McCausland v. McCausland
| Decision Date | 30 August 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 31892-0-II.,31892-0-II. |
| Citation | 118 P.3d 944,129 Wn. App. 390 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of Angela Karon McCAUSLAND, Respondent/Cross-Appellant v. Robert Glenn McCAUSLAND, Appellant/Cross-Respondent. |
Edward Marshall Lane, Barbara Anne Henderson, Tacoma, WA, for Respondent.
Catherine Wright Smith, Valerie A. Villacin, Edwards Sieh Smith & Goodfriend PS, Seattle, WA, Jeffrey Alan Robinson, Gig Harbor, WA, for Appellant.
¶ 1 This is the second appeal arising from the interpretation and enforcement of a March 2000 spousal agreement (2000 Agreement) between Robert and Angela McCausland. The parties' final separation occurred in 1998, and their marriage was dissolved in October 2001. In the first appeal, we determined that the 2000 Agreement provisions for a $16 million cash payment and a $5,500 monthly payment from Robert to Angela1 were unenforceable. We reversed and remanded to the trial court to "reconsider and to segregate monthly child support, spousal maintenance, and any property distribution adjustments flowing therefrom." In Re Marriage of McCausland, noted at 112 Wash.App. 1029, 2002 WL 1399120, at *5 (unpublished). We also directed the trial court to set child support according to the requirements of chapter 26.19 RCW, including specifying any deviations and their justification. Finally, we directed the trial court to reconsider its award of attorney fees to Angela at trial.
¶ 2 Robert appeals the trial court's decision on remand. He argues that the trial court erroneously (1) calculated child support; (2) awarded monthly payments to Angela as a property division until her death; and (3) enforced other support provisions of the 2000 Agreement without regard for need or ability to pay. Robert also ascribes error to the trial court's finding of fact that Angela had a need for attorney fees and that he had an ability to pay, but he agrees with its conclusion that Angela should not be awarded such fees.
¶ 3 Angela cross-appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly (1) allocated tax refunds from tax years 1997 and 1998; (2) allocated tax deductions 20 years hence to Robert; and (3) erred in declining to award her attorney fees.
¶ 4 We reverse and vacate the property division. We remand to a different judge for determination of child support and maintenance, if any, and to determine whether equity requires a recharacterization nunc pro tunc of any portion of the undifferentiated support Robert paid to Angela. We also vacate the order requiring Robert to pay Angela's house maintenance and repair expenses and remand for determination of any reimbursement Angela owes to Robert for expenses he has paid since our earlier remand.
¶ 5 Robert and Angela married on May 26, 1988. They have two children. They divorced in October 2001.2 We need not repeat the background facts we set forth in our previous opinion. McCausland, 112 Wash.App. 1029, 2002 WL 1399120, at *1. Rather, we highlight only the facts pertinent to the issues in this appeal from the trial court's actions on remand.
¶ 6 In his prior appeal, Robert argued that the trial court improperly characterized his monthly $5,500 support payment to Angela as a "property division." McCausland, 112 Wash.App. 1029, 2002 WL 1399120, at *3. We agreed, holding that the provisions in the 2000 Agreement for $5,500 "combined monthly support" payments and a $16 million cash payment to Angela for the anticipated but non-realized, IPO3 stock sale were "unenforceable." McCausland, 2002 WL 1399120, at **2, 3. We remanded to the trial court:
[T]o reconsider and to segregate the combined monthly child support and maintenance payments; to set child support according to the requirements of RCW 26.19, including specifying any appropriate deviations and the justification therefore; and to adjust the property distribution as necessitated by the reconsideration of the combined monthly payments.
McCausland, 112 Wash.App. 1029, 2002 WL 1399120, at *1.
¶ 7 We also determined that under the terms of the 2000 Agreement, only a party who successfully enforced the Agreement was entitled to attorney fees, and we directed the trial court to reconsider whether it should have awarded attorney fees to Angela under RCW 26.09.140 "based on the relative financial resources of the parties" since neither party had successfully enforced the 2000 Agreement at trial. McCausland, 112 Wash.App. 1029, 2002 WL 1399120, at *5. We further required that, "[i]f on remand the trial court persists in awarding attorney fees to Angela," it must "state on the record the method it used to calculate such award." McCausland, 112 Wash.App. 1029, 2002 WL 1399120, at *5, n. 7.
