State ex rel. O'Brien v. Towne, s. 37246

• Decision Date: 04 June 1964
• Docket Number: 37245,37285,Nos. 37246,s. 37246
• Citation: 392 P.2d 818,64 Wn.2d 581
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE of Washington on the relation of Patrick O'BRIEN, Respondent, v. Vernon W. TOWNE, Judge of the Municipal Court of Seattle, Petitioner. The STATE of Washington on the relation of Hubert John GILLIGAN, Respondent, v. Vernon W. TOWNE, Judge of the Municipal Court of Seattle, Petitioner. The STATE of Washington on the relation of Gerald D. HILE, Respondent, v. Vernon W. TOWNE, Judge of the Municipal Court of Seattle, Petitioner.

Page 581

64 Wn.2d 581

392 P.2d 818

The STATE of Washington on the relation of Patrick O'BRIEN, Respondent, v. Vernon W. TOWNE, Judge of the Municipal Court of Seattle,

Petitioner.

The STATE of Washington on the relation of Hubert John

GILLIGAN, Respondent, v. Vernon W. TOWNE, Judge of the Municipal Court of Seattle,

Petitioner.

The STATE of Washington on the relation of Gerald D. HILE, Respondent, v. Vernon W. TOWNE, Judge of the Municipal Court of Seattle, Petitioner.

Nos. 37246, 37285, 37245.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

June 4, 1964.

Rehearing Denied July 29, 1964.

A. L. Newbould, Corp. Counsel, Charles R. Nelson, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Gordon F. Crandall, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Seattle, for petitioners.

Gerald D. Hile, Greive & Law, R. R. Bob Greive, Seattle, for respondents.

ROSELLINI, Judge.

The defendants in these consolidated cases were charged with various petty offenses, none of which involved as a possible penalty the revocation of a defendant's driver's license. ¹ The defendants have challenged the constitutionality of RCW 35.20.090. That statute pertains to jury trials in municipal courts in cities having a population of over 500,000, which have exclusive original jurisdiction to try violations of all city ordinances, under RCW 35.20.030. RCW 35.20.090 provides inter alia:

'* * * No trial by jury shall be allowed in criminal cases involving violations of city ordinances.'

The superior court held that this provision violates Art. 1, § 12, of the state constitution and Amendment 14, § 1, of the United States constitution. The court based its holding that the provision denied equal protection of the laws to the defendants on its finding that jury trials are available for the same type of offenses in other courts of equal rank. This finding is in error inasmuch as jury trials are not allowed in trials in police courts (which have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses defined by ordinance) for violations of ordinances of first class cities (RCW 35.22.460), second class cities (RCW 35.23.600), third class cities (RCW 35.24.460) or towns (RCW 35.27.540).

The provisions of the state and federal constitutions which prohibit the granting of special privileges and immunities and guarantee equal protection of the laws, require that class legislation must apply alike to all persons within a class, and reasonable ground must exist for making a distinction between those within and those without a designated class; but within the limits of such restrictive rules, the legislature has a wide measure of discretion, and its determination, when expressed in statutory enactment, cannot be successfully attacked unless it is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, inequitable, and unjust. Sittner v. Seattle, 62 Wash.2d 834, 384 P.2d 859; Clark v. Dwyer, 56 Wash.2d 425, 353 P.2d 941, cert. den. 364 U.S. 932, 81 S.Ct. 379, 5 L.Ed.2d 365.

Classifications of cities, counties and other legal subdivisions of states upon the basis of population, have been almost universally upheld by the courts, both state and federal, when population bears any reasonable relation to the purpose and subject matter of the given legislation. To be valid, legislation need not apply alike to persons not similarly situated, and need only apply alike to all persons similarly situated. State ex rel. Lindsey v. Derbyshire, 79 Wash. 227, 140 P. 540.

If the legislature made a distinction between cities having a population of over 500,000 and smaller cities, the motivating consideration may well have been that the volume of court business is greater in a city of that size, and the allowing of a jury trial in the first instance impractical. The enanctment of a law disallowing jury trials in cities of this size, for this reason, while permitting them in smaller cites, would not be manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, inequitable, and unjust. As a matter of fact, however, the respondents have failed to show that the legislature did make such a distinction.

In the argument in support of the judgment, the defendants cite authorities sustaining the proposition that legislatures may not deny equal protection of the laws, but none supporting the contention that the law questioned here constitutes such a denial.

The only other argument advanced in support of the jugment is that the provision violates Art. 3, § 2 and Amendment 6, as carried over into the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution and Amendment 10 of the state constitution. It is the defendants' contention that these provisions secure to them the right to trial by jury. In City of Bellingham v. Hite, 37 Wash.2d 652, 225 P.2d 895, this court held that the right to trial by jury was not denied by a statute giving to a police judge jurisdiction to try certain offenses without a jury, since any person convicted was intitled to appeal to the superior court and secure a trial de novo. The same right of appeal exists here.

The respondents cite the case of Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 8 S.Ct. 1301, 32 L.Ed. 223, wherein the Supreme Court of the United States held that the right to trial by jury is not accorded by a statute which gives the right to have a jury trial on appeal, if no jury...