State, ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co., v. Donaldson

• Decision Date: 11 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-1828,90-1828
• Parties: , 19 Media L. Rep. 2176 The STATE, ex rel. BEACON JOURNAL PUBLISHING COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. DONALDSON, Judge, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 173

63 Ohio St.3d 173

586 N.E.2d 101, 19 Media L. Rep. 2176

The STATE, ex rel. BEACON JOURNAL PUBLISHING COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. DONALDSON, Judge, Appellee.

No. 90-1828.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Nov. 5, 1991.

Decided March 11, 1992.

Appellee, Paul R. Donaldson, is the Shaker Heights Municipal Judge. Appellants are the Beacon Journal Publishing Company and Akron Beacon Journal reporter John Funk. On July 27, 1989, Judge Donaldson conducted voir dire in a highly publicized criminal case, Shaker Heights v. Carl B. Stokes, case No. 89 CRB 04628. Pursuant to a defense motion, appellee conducted voir dire in chambers, closed to the public. However, the trial itself was open, and the voir dire transcript was not sealed.

On July 28, 1989, appellants filed this prohibition action in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County. They alleged that appellee had failed to give the press notice that a closure motion had been filed and failed to afford appellants an opportunity to be heard. The trial ended, and the closure order consequently terminated, on the same date that appellants filed their prohibition action. Nevertheless, appellants stated in their complaint that "[t]his matter is not moot because it involves issues which are capable of repetition, yet evading review."

After the prohibition action was filed, the municipal court adopted Loc.R. 30, "Guidelines to be Followed with Respect to Requests for Closed Proceedings." ¹ Loc.R. 30 requires parties seeking closure to file a written motion at least seven days before the proceeding sought to be closed. It requires the clerk to promptly enter the filing of the motion on the docket and make the motion available for public inspection upon request. Persons or entities objecting to closure must file written objections and requests for a hearing no later than the last court day before the proceeding sought to be closed. The filing of objections requires the judge to hold a hearing on the closure motion in open court.

On appellee's motion, a divided court of appeals dismissed the prohibition action as moot. Although recognizing that the closure order's termination did not by itself moot the case, the court held that the adoption of Loc.R. 30 "provides * * * [appellants] with the procedural due process they are entitled to in resisting future closure motions. * * * "

Beacon Journal Publishing Company and Funk appeal as of right.

Roetzel & Andress, Ronald S. Kopp and Amie L. Bruggeman, Akron, for appellants.

Gold, Rotatori, Schwartz, & Gibbons Co., L.P.A., Niki Z. Schwartz and Orville E. Stifel II, Cleveland, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

To obtain a writ of prohibition, a relator must show (1) that the court against which it is sought is about to exercise judicial power, (2) that the exercise of such power is unauthorized by law, and (3) that refusal of the writ will cause relator an injury for which he has no other adequate remedy. Commercial Savings Bank v. Wyandot Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 192, 193, 519 N.E.2d 647, 648-649. Since the Stokes trial ended before the court of appeals entered judgment in this case, the municipal court is not about to exercise judicial power. By ordinary standards, this case is moot. Id. at 194, 519 N.E.2d at 649.

However, a court may rule on an otherwise moot case "where the issues raised are 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' * * * " State, ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., v. Barnes (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 165, 527 N.E.2d 807, paragraph one of the syllabus. Courtroom closure cases often evade review, since a closure order usually expires before an appellate court can consider it--as, indeed, was the case here. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court (1982), 457 U.S. 596, 602-603, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 2618, 73 L.Ed.2d 248, 254; State, ex rel. The Repository, v. Unger (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 418, 419-420, 28 OBR 472, 473-474, 504 N.E.2d 37, 39. Nevertheless, the court of appeals held the action to be moot because the adoption of Loc.R. 30 rendered the situation in this case incapable of repetition.

A case is capable of repetition where "there * * * [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party * * * [will] be subjected to the same action again. * * * " Weinstein v. Bradford (1975), 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 349, 46 L.Ed.2d 350, 353. We find no basis in the record for the lower court's conclusion that appellee's action is not capable of repetition. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for a determination on the merits with respect to appellee's actions in the Stokes case.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

SWEENEY, WRIGHT, HERBERT R. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.

DOUGLAS, J., concurs separately.

MOYER, C.J., and HOLMES, J., dissent and would affirm the appeal as being moot.

DOUGLAS, Justice, concurring.

I concur that the judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed. Further, I concur that the case before us is one capable of repetition, yet evading review and, thus, the issue is properly before us for decision even though the matter might now appear to be moot.

I do not agree that we should avoid, for whatever reason, the merit issue presented to us by appellants. That issue is whether appellee's order closing his courtroom during one phase of a criminal proceeding has been cured by amending the rules of the Shaker Heights Municipal Court to add Rule 30, which sets forth a procedure for the court to follow before a court proceeding is closed.

While I have a number of concerns (and specifically a due process concern) with Rule 30, I limit my comments to just two: (1) Why is it necessary to have any such rule at all? and (2) Why does not the rule simply follow existing law as to hearing before closure?

The closing of courtrooms is a dangerous business. It is my judgment that a courtroom should never be closed. I recognize I am in the minority in this view but I believe the position is supported by constitutional provisions and case law. Rather than, once again, expounding on my reasons for this strongly held belief, I refer interested readers to my opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in In re T.R. (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 24-27, 556 N.E.2d 439, 456-459.

At the very least, one must start with the proposition that there is a heavy presumption that courts and court proceedings are to be open. Therefore, at least to me, it seems, at best, unwise to promulgate a rule establishing a procedure for court closure. Such a rule is not only unwise (because it invites mischief) but also unnecessary, given existing case law which sets forth what safeguards must be followed before a courtroom may be closed.

Rule 30 does not comport with existing case law. It is understandable why, given the trial court's recent experiences in the underlying criminal case (as described in appellee's brief), the court felt the necessity for an orderly procedure to consider requests for courtroom closures. However, the rule does not meet the requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court and this court when closure is requested.

Rule 30, in paragraph four, requires that "[p]ersons or entities wishing to object to a filed motion for closure shall do so by filing * * * a written objection and request for hearing. * * * " (Emphasis added.) Paragraph five provides that "[w]hen a timely objection and request for hearing has [sic] been filed in opposition to a closure motion, the Court will conduct a hearing on the motion in open court. * * * " (Emphasis added.) Thus, only if there is a timely objection filed to the proposed closure will there be a hearing on the motion for closure. No objection--no hearing! I believe this procedure violates due process and existing case law.

In the underlying criminal case, the trial court closed juror voir dire. A trial court may not constitutionally close a presumptively open proceeding without considering alternatives to closure. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1984), 464 U.S. 501, 511, 104 S.Ct. 819, 825, 78 L.Ed.2d 629, 639 ("Press-Enterprise I "). The public and press have a constitutional right of access and a right to be in attendance at criminal trials. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court (1982), 457 U.S. 596, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248. Such right of access includes access to the voir dire examination of potential jurors. Press-Enterprise I, supra. While it is true that the Constitution of the United States does not explicitly guarantee access to criminal trials, such right is implied from the First Amendment read in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980), 448 U.S. 555, 575, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2826, 65 L.Ed.2d 973, 988, the court said, " * * * [p]lainly it would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher concern and importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are conducted[.] * * *

"The Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the long history of trials being presumptively open. Public access to trials was then regarded as an important aspect of the process itself * * *."

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