¶ 8 At the 2003 remand hearing, Robert urged the trial court (1) to set child support based on his 2001 income of $75,000; (2) to impute $40,000 income to Angela based on her training and experience as a teacher; (3) to grant him a residential credit for the time the children spent with him in order to reduce his child support transfer payment to Angela accordingly; and (4) to terminate his spousal maintenance obligation to Angela.
¶ 9 Angela urged the trial court (1) to reinstate its original $5,500 per month "support" payment; (2) to divide the $5,500 payment between child support and spousal maintenance; and (3) to extrapolate the proper amount of child support based on Robert's historical income. In addition, Angela raised three new issues. She asked the trial court (1) to award her a portion of the tax refund from the parties' 1997 and 1998 tax returns; (2) to order Robert to reimburse her $6,000 for "major maintenance" to the family home; and (3) to require Robert to reimburse her for 100 percent of the children's orthodontia expenses. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 189. Finally, Angela sought attorney fees.
¶ 10 The trial court recited its findings of fact and conclusions of law entered on October 20, 2001, that the parties' anticipated $16 million property division to Angela from the bankrupt corporation was unenforceable. It also found that Robert's maintenance obligation to Angela terminated when the parties executed the 2000 Agreement. It further determined that the remainder of the 2000 Agreement was severable from the $16 million payment provision and was therefore enforceable, despite our holding that the $5,500 monthly combined support was independently unenforceable. McCausland, 112 Wash.App. 1029, 2002 WL 1399120, at *5.
¶ 11 Based on its determination of severability of the 2000 Agreement's provisions, the trial court awarded the difference between the amount of monthly child support it ordered and $5,500 to Angela as a new "property" division.4 CP at 493. The trial court further ordered that (1) the "property" payment did not terminate on Robert's death so that the payment of $5,500 a month would be a claim on his estate; (2) the payment of $5,500 a month was for the rest of Angela's life, regardless of a reduction in child support or Angela's remarriage; (3) the payment was not dischargeable in bankruptcy; and (4) the payment was not taxable to Angela or deductible by Robert.
¶ 12 In calculating child support, the trial court (1) imputed $2,000 a month income to Angela based on her unreported rental income and her voluntary unemployment; (2) determined that Robert's monthly net income was $12,523; and (3) awarded Angela extrapolated child support of $2,842 a month for the two children. The trial court explained that it set the award in excess of the statutory amount because:
The father's income alone is greater than $7,000 per month. The children participate in dance and sports activities, which are significant expenses. The children have the expectation of support at the level of their father's significant historical income.
CP at 506. The trial court did not award Robert a residential credit to offset his child support payments.5
¶ 13 With regard to the new issues Angela raised on remand, the trial court: (1) awarded Robert the tax refunds from the parties' 1997 and 1998 returns and the loss carry forward from the 1999 tax return; (2) ordered Robert to reimburse Angela for repairs and maintenance to the family home, finding that under the terms of the 2000 Agreement, he was responsible for such costs for the rest of Angela's life; and (3) ordered Robert to pay 100 percent of the children's orthodontia expenses and all other extraordinary medical and dental expenses for the children.
¶ 14 The trial court determined that Robert had the ability to pay Angela's attorney fees and that Angela had a need for him to pay them, but that our prior opinion precluded the trial court from awarding fees to Angela.
¶ 15 Robert argues that our previous decision limited the superior court's scope of authority on remand. Agreeing with Robert in principle, Angela argues that, nonetheless, we left the superior court some discretion on remand.
¶ 16 It is a well settled principle that our mandate is "binding" on the superior court and "must be strictly followed." Harp v. American Sur. Co. of New York, 50 Wash.2d 365, 368, 311 P.2d 988 (1957); State ex. rel. Smith v. Superior Court for Cowlitz County, 71 Wash. 354, 357, 128 P. 648 (1912). The Supreme Court, however, has distinguished between what the superior court on remand is "obligated to do without the exercise of any discretion, and the area within which it could exercise its discretion." Harp, 50 Wash.2d at 369, 311 P.2d 988 (emphasis added); see also State ex. rel. City of Seattle v. Superior Court of Washington for King County, 1 Wash.2d 630, 633, 96 P.2d 596 (1939). The superior court may exercise discretion where an appellate...
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