State ex rel. Attorney General v. Miller

• Decision Date: 28 April 1890
• Parties: The State ex rel. the Attorney General v. Miller
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

13 S.W. 677

100 Mo. 439

The State ex rel. the Attorney General v. Miller

Supreme Court of Missouri

April 28, 1890

Peremptory writ denied.

Frank M. Estes, T. P. Bashaw and W. H. Clark for relator.

The act of March 30, 1887, is unconstitutional and invalid: (1) Because said act contains more than one subject, and the subject is not clearly expressed in the title. Const. Mo art. 4, sec. 28; Sedgwick on Const. and Stat. Law, p. 521n; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 71; State ex rel v. County Court, 41 Mo. 39; City of St. Louis v Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578; City v. Payne, 71 Mo. 159. (2) Because said act is a local and special law. Const. Mo., art. 4, secs. 28, 53 and 54; Const. Mo., art. 9, sec. 7; Const. Mo., art. 13, sec. 2; State ex rel. v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340; State ex rel. v. Jackson Co., 89 Mo. 237; Devine v. Cook, 84 Ill. 590; State v. Mitchell, 31 Ohio St. 592; Ayer's Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 266; Scowden's Appeal, 96 Pa. St. 422; Weinman v. Railroad, 118 Pa. 192; State ex rel. v. Board of License, 49 N. J. L. 482; 4 Cent. Rep. 83; 8 Cent. Rep. 340; Brown v. State, 79 Ga. 324; Anderson v. Trenton, 42 N. J. L. 486. (3) Because said act undertakes to amend certain laws, and parts thereof, without setting out such laws and parts in full, as amended. Const. Mo., art. 4, secs. 28, 34, 53 and 54; Const. Mo., art. 9, sec. 7; Const. Mo., art. 13, sec. 2; Morrison v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 602; State v. Thurston, 92 Mo. 325; State v. Chambers, 70 Mo. 625; State ex rel. v. Com. Ass'n, 11 Mo.App. 570; State v. Fitzporter, 17 Mo.App. 270; State ex rel. v. Frazier, 98 Mo. 426; Paul v. Brown, 98 Mo. 675; State ex rel. v. Dolan, 93 Mo. 467.

Campbell & Ryan for respondent.

(1) The court will not declare the act unconstitutional, unless its unconstitutionality is clearly and certainly made to appear. State v. Able, 65 Mo. 357; Phillips v. Railroad, 86 Mo. 540-543; State ex rel. v. Railroad, 92 Mo. 155; State ex rel. v. Pond, 93 Mo. 606-618, 619, 620; Kelley v. Meeks, 87 Mo. 396; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64; State ex rel. v. Laughlin, 75 Mo. 145; Court v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175. (2) The title to the act fully meets the requirement of the constitution. There is but one subject mentioned in the title and but one treated in the body of the act, and the subject of the act is clearly stated in the title. City v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578; State v. Mathews, 44 Mo. 526; State v. Bank, 45 Mo. 536; State v. Court, 51 Mo. 392; State ex rel. v. Dolan, 93 Mo. 467; Cooley, Const. Lim. [2 Ed.] 744. The claim that the act undertakes to repeal, change, modify and affect and amend the charter of the school board, while the title gives no notice of any such purpose, is without support in law. It was not necessary for the title to express that it repealed or changed any part of the school laws. State ex rel. v. Draper, 47 Mo. 29. (3) The act is not a local act. The language of the first section, "in all cities now having or hereafter attaining a population of three hundred thousand inhabitants," meets the test -- and there is nothing in the remainder of the act to alter this clear view of the case. State ex rel. v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340; State ex rel. v. Court, 89 Mo. 237; Kelley v. Meeks, 87 Mo. 396; Rutherford v. Heddins, 82 Mo. 388. Nor is it a special law. State v. Tolle, 71 Mo. 645. (4) The act does not attempt to regulate the affairs of any city or school district, nor does it alter or change the line of any school district. There is no just reason for saying that the act is applicable only to St. Louis; but even if it were true, under the decisions of the supreme court in State ex rel. v. Walton, 69 Mo. 556, and the Tolle case, 71 Mo. 645, the law would be valid. The incongruity in the fourth section of the act providing that the first election thereunder should be held not later than the first Monday in May, 1887, is of no importance, and, when the act is read without the clause, it is perfect and complete and harmonious. St. Louis Co. v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175; Clarkson v. Furniture Co., 22 Mo.App. 109; Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80. (5) Nor is the act unconstitutional because it imposes on the circuit court judges of St. Louis the duty of dividing the city into districts. Cooley, Const. Lim. [4 Ed.] 138; State v. Harmon, 31 Ohio St. 250; Ex parte Robinson, 6 McLean, 659; Ex parte Gist, 26 Ala. 161; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 49; Burlington v. Leebrick, 43 Iowa 252; State v. Gazly, 5 Ohio 14, 22; Prigg v. Com., 16 Peters, 540; 20 Johnson [N. Y.] 268-273; Ex parte Liebold, 100 U.S. 372; People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 600.

