State ex rel. City of Minneapolis v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Co.
| Decision Date | 29 June 1906 |
| Docket Number | 14,553 - (17) |
| Citation | 108 N.W. 261,98 Minn. 380 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS v. ST. PAUL, MINNEAPOLIS & MANITOBA RAILWAY COMPANY and Another |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by relator from a judgment of the district court for Hennepin county, Holt, J., dismissing proceedings in mandamus brought to compel defendants to erect and maintain a bridge over their tracks in Minneapolis. Reversed and new trial granted.
Railroad Crossing.
The state may, in the exercise of its police power, impose upon railroad companies whose lines intersect public highways laid out after the construction of the railroad the uncompensated duty of constructing and maintaining at such crossings all such safety devices as are reasonably necessary for the protection of the traveling public.
Police Power of State.
Such a requirement, being referable to the police power, is not a taking of private property for public use in violation of the constitution.
Bridge Is "Safety Device."
A bridge over the railroad tracks, when necessary to make the crossing safe for public use, is a "safety device," within the meaning of that expression.
Construction of Franchises.
Statutes granting franchises to corporations, involving rights of the public, are to be construed liberally in favor of the public and strictly against the corporation.
Railroad Charter -- Crossings over New Streets.
The charter of the Minnesota & Pacific Railway Company, of which defendants are successors in interest, and subject to all its liabilities, contained the following provision:
"The said company shall have the right and authority to construct their said railroad and branches upon and along, across under or over, any public or private highway, road, street plank road, or railroad, if the same shall be necessary; but the said company shall put such highway, road, street, plank road, or railroad, in such condition and state of repair as not to impair or interfere with its free and proper use."
Held that this provision applies to streets and highways laid out over the railroad after its construction.
Railroad Charter.
A railroad company receives its charter and franchise subject to the implied right of the state to establish and open such streets and highways over and across its right of way as public convenience and necessity may from time to time require. That right on the part of the state attaches by implication of law to the franchise of the railroad company, and imposes upon it an obligation to construct and maintain at its own expense, suitable crossings at new streets and highways to the same extent as required by the rules of the common law at streets and highways in existence when the railroad was constructed.
Void Contract.
A contract by a city, by which the police power is attempted to be forever abdicated, is ultra vires and void.
Exercise of Police Power.
Neither the state nor a municipal subdivision thereof, to which that power is delegated, can by affirmative action or by inaction permanently divest itself of the authority and power to exercise it.
Frank Healy, for appellant.
It is admitted that the erection of the bridge in question is solely for the purpose of protection to human life and property. This being so, it is immaterial whether the railroad company's tracks antedated the laying out of the street in question or whether the street antedated the laying down of the railroad tracks. The duty of erecting the bridge is sought to be enforced through the exercise of the police power of the state. Camfield v. U.S., 167 U.S. 518; 2 Tiedeman, State & Fed. Cont. 999; Elliott, Roads & Streets, §§ 778, 780; Freund, Police Power, § 631; Thompson, Corp. § 5505; 3 Elliott, R.R. § 1102; State v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 131; State v. District Court for Hennepin Co., 42 Minn. 247.
If the state has a right to compel a railroad company to construct and maintain cattle guards and sign boards at crossings, as held in the case last cited, it has equally a right to compel the construction at the expense of the company of any bridge necessary for public safety. Plymouth v. Pere Marquette, 139 Mich. 347; Louisville v. Smith, 91 Ind. 119; Illinois v. Copiah, 81 Miss. 685; Baltimore v. State, 159 Ind. 510.
If the bridge in question falls within the police power the duty rests upon the defendants to erect it at their own expense. Gillam v. Sioux City, 26 Minn. 268; State v. Shardlow, 43 Minn. 524. Whether the railroad antedates the laying out of the street or not is immaterial, for the reason that that matter was disposed of when the street was properly laid out and compensation rendered for the property taken. Chicago v. City, 140 Ill. 309; Detroit v. Commissioners, 127 Mich. 219; Lake Shore v. Cincinnati, 30 Oh. St. 604; State v. Chicago, 29 Neb. 412; Detroit v. Osborne, 189 U.S. 383.
