State Ex Rel. Coleman v. York

• Decision Date: 18 July 1939
• Citation: 139 Fla. 300,190 So. 599
• Parties: STATE ex rel. COLEMAN v. YORK et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

190 So. 599

139 Fla. 300

STATE ex rel. COLEMAN v. YORK et al.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

July 18, 1939

Original proceeding by the State of Florida, on the relation of T. T Coleman, against Fred M. York, Chairman, and others, as members of the Florida State Board of Dental Examiners, for mandamus to compel the respondents to issue relator a certificate to engage in practice of dentistry in Okeechobee County. On respondents' motion to quash the petition.

Motion granted.

BUFORD and WHITFIELD, JJ., dissenting.

COUNSEL

James N. Daniel, of Chipley, for petitioner.

Dickenson & Dickenson, of Tampa, and Walter F. Rogers, of Jacksonville for respondents.

OPINION

THOMAS Justice.

The sole question involved here is the constitutionality of Chapter 16972 of the acts of nineteen thirty-five which attempted to amend chapter 14708 of the laws of nineteen thirty-one.

The latter law was a comprehensive legislative enactment to regulate the practice of dentistry in Florida and among its provisions were the requisite qualifications of those who should be given permission to engage in the profession and the manner of appointment of a board to determine the fitness of the applicants. The members of this board are appointed by the governor and are charged with the duty and responsibility of conducting examinations to test the ability of prospective practitioners in dentistry and of issuing certificates to those found worthy.

The former act was one to amend section one of the latter by exempting from its provisions, 'in counties of populations of between 4115 and 4130, and * * *4060 and 4070 according to the Federal Census of 1930', persons who had resided and practiced dentistry in the state for fifteen years prior to January first, 1926, and who furnished affidavits of capability, experience and good moral character.

Two counties fell within the limitation of population prescribed Liberty and Okeechobee. By amendment of the pleadings reference to Liberty County was eliminated and we are asked to determine the effectiveness of the amendatory measure and whether petitioner is entitled to a certificate to engage in his profession in Okeechobee County by complying only with the prerequisites of Chapter 16972.

That the later law is, when considered as a general law in the light of Art. III, sec. 21, of the Constitution, void seems to us obvious, see Dutton Phosphate Co. v. Priest, 67 Fla. 370, 65 So. 282; State ex rel. Buford v. Shepard, 84 Fla. 206, 93 So. 667; State ex rel. Gray v. Stoutamire, 131 Fla. 698, 179 So. 730, and cases therein cited, but it is urged that notice of its passage was published as required in that article and section and hence although it appears a general act on its face it is in reality a special law applicable to but one county.

Assuming that it is a special act the question then arises whether it violates the inhibition in Section 20 of Article III against special enactments regulating 'the jurisdiction and duties of any class of officers, except municipal officers'. In State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker, 39 Fla. 477, 22 So. 721, 63 Am.St.Rep. 174, it was decided that an act 'to regulate admissions to the bar of this state, to create a board of legal examiners, and to provide for a uniform system of legal examinations' was void because the examiners were state officers and therefore could not be appointed by the Supreme Court in the face of Art. III, Sec. 27: 'The Legislature shall provide for the election by the people or appointment by the Governor of all State and county officers not otherwise provided for by this Constitution, and fix by law their duties and compensation.'

It should be noted here that the governor must appoint or the people elect 'State and county officers' and that the Legislature may not pass special laws affecting 'any class of officers, except municipal officers.'

We see no logical distinction between a board to regulate the practice of dentistry and one to regulate the practice of law. Nor do we feel that if members of the one (board of law examiners) are state officers the members of the other (board of dental examiners) do not fall within the category 'any class of officers'.

As a practical matter, despite the authorities cited by counsel for petitioner that the rules governing the professions may be relaxed in sparsely populated communities, we feel that that yardstick of legal interpretation is hardly appropriate here for it is not the intent to make the qualifications more lenient because of sparsity of inhabitants. The relaxation applies only to a county which had in 1930 a population of not less than 4115 and not more than 4130. There is no possibility of any other county falling in the classification because it is anchored to one particular census. Any county with fewer than 4115 persons would not receive the benefit of the leniency and Okeechobee County would forever be affected though it increased in population until it became the most densely populated county in the State.

We are...