State ex rel. Church & Dwight Co. v. Collins
| Decision Date | 03 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 95976, No. SC 95977,SC 95976 |
| Citation | 543 S.W.3d 22 |
| Parties | STATE EX REL. CHURCH & DWIGHT CO., INC., Relator, v. The Honorable William B. COLLINS, Respondent. and State ex rel. Focus Workforce Management, Inc., et al., Relators, v. The Honorable William B. Collins, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
In SC95976, Church & Dwight was represented by Jennifer K. Oldaver and Patrick F. Hulla of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart PC in Kansas City, (816) 471-1301.
In SC95977, Focus Workforce Management was represented by Jennifer M. Hannah, Tedrick A. Housh III and Henry W. Tanner Jr. of Lathrop & Gage LLP in Kansas City, (816) 292-2000.
In both cases, Mulvey was represented by Todd M. Johnson and Brett T. Votava of Votava Nantz & Johnson LLC in Kansas City, (816) 895-8800.
Alicia Mulvey filed Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) claims for discrimination and retaliation against Focus Workforce Management, Inc., and four Focus employees (collectively, Focus) and Church & Dwight Company, Inc. Church and Focus each filed a motion to dismiss on grounds the MHRA claims were time-barred. Ms. Mulvey then filed a motion for leave to amend her petition to include common law claims of negligence and wrongful discharge. When the circuit court overruled the motions to dismiss and sustained Ms. Mulvey’s motion for leave to amend, Church and Focus each filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from taking any action other than vacating its orders overruling their respective motions to dismiss. Church’s writ petition also sought to prevent the circuit court from taking any other action than vacating its order sustaining Ms. Mulvey’s motion for leave to amend. This Court issued preliminary writs.
This Court finds the circuit court exceeded its authority in overruling Focus' and Church’s motions to dismiss Ms. Mulvey’s original petition for failure to state a claim. Ms. Mulvey did not file her claim in the circuit court until May 19, 2016—91 days after her right-to-sue letter issued. Ms. Mulvey’s MHRA claim, therefore, is barred by the 90-day statute of limitations provided in section 213.111.1.1
Furthermore, the circuit court abused its discretion by sustaining Ms. Mulvey’s motion for leave to amend her petition with common law claims of negligence and wrongful discharge against Church. The remedies available at common law are fully comprehended by the remedies provided by the MHRA in section 213.111.2. Accordingly, the amended common law claims against Church are preempted by the MHRA. The preliminary writs are made permanent. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 4.
In October 2014, Ms. Mulvey was hired by Focus, a staffing agency, and began work at Church’s manufacturing facility. During her employment, Ms. Mulvey asserts she was subjected to offensive and derogatory conduct, comments, and actions based upon her sex. While still employed, Ms. Mulvey complained of these actions to employees at Focus and participated in an investigation of the alleged harassment. At some point after the investigation, she was terminated by Focus and not hired as a permanent employee by Church.
Ms. Mulvey filed a charge of discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. The commission issued Ms. Mulvey a right-to-sue letter dated February 18, 2016, advising her she must bring a civil action under the MHRA "within 90 days of the date of this notice." On May 19, 2016—91 days later—Ms. Mulvey filed a petition in the circuit court alleging MHRA claims of retaliation and discrimination against Church and Focus.
Church and Focus each filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Mulvey’s petition for failure to state a claim, asserting her claim was time-barred. Before the circuit court ruled on the motions to dismiss, Ms. Mulvey filed a motion for leave to amend her petition to add common law claims of negligence and wrongful discharge. Church and Focus opposed the motion for leave to amend. The circuit court overruled the motions to dismiss and sustained Ms. Mulvey’s leave to amend her petition.
Church and Focus each seek a writ of prohibition from this Court to prohibit the circuit court from doing anything other than vacating its order overruling their motions to dismiss. Additionally, Church seeks a writ of prohibition prohibiting the circuit court from doing anything other than vacating its order sustaining Ms. Mulvey’s motion for leave to amend her petition. The two cases are consolidated for purposes of this opinion.
"Prohibition is a discretionary writ that only issues to prevent an abuse of judicial discretion, to avoid irreparable harm to a party, or to prevent exercise of extrajurisdictional power."
State ex rel. Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Dowd , 432 S.W.3d 764, 768 (Mo. banc 2014). A writ of prohibition is the proper "remedy to prevent a lower court from proceeding on [a claim] barred by the statute of limitations." State ex rel. Holzum , 342 S.W.3d 313, 315 (Mo. banc 2011). "[P]rohibition will lie if plaintiff’s petition does not state a viable theory of recovery, and relator was entitled to be dismissed from the suit as a matter of law." State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Dolan , 256 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Mo. banc 2008) (internal quotations omitted). If the complaint is insufficient to justify court action, it is "fundamentally unjust to force another to suffer the considerable expense and inconvenience of litigation" in addition to being "a waste of judicial resources and taxpayer money." State ex rel. Henley v. Bickel , 285 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Mo. banc 2009).
Church and Focus assert they are entitled to writs of prohibition because the circuit court exceeded its authority in overruling the motions to dismiss because Ms. Mulvey’s MHRA claims are time-barred. The MHRA provides, in pertinent part, "Any action brought in the court ... shall be filed within ninety days from the date of the commission’s notification letter to the individual." Section 213.111.1. By the statute’s plain language, an MHRA claim must be brought in the circuit court within 90 days of the commission’s notification letter.
The commission’s notification letter to Ms. Mulvey was dated February 18, 2016. The notification letter twice stated the 90-day filing requirement. Ms. Mulvey did not file her MHRA action in the circuit court until May 19, 2016—91 days later. Ms. Mulvey, therefore, failed to comply with section 213.111.1’s 90-day statute of limitations.
Ms. Mulvey contends, nevertheless, she filed her petition timely because Rule 44.01(e) gave her with an additional three days in which to file her MHRA claims. Rule 44.01(e) provides:
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon the party and the notice or paper is served by mail, three days shall be added to the prescribed period.
Rule 44.01(e), however, "by its own terms, applies when a party has a limited amount of time to exercise some right or comply with some requirement ‘after the service of a notice or other paper.’ " Columbia Glass & Window Co. v. Harris , 945 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Mo. App. 1997). "In other words, it applies to situations where the act of serving notice causes the clock to start running." Id. "If an event other than a service of notice starts the clock, then Rule 44.01(e) does not apply." Id. The language of section 213.111.1 is clear and unambiguous: the 90-day statute of limitations begins running from the date of the right-to-sue letter. Because the statute of limitations is not triggered by the service of the letter, Rule 44.01(e) does not apply.
Ms. Mulvey further asserts principles of equitable tolling apply and excuse her untimely filing. Statutes of limitation in the MHRA are strictly construed. Hill v. John Chezik Imps. , 797 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Mo. App. 1990). "Statutes of limitation may be suspended or tolled only by specific disabilities or exceptions enacted by the legislature, and courts cannot extend those exceptions." Id. Ms. Mulvey has not alleged any factual circumstances allowing her to evade section 213.111.1’s 90-day statute of limitations. Her only allegation is that Focus caused her to be late in filing because it did not provide the personal addresses of its employees to the commission.
The personal addresses of the individual Focus defendants, however, were not necessary for Ms. Mulvey to file her petition in the circuit court; indeed, Ms. Mulvey used the business address of their employer, Focus, when filing her petition.
Because Ms. Mulvey failed to timely file her petition in the...
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