OPINION

Quo Warranto.

Black J.

-- This is an information in the nature of a quo warranto, prosecuted by the attorney general to test the right of the respondent to the office of director in the public schools in the city of St. Louis, and the controversy is made to turn upon the constitutionality of the act of March 30, 1887 (Laws of 1887, p. 272).

The special act of February 13, 1833, and the special amendments thereof (2 Ter. Laws, 399, and 2 R. S. 1879, p. 1536), created a corporation for school purposes by the name of "the board of president and directors of the St. Louis public schools," embracing the territorial limits of the city of St. Louis as then or thereafter established. Two directors were elected from each ward of the city for the term of three years. To entitle a person to vote for a director, or to hold the office of director he must, among other things, have paid a city tax; these are some of the features of the special law.

The act of March 30, 1887, the one now in question, is entitled: "An act fixing the number of directors in public school boards, in certain cities, and providing for election of such directors, and for districting said cities therefor." The first section is as follows: "Section 1. In all cities of this state now having, or hereafter attaining, a population of over three hundred thousand inhabitants, the number of school directors or trustees, or number of members of any board having charge of public schools or public school property in such cities, under and by virtue of any special charter or general law, shall be twenty-one; seven to be elected on general ticket at large by the qualified voters of such city, and fourteen to be elected by districts by the qualified voters of such city districts."

Other sections make it the duty of the circuit court of any such city to divide the city into fourteen districts and to certify the division to the school board. At the first election under the act one director is to be elected from each of the fourteen districts, and seven are to be elected at large. The terms of the old members are to cease when their successors are elected and qualified. Provisions are made whereby part of the directors thus elected at the first election hold for four years and others for two years. Thereafter the directors are elected, except to fill vacancies, for four years. Payment of a school tax for two consecutive years next before the election is made an additional qualification to hold the office of director. The sixth and last section repeals all conflicting acts and parts of acts.

Twenty-one directors were elected under the provisions of this law at the November election, 1887, the respondent being one of the persons then elected as a director at large. He qualified by taking the oath of office, and entered upon and has ever since continued to discharge the duties of a director. The pleadings admit that he possesses all of the qualifications to hold the office. The claim of the relator is that the act of March 30, 1887, is unconstitutional on several grounds; and of these in their order.

1. The title of the act, it is urged, does not conform to section 28, of article 4, which declares: "No bill * * * shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title." This section in the constitution of 1875 and one of a like import in the constitution of 1865 have been the subject of frequent consideration in this court. Its demands are that matters which are incongruous, disconnected and without any natural relation to each other must not be joined in one bill; and the title must be a fair index of the subject-matter of the bill. A very strict and literal interpretation would lead to many separate acts relating to the same general subject, and thus produce an evil quite as great as the mischief intended to be remedied; hence a liberal interpretation and application must be allowed. In Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64, the following rule taken from Sedgwick was approved: "Where all the provisions of a statute fairly relate to the same subject, have a natural connection with it, are the incidents or means of accomplishing it, then the subject is single, and if it is sufficiently expressed in the title the statute is valid." Substantially the same rule had been laid down in several previous cases. The City of St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578; State v. Mathews, 44 Mo. 523; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; The City of Hannibal v. The County of Marion, 69 Mo. 571; State ex rel. v. Mead, 71 Mo. 266. The act in question fixes the number of directors in cities of over three hundred thousand inhabitants, prescribes their qualifications, and determines how and for what length of time they shall be elected. All these matters are closely related, and under the rule before stated constitute but one subject.

The opposing argument seems to be that while the legislature may deal with one general subject in one act under one general title, yet, when it undertakes to deal with particular regulation only, each particular regulation must stand by itself in a single act with an appropriate title. The act in question, it is said, is bad because it contains three particular...