State ex rel. Brannan v. Williams

Decision Date29 November 2007
Docket NumberNo. 1 CA-CV 06-0719.,1 CA-CV 06-0719.
Citation171 P.3d 1248,217 Ariz. 207
PartiesSTATE of Arizona ex rel. Martin BRANNAN, La Paz County Attorney, Petitioner/Appellant, v. The Honorable E.M. "Beth" WILLIAMS, Justice of the Peace for the Fourth Precinct Justice Court, La Paz County, Arizona, Respondent/Appellee. State of Arizona ex rel. Martin Brannan, La Paz County Attorney, Petitioner/Appellant, v. The Honorable John Drum, Justice of the Peace for the Sixth Precinct Justice Court, La Paz County, Arizona, Respondent/Appellee.
CourtArizona Court of Appeals

Martin Brannan, La Paz County Attorney, Parker, Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant.

E.M. "Beth" Williams, Justice of the Peace, Quartzsite, In propria persona.

OPINION

TIMMER, Judge.

¶ 1 We are asked to decide whether the superior court erred by denying the State's special action request to compel two La Paz County Justices of the Peace to adjudicate complaints issued by law enforcement officers for attempted possession of marijuana and attempted possession of drug paraphernalia, both class one misdemeanor crimes. The decisive issue is whether justice courts have jurisdiction to consider such charges. For the reasons that follow, we hold that justice courts possess such jurisdiction, and the superior court therefore erred by denying special action relief.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On separate occasions in Spring 2006, an Arizona Department of Public Safety ("DPS") officer issued traffic tickets and complaints to two individuals, citing them for attempted possession of marijuana in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 13-1001(A), -3405(A)(1) (Supp.2006), and attempted possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-1001(A), -3415(A) (2001), both class one misdemeanors.1 A.R.S. §§ 13-1001(C)(6), -3405(B)(1), -3415(A). The complaints directed the cited individuals to appear, respectively, before the justice courts in Quartzsite and Parker. Subsequently, respondents John C. Drum, justice of the peace in Parker, and E.M. "Beth" Williams, justice of the peace in Quartzsite, summarily dismissed these charges. Judge Williams, through her court clerk, explained that the court "does not accept misdemeanor drug charges filed on a citation," and further stated that the matter could only proceed if the La Paz County Attorney filed a complaint. The court under Judge Drum's direction did not explain its decision but simply marked the charges on the ticket as "void".

¶ 3 In May 2006, the State filed petitions for special action in the superior court asking it to compel respondents to conduct criminal proceedings on misdemeanor drug offenses charged by law enforcement officers in future traffic tickets and complaints. After consolidating the cases, the court denied special action relief. The court acknowledged that justice courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate misdemeanor crimes. Nevertheless, the court concluded that A.R.S. § 13-110 (2001) deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try charges of attempted crimes when the underlying completed crimes are felonies. Section 13-110 provides as follows:

A person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears upon the trial that the crime intended or attempted was perpetrated by the person in pursuance of such an attempt, unless the court, in its discretion, discharges the jury and directs the person to be tried for the crime.

(Emphasis added.) Possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia are class six felonies, A.R.S. §§ 13-3405(B)(1), 13-3415(A), which justice courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate beyond preliminary proceedings. A.R.S. § 22-301(A)(1), (2) (limiting justice courts' criminal jurisdiction over felony charges to commencing action and conducting preliminary proceedings). Consequently, according to the superior court, justice courts lack jurisdiction to exercise the discretion afforded by § 13-110 to direct trials on charges of possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. For this reason, the court ruled that considering "the statutory scheme of A.R.S. §§ 13-110, and 22-301(A)(1), (2)," justice courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate misdemeanor charges of attempted possession of marijuana and attempted possession of drug paraphernalia. This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

¶ 4 The State argues the superior court erred in ruling that A.R.S. § 13-110 deprives a justice court of jurisdiction over a misdemeanor attempt charge merely because the court may not possess jurisdiction to later direct a trial on the completed crime. The State points out that other provisions govern the justice courts' jurisdiction. Additionally, § 13-110 may never apply to affect jurisdiction if evidence fails to demonstrate the commission of a completed crime and, regardless, a court may not exercise any discretion under this provision until after commencement of a jury trial. Judge Williams responds that the superior court properly denied relief to the State as justice courts lack authority to determine that an attempted misdemeanor crime should be tried as a completed felony crime, thereby depriving such courts of jurisdiction.2 Because resolution of this matter turns on the proper interpretation and interplay of statutes relating to the justice courts' jurisdiction, we review the superior court's ruling de novo as a question of law. State v. Mangum, 214 Ariz. 165, 167, ¶ 6, 150 P.3d 252, 254 (App.2007).

