State ex rel. Barrett v. Boeckeler Lumber Company

Citation256 S.W. 175,301 Mo. 445
PartiesTHE STATE ex rel. JESSE W. BARRETT, Attorney-General, v. BOECKELER LUMBER COMPANY
Decision Date03 December 1923
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

Reported at 301 Mo. 445 at 572.

Original Opinion of December 3, 1923, Reported at 301 Mo. 445. Motion to Modify Judgment Overruled October 6, 1923.

OPINION

cWhite J.

On Motion to Modify.

In addition to the expression in the majority opinion, in which I concur, I state these additional reasons for concurring in the order modifying the original judgment.

The difference between the judges of the court is not as to the guilt of the respondents, nor as to the amount in fines to be imposed. As I understand it, we differ mainly regarding the best method to secure future compliance with the law. Should the corporations be dissolved there is no certain way to hinder the individuals operating them from conducting the same business as individuals, or from forming under other names new corporations for the same purpose. It is better to allow them to continue business in the open rather than to continue under the veil of different names. In the latter case, a subsequent violation of the law would require another suit like this.

It may be argued that the statute prevents the continuance, under other names, of the business of the forfeited corporations. Section 9665, Revised Statutes 1919, contains the following:

"It shall thereafter be unlawful for any person, corporation, or association of persons, to deal in or offer for sale in this State any article of manufacture, mechanism, merchandise, commodity, . . . produced, manufactured or dealt in by any corporation whose rights, franchises or privileges have been so declared to be forfeited."

The section further says that the above provisions "are hereby made applicable in all respects to the successors or assigns of any corporation whose rights, franchises or privileges have been so declared to be forfeited."

The next section, Section 9666, attempts to apply the provisions mentioned to "natural persons, partnerships, associations of persons and corporations created or organized by or under the law of this State."

Numerous perplexing questions spring into view in determining the meaning and scope of that statute. If that language is to be given effect as it reads, nobody in the State of Missouri, after a forfeiture, could ever engage in the lumber business. The citizens of St. Louis would be obliged to bootleg their lumber from Illinois. To give the statute that meaning is to hold it unconstitutional.

Suppose it is construed to mean that the persons who have operated the dissolved corporation shall not again engage in the same business. Does anyone suppose it would be easy to give it such effect? Corporations are artificial persons and have no natural rights; they may be prohibited from engaging in any particular business. Natural persons have natural rights. Any person out of jail has the right to make a living at any lawful calling, and no legislative act can deprive him of that right. [Sec. 4, Art. 2, Mo. Constitution; State ex rel. v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 394; 6 R. C. L. p. 266.]...

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