State ex rel. Brown v. Bates
| Decision Date | 12 December 1941 |
| Docket Number | 15340. |
| Citation | 18 S.E.2d 346,198 S.C. 430 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. BROWN et al. v. BATES, State Treasurer. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Jan. 9, 1942.
Frank A. Graham, Jr., of Columbia, and Thos. M. Boulware, of Barnwell, for petitioners.
John M. Daniel, Atty. Gen., and M. J. Hough and T. C. Callison Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.
Chapter 162 of the Code, Section 8507 to 8530-2, as amended (See 1941 Report of Code Commissioner for various amendments to Code provisions), subjects "motor vehicle carriers" engaged in the business of transporting persons or property for compensation, to special license charges and regulations which are not applicable to the owners of other motor vehicles. The Act of 1941, numbered 167, 42 Stat. at Large, p. 227, directs among other things that the license fees collected under Chapter 162 of the Code as amended "shall, after the cost of administration and collection have been deducted, be turned into the State Treasury to the credit of the General Fund of the State."
In this proceeding in the original jurisdiction of the Court the petitioners, describing themselves as taxpayers and as owners and operators of motor vehicles used in the transportation of property for hire under licenses issued to them by the Public Service Commission, are seeking an injunction against the State Treasurer to prevent him from carrying out this statutory direction, charging in the main that the 1941 Act violates Article X, Section 2 of the Constitution, in that the purpose of the Act, as shown by additional provisions thereof which are not attacked in this case, is to provide for a State deficit and that the Act does not provide for the levying of a tax for such purpose in accordance with the requirements of the Constitutional provision stated; and that it violates Article X, Section 3 of the Constitution, in that, it is alleged, the license fees in question constitute a tax levied for a special purpose, to wit "for the use of the roads comprising the State Highway System," and that the 1941 Act seeks to "divert" the same to the general financial purposes of the State; and that the Act also violates the State and Federal Constitutions, Const. S.C. art. 1, § 8; Const.U.S. art. 1, § 10, in that it impairs the obligation of the contract of the State as represented by its outstanding State Highway Certificates of Indebtedness.
Additional provisions of the same Act relate to the issuance of notes in the amount of Two Million, Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars to provide funds to pay the current indebtedness of the State (a "deficit") as of June 30, 1941, or to restore funds received after June 30, 1941, and applied to such current indebtedness, and pledge the motor vehicle license fees in question for the payment of the notes so issued.
In substance, the foundation of the petition may be said to be that under the provisions of Chapter 162 of the Code as amended, the license fees in question, having been imposed (exclusive of the costs of enforcement of the Act and of the specified proportion which under the law goes to the counties, cities and towns) "for the use of the roads comprising the State Highway System" there has been a statutory allocation of these funds which bars the Legislature from diverting or appropriating the same to any other purpose. To support this contention, petitioners rely upon the State Highway Bond Act of 1929, 36 Stat. at Large, p. 670, and upon the decisions of this Court construing the same, such as, State v. Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 150 S.E. 269; State ex rel. Edwards et al. v. Osborne et al., 193 S.C. 158, 7 S.E.2d 526; State ex rel. Edwards et al. v. Osborne et al., 195 S.C. 295, 11 S.E.2d 260.
The respondent has demurred to the petition on various grounds. As we view the matter it will be necessary to consider only the ground of demurrer that the motor vehicle license fees in question are subject to the control of the Legislature; that is to say, that the funds derived from such licenses are part of the general funds of the State, and not funds derived from a tax or license imposed for a specific purpose within the meaning of the Constitutional provisions upon which the petitioners rely.
