State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Speed

• Decision Date: 22 June 1904
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. Attorney-General v. SPEED, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

81 S.W. 1260

183 Mo. 186

THE STATE ex rel. Attorney-General v. SPEED, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 22, 1904

Appeal from Cole Circuit Court. -- Hon. Jas. E. Hazell, Judge.

Affirmed.

W. M Williams and Johnson, Houts, Marlatt & Hawes for appellant.

(1) The act does not require the coal oil inspector of the city of St. Louis to pay into the State Treasury the excess fees collected by him over and above seven thousand dollars per annum. There is nothing in the act fixing seven thousand dollars as an annual allowance to the inspector. It does not say that he shall only retain this sum out of the fees collected in each year. The period of one year is nowhere mentioned in this section of the statute. The inspector is required to make a settlement each six months of the fees collected during that time, and to pay the excess over seven thousand dollars into the State Treasury. It does not appear from the petitions that either of the defendants received and collected during any period of six months more than seven thousand dollars, and under the terms of the statute neither is indebted to the State in any amount. Laws 1899, p. 231. (2) "The intention of the Legislature must be ascertained from the words of the statute, and not from any general inferences to be drawn from the nature of the objects dealt with by the statute." State v. Hays, 78 Mo. 605; Hicks v. Jamison, 10 Mo.App. 35; Singhuff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621; Dewey v United States, 178 U.S. 521; Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 72. (3) The statutory rule for the construction of laws is that "words and phrases shall be taken in their plain and ordinary or usual sense." "The popular or received import of words furnishes the general rule for the interpretation of public laws, as well as of private and social transactions." R. S. 1899, sec 4160; Warren v. Paving Company, 115 Mo. 577; Randol v. Garoutte, 78 Mo.App. 609. (4) The act is in conflict with section 53 of article 4 and section 12, article 9, of the Constitution of this State. Henderson v. Koenig, 168 Mo. 356; Rauer v. Williams, 50 P. 691; Devine v. Commissioners, 84 Ill. 590; State v. Mayer, 45 N. J. L. 247; Topeka v. Gillette, 32 Kan. 431; Gibbs v. Morgan, 39 N. J. L. 126; Commonwealth v. McMichael, 8 Pa. Dist. 157; Morrison v. Balchut, 5 A. 739; Edmonds v. Herbrandson, 14 L. R. A. 727; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 177; State v. Walsh, 136 Mo. 400; Dunne v. Railroad, 131 Mo. 1.

Edward C. Crow, Attorney-General, and C. D. Corum for respondent.

