Yakima County Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n v. Board of Com'rs for Yakima County

• Decision Date: 26 October 1979
• Docket Number: No. 46019,46019
• Parties: , 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2585 YAKIMA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION, a Washington nonprofit corporation, Respondent, v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR YAKIMA COUNTY, Washington, presently composed of Les Conrad, Charles Rich, and Graham Tollefson, Appellants.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 831

92 Wn.2d 831

601 P.2d 936, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2585

YAKIMA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION, a Washington nonprofit corporation, Respondent, v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR YAKIMA COUNTY, Washington presently composed of Les Conrad, Charles Rich and Graham Tollefson, Appellants.

No. 46019.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Oct. 26, 1979.

Jeffrey C. Sullivan, Pros. Atty., Yakima, Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Richard A. Heath, James K. Pharris, Asst. Attys. Gen., Robt. E. Beaty, Olympia, for appellants.

Thorner, Kennedy & Gano, David A. Thorner, Craig L. Smith, Yakima, for respondent.

BRACHTENBACH, Justice.

This case concerns the applicability of certain provisions of the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA), RCW 41.56, to Yakima County deputy sheriffs. Some background is necessary to put the precise issue in context.

PECBA was enacted in 1967, as then-Governor Evans explained when executing a partial veto,

to promote the continued improvement of the relationship between public employers and their employees by providing a uniform basis for implementing the right of public employees to join labor organizations of their own choosing and to be represented by such organizations in matters concerning their employment relations with public employers.

Laws of 1967, Ex.Sess., ch. 108, pp. 1884, 1891. In 1973, the Act was amended in part by the addition of provisions for mandatory mediation, fact-finding and binding arbitration for "uniformed personnel." RCW 41.56.030(6); .430-.490; .905; .910.

"Uniformed personnel" are defined by RCW 41.56.030(6) as "law enforcement officers . . . of cities with a population of fifteen thousand or more or law enforcement officers employed by the governing body of AA counties." An AA county has a population of 500,000 or more. RCW 36.13.010. King County is currently this state's only AA county. A first class county has a population of 125,000 but less than 210,000. RCW 36.13.010. Yakima County fits in this category.

The Yakima County Deputy Sheriff's Association (deputy sheriffs) brought this declaratory action to challenge as unconstitutionally underinclusive RCW 41.56.030(6)'s classification of "uniformed personnel" by population. The trial court held that the deputy sheriffs' equal protection rights were violated by RCW 41.56.030(6)'s population classification. It then struck the challenged language from the statute, thereby extending the act to all law enforcement personnel. We accepted direct review under RAP 4.2.

The precise issue here, therefore, is whether the exclusion of non-AA county deputy sheriffs from PECBA's mandatory mediation, fact-finding and arbitration provisions violates the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the state constitution (Const. art. 1, § 12). We hold that it does not and reverse.

We begin by ascertaining the challenged legislative classification. RCW 41.56.030(6) creates a class of "uniformed personnel", I. e., law enforcement officers employed by AA counties or cities with at least a 15,000 population. Thus, the challenged class in this lawsuit is that of law enforcement officers statutorily designated as "uniformed personnel." Respondent deputy sheriffs are law enforcement officers outside this class.

The deputy sheriffs do not contend, nor did the trial court find, that the deputies are part of a suspect class or that they have a fundamental right to mandatory mediation, fact-finding and arbitration. Therefore, we examine the legislature's decision to classify certain law enforcement officers as "uniformed personnel" with minimal rather than strict scrutiny. Nielsen v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 90 Wash.2d 818, 820, 585 P.2d 1191 (1978).

There is some confusion in our cases about the requirements of minimal scrutiny. In some cases, we seem only to examine whether the challenged classification rests upon grounds that reasonably constitute a distinction between those within and without the class. State v. Ruzicka, 89 Wash.2d 217, 231, 570 P.2d 1208 (1977); In re Ballot Title for Initiative 333, 88 Wash.2d 192, 194, 558 P.2d 248, 559 P.2d 562 (1977); Gluck v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 84 Wash.2d 316, 318, 525 P.2d 768 (1974). In other cases, we seem to be concerned only that the classification have some rational relation to the legislation's purpose. Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash.2d 584, 592, 584 P.2d 918 (1978); In re Patterson, 90 Wash.2d 144, 149-50, 579 P.2d 1335 (1978); Houser v. State, 85 Wash.2d 803, 807, 540 P.2d 412 (1975). Finally, in some cases, we claim to use a "rational relationship" test, but then only look for "reasonable grounds." Willard v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 91 Wash.2d 759, 763, 592 P.2d 1103 (1979); Griffin v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 91 Wash.2d 616, 627, 590 P.2d 816 (1979); Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash.2d 592, 604-05, 575 P.2d 201 (1978).