A proper regard for the Constitutional principle under which legislative and judicial powers are entirely separate and that one branch of the government should exercise its powers in such manner as not to infringe upon the functions of another branch, requires us to approach the problems in this case with two cardinal principles in mind, to wit: (1) The intention of the Legislature in the enactment of the State Highway Bond Act should first be sought. Refinements of legal argument, however ably presented, should not be permitted to lead us into a field of discussion or speculation which would impose upon the legislative purpose or result that which was not within the contemplation of the Legislature. Windham v. Pace, 192 S.C. 271, 6 S.E.2d 270. And (2) if when the intention of the Legislature in the enactment of the State Highway Bond Act has thus been ascertained, the attack upon the constitutionality of the 1941 Act is found to rest upon principles which do not conclusively establish its unconstitutionality, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the Act. In other words, recognition must be given to the legislative view that the enactment of the 1941 Act transgressed no constitutional limitation, unless it is made to appear that some specific constitutional limitation has been so palpably violated as to demand the exercise of the extraordinary power of the judiciary to nullify legislative action. State v. Moorer et al., supra; Federal Land Bank v. Garrison, 185 S.C. 255, 193 S.E. 308.
Bearing these principles in mind, we proceed to a consideration of the intention and purpose of the Legislature in the enactment of the pertinent legislation, as disclosed by the stated objects of the same and the language employed in the legislative directions to carry such objects into effect.
Presumably the petitioners do not question the elementary proposition that ordinarily the proceeds of tax levies (including license fees) may be appropriated to any public purpose, and that by successive legislative acts the appropriation of any particular tax levy may be changed from one public purpose to another in the uncontrolled discretion of the Legislature. Crawford v. Johnston, 177 S.C. 399, 181 S.E. 476. The burden of their argument here is that in the present case the motor vehicle license fees in question were imposed specifically for the purposes of the State Highway Department, and that by virtue of the statutory language designating such purposes, and of the State Highway Bond Act of 1929, providing for a larger amount of bonded indebtedness and for the construction of a State Highway System on the faith of the taxes described in said Act, the license fees now in question were specifically allocated in a constitutional sense to the purposes stated, and that until such purposes have been accomplished, an appropriation of any substantial part of such funds to any other purpose is an unconstitutional "diversion," (in view of the issuance of bonds under the 1929 Act) a violation of the contract clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions.
So we turn to the legislation under discussion to determine whether the language used by the Legislature discloses any such legislative purpose in the imposition of the license fees in question. If it does not--in other words, if such legislation discloses that the motor vehicle license fees in question were imposed as a part of the general fiscal policy of the State, to provide funds which would be within the control of the Legislature as are other State funds not specifically allocated in a constitutional sense--then of course the argument of the petitioners falls.
As a practical matter it may be said that the origin of the present system of licensing and regulating motor vehicle carriers for hire stems from the Act of 1925, 34 Stat. at Large, p. 252. That Act imposes license fees on such carriers and subjects them to various regulations not applicable to motor vehicles generally. The license fees are expressed to be in lieu of any other license fee or license tax charged by the State (Section 6); and the funds derived from this tax imposition are directed to be paid into the State treasury. After the deduction of the costs of administration, specified proportions of the funds collected are required to be paid to the counties, cities and towns. The balance is deemed to be "collected for the use of the roads comprising the State Highway System." The administration and enforcement of the Act are placed entirely in the hands of the State Highway Commission.
By an Act passed in 1928, 35 Stat. at Large, p. 1238, the administration of this legislation, including the collection of the license fees, is "transferred to and devolved upon the South Carolina Railroad Commission."
A Statute passed in 1930, 36 Stat. at Large, p. 1398, provides that in addition to the license fees imposed by the 1925 Act (and which at the time of passage of the 1930 Act were of course payable to the South Carolina Railroad Commission) motor vehicle carriers for hire shall pay to the State Highway Department an annual license fee as provided by the general law relating to the owners of similar vehicles which are not encompassed within the 1925 legislation as amended. The further provision of this Act that "all funds derived by the State Highway Department from the provisions of this Act shall be credited to the State Highway Fund and used for the construction and maintenance of the State Highway System," obviously refers to...
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