(1) The primary rule for the construction of statutes in this State, as laid down by the Revised Statutes, and as established by the general rules of construction, is that words shall be taken and understood according to their plain and ordinary meaning, and regard must be paid to their general use. Occult meanings are not sought and strained constructions are not favored. Warren v. Paving Company, 115 Mo. 572; State ex rel. v. Marion Co. Ct., 128 Mo. 427; State v. Jones, 102 Mo. 305; State v. Johnson, 132 Mo. 105. "Fees are compensation for particular acts or services, as the fees of clerks, sheriffs, lawyers, physicians," etc. Cowden v. Hough, 10 Ind. 85. It is evident, therefore, that, since the amendment of the act under consideration, the inspectors do not receive their compensation as fees, and if we are correct as to this proposition, then the word "fees" may also be eliminated from consideration. It therefore follows that a proper interpretation of this statute rests upon the proper meaning to be attributed to the word "salary." The ordinary signification of the word "salary" is clear. It is understood by all as having reference to yearly compensation. It has received judicial definition, as the following authorities show: Henderson v. Koenig, 168 Mo. 367; Cowden v. Hough, 10 Ind. 83; Fulgham v. Lightfoot, 1 Call 219. Many lexicographers have given it a like meaning. Burrell's Law Dict.; Anderson's Law Dict. (2) If the contention of appellant be sustained, it must be on the ground that the Legislature intended to fix the salaries of these inspectors at fourteen thousand dollars per annum. When one reflects on the salaries of other and more responsible officers of the State, it is unreasonable to assume that the Legislature intended to do any such thing. Statutes must be construed in reference to the objects which prompted and induced their enactment. Ross v. Railroad, 111 Mo. 18; State ex inf. v. Cramer, 150 Mo. 100. The true meaning of an act is to be found, not merely from its words, but from the cause and necessity of its being made. Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 27. The language of the statute must be given such a construction as will carry its design into effect, even though in so doing the exact letter of the law be sacrificed, or though the construction be indeed contrary to the law. Endlich on Statutory Construction, sec. 295. (3) The coal oil inspectors in cities of three hundred thousand inhabitants or over or less are not county officers within the meaning of the Constitution. (4) The act here does not fix the compensation of the inspector of the city of St. Louis at a different amount from that of any other city which now has or which may hereafter have a population of three hundred thousand inhabitants or more. (5) The Constitution does not prohibit classification for legislative purposes. The section under consideration is not an arbitrary act. The design of the Legislature was to curtail the fees of the inspectors in cities containing a large population, and wherein such inspector received, under the law as it existed prior to the enactment of 1899, an unreasonably large sum for the services performed. The line had to be drawn somewhere, and the Legislature, in fixing the amount of fees in cities of a certain population or more, did not act arbitrarily or unwisely. (6) This law is not local. It need not necessarily always apply to the city of St. Louis. It is not a matter in which the people of St. Louis are peculiarly interested. The amount of the fees which are to be turned into the State Treasury is a matter in which all of the citizens have an interest. It has been expressly held that any act which applies to and embraces all persons who are and who may come under it under like conditions and circumstances, is not special within the meaning of the Constitution. Humes v. Railroad, 82 Mo. 221; Burkholder v. Trust Company, 82 Mo. 572; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439; State ex rel. v. County Court, 128 Mo. 443; Ex parte Lucas, 160 Mo. 237. The act in question is applicable to any city which now has or which may hereafter have three hundred thousand inhabitants or more. It is not, therefore, a local or special law. State ex rel. v. Bell, 119 Mo. 70; State ex rel. v. Marion County Court, 128 Mo. 427; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64.

ROBINSON, C. J. Brace, Marshall, Gantt, Burgess and Valliant, JJ., concur; Fox, J., not sitting.

OPINION

In Banc

ROBINSON C. J.

This is a proceeding by the State, upon the relation of the Attorney-General, against the defendant Richard B. Speed, to recover the sum of $ 11,477.72, alleged in the petition to have been retained by defendant from the fees collected by him while coal oil inspector for the city of St. Louis, between the twenty-first day of August, 1899, and the nineteenth day of June, 1901, in excess of the amount allowed to him by law, of seven thousand dollars per annum.

To the petition filed defendant interposed a demurrer, assigning as his reason why the action therein stated against him should not be maintained, first: "Because the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action," and second, "Because there is no valid enactment requiring the defendant to pay into the State Treasury the fees collected by him as coal oil inspector, in excess of seven thousand dollars, as demanded in said petition." This demurrer the court overruled, and defendant declining to plead further, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant for said sum of $ 11,477.72, as prayed for in plaintiff's petition, and the case has been brought to this court on defendant's appeal.

The theory upon which this case has been presented and is now sought to be maintained by the State is that, since the going into effect of the act of May 19, 1899 (Laws 1899, p. 231) repealing section 5575 of article 1, chapter 87, Revised Statutes 1889, relating to inspectors of petroleum, etc., coal oil inspectors for cities of this State with a population of three hundred thousand inhabitants or over, are entitled to retain seven thousand dollars, and no more, annually, out of the fees collected by them, and that the balance of such fees the inspectors shall pay over to the State Treasurer, while the defendant, upon the other hand, to defeat this proceeding against himself, contends, first, that by a proper construction of the statute as enacted, he, as coal oil inspector for the city of St. Louis, was entitled to retain the sum of seven thousand dollars out of the fees collected by his office, at each semiannual statement period designated in said act for the reporting of said fees; or, to state his contention directly, it is, that by this statute, his salary or compensation has been fixed at fourteen thousand dollars per annum; and for his second contention against plaintiff's right to maintain this action against him, he says that the act in question, of May 19, 1899, is violative of the provisions of section 53, article 4, of the Constitution of Missouri, prohibiting the General Assembly from passing any local or special law, and also of the provisions of section 12 of article 9 of said Constitution, in which it is declared: "The General Assembly shall, by a law...