examined. One of the primary reasons an issue is considered discretionary is that its resolution is based on factors which vary from case to case and which involve the balance of conflicting facts and equitable considerations. Walsh v. Centeio, 692 F.2d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir.1982). Thus, the phrase ‘within the discretion of the trial court’ does not mean that the court is free to reach any conclusion it wishes. It does mean that where there are opposing equitable or factual considerations, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.' State v. Chapple (1983), 135 Ariz. 281, 296-297, 660 P.2d 1208. However, the court explained, ‘[t]he term “abuse of discretion” is unfortunate. In ordinary language, “abuse” implies some form of corrupt practice, deceit or impropriety. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1976). In this sense, the application of the word to the act of a trial judge who ruled in accordance with all the decided c...
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