¶ 5 When construing statutes, our primary goal is to ascertain the legislature's intent. Zamora v. Reinstein, 185 Ariz. 272, 275, 915 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1996). We first look to the text of the relevant statutes. State v. Christian, 205 Ariz. 64, 66, ¶ 6, 66 P.3d 1241, 1243 (2003). If the statutory language is clear, we ascribe plain meaning to its terms. Rineer v. Leonardo, 194 Ariz. 45, 46, ¶ 7, 977 P.2d 767, 768 (1999). As necessary, we employ secondary principles of statutory construction to glean legislative intent. State ex rel. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Demetz, 212 Ariz. 287, 289, ¶ 7, 130 P.3d 986, 988 (App.2006). In interpreting a statute, we view it in the context of other related statutes and the overall statutory scheme. Goulder v. Ariz. Dep't. of Transp., 177 Ariz. 414, 416, 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993). With these principles in mind, we examine the constitutional and statutory grants of jurisdiction to the justice courts.

¶ 6 Justice courts derive their jurisdiction solely from the constitution and statutes of this state. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 32(B); State ex rel. Milstead v. Melvin, 140 Ariz. 402, 404-05, 682 P.2d 407, 409-10 (1984). Article 6, Section 32(C) of the Arizona Constitution restricts the justice courts' criminal jurisdiction to misdemeanor crimes. Section 22-301(A), A.R.S., specifies that justice courts shall have jurisdiction over the following misdemeanor crimes: "1. Misdemeanors and criminal offenses punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars, or imprisonment in the county jail for not to exceed six months, or by both a fine and imprisonment."3 Attempted possession of marijuana and attempted possession of drug paraphernalia are both class one misdemeanors punishable by fines of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars or imprisonment in the county jail for a period not to exceed six months. A.R.S. §§ 13-707(A)(1), -802(A), -1001(C)(6), -3405(B)(1), -3415(A). Thus, under the plain language of A.R.S. § 22-301(A)(1), justice courts possess jurisdiction to adjudicate charges of attempted possession of marijuana and attempted possession of drug paraphernalia. Nevertheless, we consider whether the legislature intended to strip justice courts of such jurisdiction by enacting A.R.S. § 13-110.

¶ 7 Applying principles of statutory construction, we decide the legislature did not intend A.R.S. § 13-110 to affect the justice courts' jurisdiction properly exercised pursuant to § 22-301(A)(1). First and foremost, the plain language of § 13-110 does not address the justice courts' jurisdiction. State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 48, ¶ 26, 97 P.3d 865, 873 (2004) (acknowledging language of statute is best and most reliable index of statute's meaning).

¶ 8 Second, the legislature's placement of § 13-110 in the general provisions of the Criminal Code rather than among provisions governing justice courts supports a conclusion that the legislature did not intend § 13-110 to deprive justice courts of jurisdiction properly exercised under § 22-301(A)(1). McMann v. City of Tucson, 202 Ariz. 468, 473, ¶ 14, 47 P.3d 672, 677 (App.2002) (gleaning legislative intent from placement of provision in Criminal Code rather than statutes governing cities and towns); Norgord v. State ex rel. Berning, 201 Ariz. 228, 231, ¶ 8 33 P.3d 1166, 1169 (App.2001) (concluding placement of indecent exposure statute in "Sexual Offenses" chapter of Criminal Code suggests legislature intended to classify indecent exposure as sexual offense).

¶ 9 Third, consideration of § 13-110 to determine the justice courts' jurisdiction would lead to speculation and uncertainty, surely a result not intended by the legislature absent express language. See Forino v. Arizona Dept. of Transp., 191 Ariz. 77, 80, 952 P.2d 315, 318 (App.1997) ("To discern the legislature's intent, we may consider the effect and consequences of alternative construction."). A justice court must look to the charge to determine its jurisdiction. State ex rel. Baumert v. Municipal Court of City of Phoenix, 120 Ariz. 341, 344, 585 P.2d 1253, 1256 (App.1978) ("Upon review we must look to the charge to determine jurisdiction rather than look to what might have been charged under the particular facts of any case."). If the court must consider the applicability of § 13-110 to determine jurisdiction, however, it would be forced to speculate about the eventual application of that provision. As the State contends, a court may only exercise the discretion granted by § 13-110...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Brodsky v. State
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • 18 Abril 2008
    ...extent the resolution of an issue depends on statutory interpretation, we review the superior court's ruling de novo. State ex rel. Brannan v. Williams, 217 Ariz. 207, ¶ 4, 171 P.3d 1248, 1250-51 ¶ 5 The Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant from multiple prosecutions and multiple pun......
  • 1800 Ocotillo, LLC v. Wlb Group, Inc.
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • 29 Enero 2008
    ...contracts, we would not expect it do so by enacting a statute that applies only to professional corporations. State ex rel. Martin Brannan v. Williams, 217 Ariz. 207, 210, ¶ 8, 171 P.3d 1248, 1251 (App.2007) (gleaning legislative intent from placement of contested statute within Arizona Rev......
  • Hba v. City of Goodyear
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • 8 Diciembre 2009
    ...extent that the resolution of an issue depends on statutory interpretation, we review the court's ruling de novo. State ex rel. Brannan v. Williams, 217 Ariz. 207, 209-10, ¶ 4, 171 P.3d 1248, 1250-51 (App.2007); Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Apache Junction (Home Builders IV......
  • State v. Rivera (In re Two Hundred Fifty Thousand One Hundred One Dollar & Sixty Cents ($250,101.60) in U.S. Currency)
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • 3 Mayo 2016
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT