State ex rel. Canterbury v. Paul

• Decision Date: 14 July 1999
• Docket Number: No. 25890.,25890.
• Citation: 205 W.Va. 665,520 S.E.2d 662
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia, ex rel. Steven CANTERBURY, Executive Director of West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority, Petitioner, v. Carl "Worthy" PAUL, Magistrate for Ohio County, Respondent.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

520 S.E.2d 662

205 W.Va. 665

STATE of West Virginia, ex rel. Steven CANTERBURY, Executive Director of West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority, Petitioner, v. Carl "Worthy" PAUL, Magistrate for Ohio County, Respondent.

No. 25890.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted June 1, 1999.

Decided July 14, 1999.

Dissenting and Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Starcher October 18, 1999.

Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Esq., Attorney General, Chad M. Cardinal, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for Petitioner.

John M. Hedges, Esq., Byrne and Hedges, Morgantown, West Virginia, Attorney for the Respondent.

MAYNARD, Justice:

In this petition for a writ of prohibition, we are asked to address a magistrate's interpretation of W.Va.Code § 50-3-2 (1996), which requires magistrates to impose certain court costs upon conviction in criminal cases. The petitioner in this case, the West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority (Jail Authority), asserts that the respondent magistrate is wrongfully refusing to impose those statutory court costs.

After careful consideration of the arguments of the parties, we find that the magistrate's refusal to impose those court costs ignores the legislative intent of the statute. The magistrate has interpreted the statute in a manner that conflicts with an interpretation of the statute by the Office of the Administrative Director of the Courts. Furthermore, the disputed language in W.Va. Code § 50-3-2 (1996) was eliminated through an amendment by the Legislature in 1999, and the new version of the statute clearly evinces a legislative intent that magistrates are to collect court costs upon conviction in all criminal cases.

We therefore grant the requested writ of prohibition, as moulded.

I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND

By a letter dated October 22, 1997, the respondent in this case, Ohio County Magistrate Carl "Worthy" Paul, informed the Office of the Administrative Director of the Courts that he was troubled by certain court cost assessments. Specifically, Magistrate Paul challenged the assessment of $55.00 in court costs in certain criminal cases, as required by W.Va.Code § 50-3-2 (1996). Of this $55.00 fee, W.Va.Code § 50-3-4a (1990) mandates that $40.00 be delivered to the State treasury for placement into the regional jail and prison development fund.

In his letter, Magistrate Paul stated he would only impose the $55.00 fee in cases where a criminal defendant was convicted after a trial, and conversely would not impose the $55.00 fee where the conviction was the result of a plea. Magistrate Paul wrote:

Some assessments of court costs are troubling me. I would appreciate your review and comments. Heretofore, I naively accepted the assessments as they have been in place.

* * *

W.Va.Code 50-3-2 provides for the assessment of $55.00 in fees in "each criminal case tried". The operative term is "tried". Guilty pleas, whether to a citation or upon complaint and warrant, are not tried. There is no trial. What authority is there to assess this fee on guilty pleas?

* * *

Unless there is authority to support the status quo, my oath requires me to simply follow the law as written by the legislature and start assessing costs as they have [been] prescribed.

Costs should be assessed as follows: ...

4. The $55.00 assessment at W.Va. Code 50-3-2 is made only on matters that are tried, not on pleas[.]

* * *

[N]o later than 1 January 1998 I intend to implement the assessments as statutorily directed.

In response to Magistrate Paul's letter, as well as similar inquiries from other magistrates, on August 26, 1998, the Office of the Administrative Director of the Courts issued Memorandum No. 98-29 to all sitting and senior-status magistrates. In that Memorandum, the Administrative Office interpreted W.Va.Code § 50-3-2 (1996) to mean that magistrates are required to assess the $55.00 fee in every criminal case where the defendant is adjudged guilty, whether by plea or by trial. The Memorandum states:

Magistrates are to impose costs in a criminal case upon conviction of a defendant. While the language of the statute refers to each criminal case "tried" in a magistrate court, a conviction may occur as a result of a defendant [being] found guilty as a result of a bench or jury trial, or as a result of a magistrate accepting a guilty plea. Therefore, the assessment should be made in each criminal case which results in a conviction regardless of how that conviction occurred.

The parties appear to agree that, even after receiving Memorandum No. 98-29, Magistrate Paul willfully refused to collect the $55.00 fee in cases in which the defendant was convicted by reason of a guilty plea.

On March 10, 1999, the West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority, by its executive director Steven Canterbury, petitioned this Court for a writ of prohibition. The petition alleged that Magistrate Paul exceeded the jurisdiction of the magistrate court by refusing to assess the $55.00 fee in all criminal proceedings pursuant to W.Va.Code § 50-3-2 (1996), thereby depriving the regional jail and prison development fund of its dedicated source of revenue.

By an order entered March 30, 1999, this Court issued a rule to show cause, and set the matter for argument.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We set forth the factors we consider for granting a writ of prohibition in Syllabus Point 4 of State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W.Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996), where we held:

In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of prohibition for cases not involving an absence of jurisdiction but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors: (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal's order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue. Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight.

We examine this case with these factors in mind.

III. DISCUSSION

The parties in this case dispute the meaning of W.Va.Code § 50-3-2 (1996), which provided, in pertinent part:

In each criminal case tried in a magistrate court in which the defendant is convicted, there shall be imposed, in addition to such other costs, fines, forfeitures or penalties as may be allowed by law, costs in the amount of fifty-five dollars.

However, on March 10, 1999, W.Va.Code § 50-3-2 (1996) was substantively amended by the Legislature. Enrolled Senate Bill 374 amended this part of the statute to read as follows:

(a) In each criminal case before a magistrate court in which the defendant is convicted, whether by plea or at trial, there shall be imposed, in addition to other costs, fines, forfeitures or penalties as may be allowed by law, costs in the amount of fifty-five dollars. (Emphasis added).

This statute took effect June 8, 1999, 90 days after its passage.

Of the fees assessed in a criminal case in magistrate court, including those imposed under both W.Va.Code § 50-3-2 (1996) and W.Va.Code § 50-3-2 (1999), $40.00 must be paid into the regional jail and prison development fund. This is mandated by W.Va.Code § 50-3-4a (1990), which states, in pertinent part:

The clerk of each magistrate court shall, at the end of each month, pay into the regional jail and prison development fund in the state treasury an amount equal to forty dollars of the costs collected in each criminal proceeding[.]

The Jail Authority states that pursuant to a bond indenture, deed of trust and security agreement dated August 1, 1988, the Jail Authority sold $117,495,000.00 in revenue bonds for the construction and maintenance of several jail facilities. To repay these bonds, the Jail Authority relies on revenue generated solely from fees, fines and costs collected and deposited in the regional jail and correctional facility development fund pursuant to numerous statutes¹ including W.Va.Code § 50-3-2 (1996).

In fiscal year 1997, approximately $10,000,000.00 was collected by the Jail Authority through magistrate court fees. The Jail Authority contends that if any substantial portion of these fees, fines and costs are not paid, the Jail Authority will have insufficient revenue to pay for the bonds, resulting in a default by the State on the bonds. The Jail Authority further contends that even a small diminution in collections may result in a failure of the Jail Authority to meet the "debt service coverage" requirements of the bonds, which would also constitute a default.

In its petition to this Court, the Jail Authority directs the Court to numerous statutes which suggest that the collection of the $55.00 fee by a magistrate in every criminal case is mandatory. The Jail Authority proposes that we read and apply these statutes together to ascertain the legislature's intent, which we will do. "[S]tatutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read and applied together so that the Legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments." Syllabus Point 3, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Com'r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). The Jail Authority argues that Magistrate Paul's refusal to assess court costs in every criminal case circumvents the legislative intent behind W.Va.Code...