The case at bar is not a case of condemnation of the highway over a railroad but is solely a question of enforcement of a police regulation to construct a bridge over a dangerous crossing, and condemnation decisions have no bearing upon this controversy. New York v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556.
The provisions of the charter of Minnesota & Pacific Railway Co. requiring it to put streets and highways crossed by its tracks in good repair, properly construed, include streets and highways laid out over the right of way after the construction of the railroad. There is a continuing duty to maintain the highway so that it is safe for the traveling public and this duty devolves upon one who encroaches upon the highway. Manley v. St. Helens, 2 H. & N. 840; Chicago v. People, 200 U.S. 561. We do not claim that it is the duty of a railroad company to build highways, but we do claim that if a safety device becomes necessary because of the presence of the railroad then it becomes the duty as a matter of law and justice for the railroad company to provide that safety device.
The obligation to construct and maintain safe crossings at streets and highways laid out over the right of way after the construction of the railroad is imposed upon the railroad company at common law. Manley v. St. Helens, supra; Commonwealth v. L. & N.R. Co., 109 Ky. 60; Illinois v. Chicago, 141 Ill. 586; Chicago v. City, 140 Ill. 309.
The police power is inherent in the state and may be exercised without express statutory authority. It is a common-law right incapable of being divested by any act of the state legislature. The construction of the bridge in question is required for the public welfare, convenience and safety and in compelling its construction the state exercises its police power.
A necessary bridge over railroad tracks is a safety device within the meaning of State v. District Court for Hennepin County, 42 Minn. 247.
Rome G. Brown and Charles S. Albert, for respondents.
Whatever the power of the legislature may be to enact statutes, whether under its police power or otherwise, to compel railway companies to build bridges over their rights of way along new streets, there has been no attempt in this state to exercise any such power by statutory enactment.
The street in question is not, and never has been, one crossing the tracks at the grade of the right of way. The necessity for the bridge now demanded does not arise from the operation of defendants' railways.
Defendant railway companies are not obligated to carry a street, by means of a bridge, across their right of way and tracks, where they are the senior occupants. State v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 131, 140; State v. Minnesota Transfer Ry. Co., 80 Minn. 108; State v. Ensign, 54 Minn. 372; State v. Chicago, St. P.M. & O. Ry. Co., 85 Minn. 416, 421; City v. Chicago, 102 Iowa 624; Hill v. Port Royal (S.C.) 5 L.R.A. 350; State v. Morgan, 111 La. An. 120, 35 So. 482; State v. Wilmington, 74 N.C. 143; Chicago v. City, 97 Wis. 418; Northern Central v. Mayor, 46 Md. 425; State v. Missouri, 33 Kan. 176; Dyer v. Railroad, 87 Tenn. 712; Commissioners v. Michigan, 90 Mich. 385; San Antonio v. Belt, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 281.
The legislature would not have the power, either under its police powers or otherwise, to enact and enforce a statute compelling railroads, without any provisions for compensation, to bridge along streets laid out after the railroad was built. State v. District Court for Hennepin County, 42 Minn. 247; State v. Shardlow, 43 Minn. 526.
The contract embodied in the ordinance of 1892 is a valid contract. Where a contract is claimed by a municipality to be without consideration or ultra vires, the burden of showing all the facts necessary to establish that claim is upon those making the claim. The presumption is in favor of the validity of the contract. State v. Ensign, supra; State v. Minnesota Transfer Ry. Co., supra; Brown v. Board of Education, 103 Cal. 531; 14 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 243, and cases cited. The contract in question, having a valid consideration, is a valid and enforcible contract. State v. Chicago, St. P.M. & O. Ry. Co., supra.
Under the common-law rule, unless changed by statute, when a person or corporation, municipal or otherwise, laid out a way across the land, way, highway, street, or railroad right of way of another person or corporation, it was the duty of the junior occupant to bear all the expense of constructing and maintaining the crossings, which duty was a continuing one.
With respect to ways in general: Boston v. City, 159 Mass. 284. As applied to railroad crossings: The common-law rule, as it has always existed and been recognized independent of statute, requires the construction and maintenance of crossings by railroad companies only in case where the railway rights of way have intersected pre-existing highways, and does not include the obligation to construct or...
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