In fact, three steps are involved when measuring the constitutionality of a legislative classification with minimal scrutiny. Underlying this scrutiny is the notion that the party challenging the classification has the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of a statute's constitutionality. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Washington Life & Disability Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 83 Wash.2d 523, 528, 520 P.2d 162 (1974).

First, does the classification apply alike to all members within the designated class? In re George, 90 Wash.2d 90, 94, 579 P.2d 354 (1978); Everett v. Fire Fighters, Local 350, 87 Wash.2d 572, 576, 555 P.2d 418 (1976). The answer is usually yes. Washington Kelpers Ass'n v. State, 81 Wash.2d 410, 421, 502 P.2d 1170 (1972); Belancsik v. Overlake Memorial Hosp., 80 Wash.2d 111, 115, 492 P.2d 219 (1971); State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse, 187 Wash. 75, 81, 59 P.2d 1101 (1936). However, an affirmative answer to this narrow question does not itself mean that the challenged legislative classification will survive minimal scrutiny. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 994-95 (1978); Tussman & tenBrock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal.L.Rev. 341, 345 (1949).

Second, does some basis in reality exist for reasonably distinguishing between those within and without the designated class? More specifically, do reasonable grounds exist to support the classification's distinction between those within and without the class? Crane Towing, Inc. v. Gorton, 89 Wash.2d 161, 174, 570 P.2d 428 (1977); Clark v. Dwyer, 56 Wash.2d 425, 435, 353 P.2d 941 (1960), Cert. denied, 364 U.S. 932, 81 S.Ct. 379, 5 L.Ed.2d 365 (1961). The legislature's discretion in making classes is wide and, when a statutory classification is challenged, facts are presumed sufficient to justify it. Moran v. State, 88 Wash.2d 867, 874, 568 P.2d 758 (1977). The burden is on the challenger to prove that the classification does not rest on a reasonable basis. Haddenham v. State, 87 Wash.2d 145, 150, 550 P.2d 9 (1976).

Third, does the challenged classification have any rational relation to the purposes of the challenged statute? Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501, 99 S.Ct. 740, 762, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979). More specifically, does the difference in treatment between those within and without the designated class serve the purposes intended by the legislation? Salstrom's Vehicles, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 87 Wash.2d 686, 694, 555 P.2d 1361 (1976); Sonitrol Northwest, Inc. v. Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 588, 589-90, 528 P.2d 474 (1974); See 3 B. Schwartz, A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States, 500-04 (1968); Developments in Law Equal Protection, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1082-87 (1969). The challenger must do more than merely question the wisdom and expediency of the statute. Brewer v. Copeland, 86 Wash.2d 58, 61, 542 P.2d 445 (1975). The challenger must show conclusively that the classification is contrary to the legislation's purposes. State v. Kent, 87 Wash.2d 103, 110, 549 P.2d 721 (1976). Moreover, it must be remembered that equal protection does not require a state to attack every aspect of a problem. Rather, the legislature is free to approach a problem piecemeal and learn from experience. State v. Kent, supra at 111, 549 P.2d 721.

With these presumptions and principles at hand, we now consider whether the deputy sheriffs' equal protection rights are offended by RCW 41.56.030(6)'s classification of certain law enforcement officers as "uniformed personnel." The deputy sheriffs do not claim that the classification applies differently to members of the designated class. RCW 41.56.030(6) applies evenly to all "uniformed personnel" as defined, and the statute, therefore, satisfies the test's first step.

The second step demands that reasonable grounds exist for distinguishing between those within and without the designated class. The only AA county in the state and thus the only county employing "uniformed personnel" is King County. Because King County is twice as large as any other county, it is presumed that a real difference exists between its law enforcement and public employee concerns and those of other smaller counties. The deputy sheriffs fail to overcome the presumption that sufficient facts support this distinction.

Moreover, county and city law enforcement agencies, even if both serve populations over 15,000, differ in function and structure. Compare RCW 35 With RCW 36. For example, county sheriffs usually are elected, while police chiefs usually are appointed. Compare RCW 35.23.130 With RCW 36.16.030. However, in King County, the chief law enforcement officer is appointed. King County Code § 2.16.090. County deputy sheriffs are law enforcement officers in primarily rural unincorporated areas, while city police enforce the law in primarily urban areas. The roles, responsibilities and problems of county law officers truly can differ from those of city police officers, and RCW 41.56.030(6)'s classification of certain of those...