State ex rel. City of Seattle v. Superior Court of Washington for King County
| Decision Date | 07 December 1939 |
| Docket Number | 27842. |
| Citation | 96 P.2d 596,1 Wn.2d 630 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. CITY OF SEATTLE v. SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY et al. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2.
Original mandamus proceeding by the State of Washington, on the relation of the City of Seattle, a municipal corporation against the Superior Court for the State of Washington for King County and Howard M. Findley, Judge, and others, to require the Superior Court of King County to take evidence for the purpose of determining and allowing certain offsets against the judgment affirmed by the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Cooper v. Seattle, 92 P.2d 249.
Writ denied.
A. C Van Soelen and J. Ambler Newton, both of Seattle, for relator.
Thos J. L. Kennedy and Emil G. Gustavson, both of Seattle, for respondents.
This is an original application for a writ of mandate requiring the superior court of King county to take evidence for the purpose of determining and allowing certain offsets against the judgment affirmed by this court in State ex rel. Cooper v. Seattle, Wash. 92 P.2d 249.
The facts material to the issue, as they appear in the application for the writ and in the return of the respondents to the show cause order, may be summarized as follows:
Four employees in the light department of the city of Seattle, having civil service standing, instituted an action against the city and certain of its officials, seeking a writ of mandate requiring that they be reinstated in position they formerly held in the city's service and for payment to them of the salaries attached to such positions during the period of their separation from employment.
For convenience, the parties in that action, as well as in the present one, will be referred to as 'employees' and 'city.'
At the trial of the first action, findings of fact and conclusions of law favorable to the employees were made by the court, and a judgment was entered directing the issue of a peremptory writ of mandate requiring the city to restore the employees to their former employment and to pay them the salaries attached to their positions, from October 21, 1937, to the date of their reinstatement, this date to be determined by the return of the city to the peremptory writ; the return was required to be made within ten days after entry of the judgment. The judgment also provided for crediting the city with specific amounts which the court found the employees had severally carned in private employment between the date of their suspension and the time of trial.
On the city's appeal, as we have seen, the judgment was affirmed in State ex rel. Cooper v. Seattle, supra. After the filing of the remittitur in the superior court, the city made application to the court to set a day for taking evidence 'with respect to the amount of back pay relators [employees] are entitled to accruing since August 3, 1938, the date of the judgment herein, from which an appeal was taken and judgment affirmed, the remittitur having been filed August 9, 1939.'
The motion is supported by the affidavit of Mr. Newton, assistant corporation counsel, reciting that 'Affiant is informed, and believes, that each of the relators [employees] herein since the date of said judgment * * * has earned various amounts in private and in City employment which are proper offsets against back pay and which in accordance with the affirmance of the judgment of the lower court should be determined in order that a final judgment may be entered herein; * * *'
The employees, appearing specially, filed a motion to quash the application, challenging the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the motion or to conduct the proceedings thereby contemplated, as being beyond the power of the court and not sanctioned by law. The court made an order granting the employees' motion to quash, and denied the city's application.
In support of its application for the present writ, the city relies upon the language of the remittitur, which, after unconditionally affirming the judgment of the trial court continues: 'And it is further ordered that this cause be remitted to the said superior court for further proceedings in accordance herewith.' The city's contention is that the quoted language in the rem...
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McCausland v. McCausland
...its discretion." Harp, 50 Wash.2d at 369, 311 P.2d 988 (emphasis added); see also State ex. rel. City of Seattle v. Superior Court of Washington for King County, 1 Wash.2d 630, 633, 96 P.2d 596 (1939). The superior court may exercise discretion where an appellate court directs it to "consid......
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Rubin v. Juanita Shores Condominium Owner's Assn.
...court and determined upon its merits becomes a judgment of the court of appeals. State ex rel. Seattle v. Superior Court for King County, 1 Wn.2d 630, 633, 96 P.2d 596 (1939). When this court remands a matter to superior court, its mandate is binding and must be strictly followed. Harp v. A......
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Rubin v. Juanita Shores Condominium Owner's Association, No. 59639-0-I (Wash. App. 12/24/2007)
...appealed to this court and determined upon its merits becomes a judgment of the court of appeals. State ex rel. Seattle v. Superior Court for King County, 1 Wn.2d 630, 633, 96 P.2d 596 (1939). When this remands a matter to superior court, its mandate is binding and must be strictly followed......
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State v. Laws, 34198
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