State ex rel. Berry v. McBride
| Decision Date | 30 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 30696.,30696. |
| Citation | 625 S.E.2d 341 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of West Virginia ex rel. James William BERRY, Sr., Petitioner, v. Thomas L. McBRIDE, Warden, Mt. Olive Correctional Center, Respondent. |
Syllabus by the Court
1. "When the constitutionality of a statute is questioned every reasonable construction of the statute must be resorted to by a court in order to sustain constitutionality, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the legislative enactment." Syllabus Point 3, Willis v. O'Brien, 151 W.Va. 628, 153 S.E.2d 178 (1967).
2. State ex rel. White v. Parsons, 199 W.Va. 1, 483 S.E.2d 1 (1996) did not invalidate the entire range of provisions in West Virginia Code of State Regulations, Title 95, Series 1 and 2.
3. The Legislature acted constitutionally in amending W.Va.Code, 31-20-9 [1998] insofar as that amendment requires that West Virginia Code of State Regulations, Title 95-2-8.7 relating to double-bunking in cells designed for single occupancy does not apply to correctional facilities.
4. The constitutional principles of equal protection and due process of law, W.Va. Const. art. 3, § 10, require that decisions regarding whether an inmate in a State correctional facility should be housed in a single cell must be made pursuant to enforceable standards, policies, and procedures that are based on pertinent medical and other relevant criteria.
Jason E. Huber, Esq., Forman & Huber, PC, Charleston, for Petitioner.
Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General, Charles P. Houdyschell, Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, for Respondent.
In the instant case we adopt the recommendations of a special master appointed by this Court and hold that double-bunking in correctional facilities is not barred by State regulations; and that the decision whether an inmate should or should not be housed in a single cell must be made pursuant to enforceable standards, policies, and procedures that are based on pertinent medical and other relevant criteria.
This matter is before this Court upon James William Berry's petition asserting that the respondent warden of the Mount Olive Correctional Complex ("MOCC") in the past has required (and in the future may require) the petitioner Mr. Berry to share a cell at the MOCC with another inmate. (We will refer to this practice as "double-bunking.")
The petitioner began the instant case by filing a petition pro se invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court, to which the respondent replied; and the case was thereafter submitted for decision. This Court subsequently issued an opinion finding most of the grounds for the petitioner's claim to be entitled to be housed in a single cell to be without merit.1 State ex rel. Berry v. McBride, No. 30696, ___ W.Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2002 WL 31681823 (November 27, 2002) ().
However, this Court's now-withdrawn opinion did conclude that West Virginia Code of State Regulations, Title 95-2-8.72 prohibited the respondent from housing more than one inmate in a correctional facility (as opposed to an inmate in a jail) in a cell designed for single occupancy. On that basis, the withdrawn opinion granted the petitioner's requested writ.
Title 95-2, "Minimum Standards for Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of Correctional Facilities," was promulgated in 1996 and states in pertinent part that:
8.7. Single Occupancy. Only one inmate shall occupy a room or cell designed for single occupancy....
However, in 1998 the Legislature added language at W.Va.Code, 31-20-9(a)(2) [1998] to state in pertinent part:
Provided, That rules filed by the jail and correctional facilities standards commission and authorized by the Legislature to be promulgated before the amendment to this section enacted in the regular session of the Legislature in the year one thousand nine hundred ninety-eight remain in force except that such previously promulgated rules no longer apply to: (i) Correctional facilities; ... [emphasis added].
After this Court issued its original opinion in the instant case, the respondent requested that this Court rehear the instant case and reconsider our decision in light of the foregoing-quoted 1998 amendment. We granted the respondent's request, withdrew our original opinion, and appointed counsel to represent the petitioner.
Upon the parties' request, this Court thereafter referred this matter to Judge Derek C. Swope to serve as special master for the purposes of supervising the taking of depositions and facilitating discovery. This Court further ordered that at the conclusion of discovery, the special master should make such findings of fact and conclusions of law as are necessary to address the issues presented by the parties and to permit adequate review by this Court.
The special master received the memoranda of both parties and issued an Interim Report requesting additional discovery. The additional discovery matters having been concluded, the special master then submitted recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law to this Court, which we largely adopt and incorporate herein. We appreciate the special master's thorough and reasoned approach to the matters that were before him. Upon oral argument and a review of the briefs on rehearing, we issue this opinion, replacing our previously-issued opinion in the instant case.
A.
The Mount Olive Correctional Complex where the petitioner is housed by the respondent is a correctional facility that currently houses approximately 980 inmates, and originally did not place more than one person in each cell. According to the special master's report, the cells at MOCC were originally designed so that they could be modified to house two inmates, but the architect deleted that design feature before the construction of the MOCC. However, when the MOCC population exceeded bed and cell space, the respondent began double-bunking inmates. The increase in population assertedly occurred when a large number of prisoners held in county or regional jails were ordered to be transferred to West Virginia Division of Corrections facilities. See State ex rel Sams v. Kirby, 208 W.Va. 726, 542 S.E.2d 889 (2000).
The petitioner has been incarcerated at the MOCC since May 17, 1997, and is serving a life sentence. The petitioner asserts that the physicians at the Veterans Administration Hospitals in Huntington and Beckley have determined that he is seventy-five percent disabled. The petitioner is required to move about in a wheelchair as a result of being struck by an automobile. The petitioner contends that he suffers from nerve damage and degenerative arthritis.
The petitioner was first double-bunked for approximately four months during his classification period at MOCC. From 1997 until approximately December 2001, the petitioner occupied a single cell by himself.
In December 2001, the petitioner was sent to "lockup" for ninety days. Upon returning from lockup, the petitioner was placed in a single cell, but over a period of approximately six months, four other inmates were moved into and out of the petitioner's single cell. The petitioner asserts that he had no personal problems with the first three inmates, but that the fourth inmate consistently abused the petitioner, and preyed upon him based on his disability. The petitioner contends that even when he is alone, his cell is difficult to move around in; and when another inmate is housed in his cell, it is extremely difficult, painful, and awkward for him to move about in his cell. It appears that currently the petitioner is not double-bunked.
Upon reviewing the documentary record before him, the special master found no mention of the petitioner's having received a medical assessment related to the issue of his suitability for single- or double-bunking, or of any objective medical or other criteria being used by MOCC in determining whether the petitioner should be housed in a single cell. The special master requested additional submissions from the parties on this issue.
In response, the petitioner asserted that MOCC has no objective criteria to evaluate an inmate's physical and/or psychiatric need for a single cell. The petitioner contended that there are no general standards and that all inmates are evaluated, if at all, on an ad hoc and standardless basis.
The respondent asserted that medical professionals at MOCC assess individuals similarly situated to petitioner "based upon their individual medical needs." According to the special master's report, the respondent asserts that medical protocols or criteria "would be" based upon an accepted standard of care, and that the medical unit will order special accommodations to inmates "as needed;" and that should the medical unit find a condition which would permit an inmate to reside within the general population but require single housing, it would be the "desire" of corrections to adhere to the clinical judgment of its medical professionals.
The special master requested information concerning whether Mr. Berry was in fact medically assessed for his condition and for his suitability for double bunking. The petitioner asserted that the respondent admitted that the medical unit did not specifically evaluate Mr. Berry in order to determine if he needed a single cell.
The special master inquired of the parties as to whether MOCC's determination of Mr. Berry's medical disability was based upon the assessment of medical professionals using any objective criteria, and, if so, whether such a determination might play a role in his being double-bunked in the future. The petitioner asserted that since Mr. Berry was never assessed, the respondent's determination could not have been made based upon objective criteria. The petitioner...
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