State ex rel. Boggs v. Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 24 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-73,97-73
• Citation: 694 N.E.2d 1346,82 Ohio St.3d 222
• Parties: , 125 Ed. Law Rep. 1337 The STATE ex rel. BOGGS et al., Appellants, v. SPRINGFIELD LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 222

82 Ohio St.3d 222

694 N.E.2d 1346, 125 Ed. Law Rep. 1337

The STATE ex rel. BOGGS et al., Appellants, v. SPRINGFIELD LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellee.

No. 97-73.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted March 3, 1998.

Decided June 24, 1998.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

Where a collective bargaining contract executed pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117 includes an express termination date, the agreement may be deemed to continue by implied mutual assent after that date only until such time as either party to the agreement acts in a manner inconsistent with the inference that both parties wish to be governed by the contract.

This cause is before this court for the second time. In State ex rel. Boggs v. Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 94, 647 N.E.2d 788, we held that the court of appeals erred in dismissing the relators' complaint in mandamus pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) by issuing summary judgment in favor of the respondent, based on materials filed by the respondent that were extrinsic to the complaint. This court reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings and resolution on the merits.

On remand the parties engaged in discovery and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The material facts are not in dispute.

Relators-appellants are twenty-one school bus drivers and mechanics who, at one time, were subject to a collective bargaining agreement ("agreement") between their employer, respondent-appellee Springfield Local School District Board of Education ("board"), and Local 530 of the Ohio Association of Public School Employees/AFSCME-AFL-CIO ("union"). The agreement became effective on September 1, 1990, and, according to its terms, was to "remain in full force and effect until 11:59 p.m., August 31, 1993." Section 12.1(C), Article XII of the agreement, dealing with employee rights and obligations, provided that "[p]rovisions of this article supersede [R.C. 3319.081]."

Early in 1993, the board notified the union that it was considering subcontracting its transportation services to a private company, Settle Service, Inc., a division of Laidlaw Transit, Inc. ("Settle"). As the board and the union commenced negotiations for a new collective bargaining contract on May 3, 1993, the union was strongly opposed to the school administration's proposal to privatize school bus services.

On August 30, 1993, the union gave notice to the board, pursuant to R.C. 4117.14, of its intent to commence a strike on September 14, 1993 by bus drivers and mechanics. No new agreement was reached by August 31, the stated expiration date of the existing agreement. Nor did either side expressly ask the other for an extension of the expiration date of the agreement.

On September 13, 1993, the board adopted a resolution that authorized the superintendent of the school district to enter into a transportation contract with Settle and stated that "[a]ll classifications * * * of bus driver and mechanic shall be abolished on the date the contract provided for in Section 1 of this resolution becomes effective." The authorization was contingent upon the school administration either (1) reaching agreement with the union on a new agreement or (2) meeting all obligations of R.C. Chapter 4117 and other legal requirements.

On Tuesday, September 14, the union implemented the strike described in its prior notice.

On Friday, September 17, sixteen of the relators and two other employees terminated their strike and delivered to the school superintendent a signed statement that they "wish[ed] to have [their] continuing contracts and other contracts honored by the School board and furthermore [wished] to go back to work as school bus drivers of the Springfield Local Board of Education."

On the same date the same sixteen relators, and six other employees, initiated this action in mandamus. In their complaint, the relators alleged that seventeen of them "[held] continuing contracts of employment pursuant to R.C. § 3319.081." ¹ They further alleged that the remaining five were "not yet continuing contract employees pursuant to R.C. § 3319.081, but, nevertheless, [had] a contract of employment for the school year 1993-1994 with Respondent." They sought a writ of mandamus to compel the board, inter alia, to reinstate them and recognize their "continuing contracts and written contracts * * * authorized by R.C. § 3119.081."

Thereafter, the drivers and mechanics went back to work driving buses and performing their other regular duties.

On September 23, 1993, the board notified the president of the union of its intent to lay off all employees in the positions of bus driver and mechanic at the close of business on October 8, 1993, apparently based on its plan to proceed with privatization of school bus transportation services. The prior agreement at Section 12.2(A), Article XII, required that the union president "be notified two (2) weeks in advance of any anticipated layoff."

On October 1, 1993, the board issued what it termed its "Final Offer," setting forth proposed guaranteed wages and benefits the school employees would receive under a privatized school transportation system. It notified the union that, absent its agreement to those terms, it would view the situation as one of "ultimate impasse," and would unilaterally implement the terms of the final offer at the close of business on October 8, 1993. The union rejected the offer on October 8, and demanded, in writing, that the board honor the union members' "existing and continuing contracts under O.R.C. 3319.081."

On October 11, 1993, the board executed a contract with Settle pursuant to which Settle agreed to "provide drivers for the buses used in providing" transportation for the school district. Settle agreed to "offer all Existing Drivers employment" and to recognize their accumulated seniority and benefits. "Existing Drivers" were defined as "those drivers who were employed by the District as of September 1, 1993 and subsequently accept employment with the Company."

On the same date the board deemed all of its positions of bus driver and mechanic to be abolished, consistent with its previous resolution. Thereafter, it appears an unknown number of the relators continued to drive school buses, but reported to Settle supervisors, and were deemed by the board and Settle to be employees of Settle.

Based on these facts, the court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of respondent, and again denied the relators the writ of mandamus they sought.

The cause is now before us upon an appeal as of right.

Buckley King & Bluso and James E. Melle, Columbus, for appellants.

Johnson, Balazs & Angelo and Michael J. Angelo, Cleveland, for appellee.

MOYER, Chief Justice.

We conclude that the relators are entitled to a writ of mandamus and therefore reverse the court of appeals.

The board contends that the agreement was in effect until the point of "ultimate impasse" in renegotiations, and that the agreement authorized the layoffs of the relators. The relators contend that the agreement was not in effect, having expired prior to their return to work on or after September 17, 1993. Thus, we must initially determine whether the provisions of the agreement governed the legal rights and responsibilities of the board and the relators during the relevant events underlying this dispute, as asserted by the board, or whether to apply the law set forth in R.C. 3319.081, as argued by the relators.

The board argues that, by declaring ultimate impasse on October 1, 1993, it manifested its intent to no longer be bound by the terms of the expired collective bargaining agreement. In State ex rel. Rootstown Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Portage Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 489, 493, 678 N.E.2d 1365, 1368, we rejected an argument similar to that made by the board in this case. The contention...