State Ex Rel. Cordray v. Court of Claims of Ohio., 09AP–863.
| Decision Date | 21 September 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 09AP–863.,09AP–863. |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio ex rel. CORDRAY,v.COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Elise Porter and Susan E. Ashbrook, Assistant Attorneys General, for relator.Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, L.L.P., Charles R. Saxbe, and Elizabeth J. Watters, Columbus, Special Counsel to the Attorney General, for respondent.PEGGY L. BRYANT, Judge.
[Ohio App.3d 164] {¶ 1} Relator, Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray (“Attorney General”), commenced this original action seeking a writ of mandamus that orders respondent, Court of Claims of Ohio, both to vacate the orders that respondent issued in reviewing the award of attorney fees to the Attorney General and to dismiss the appeal because, after legislative amendments in July 2000, the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to consider and determine attorney fees in reparations cases under the Victims of Crime Act, R.C. 2743.51 et seq. The Attorney General's complaint seeks a writ of prohibition to preclude respondent from considering appeals of the Attorney General's attorney-fee awards pending in the Court of Claims.
{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Tenth Appellate District, this matter was referred to a magistrate, who issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, that is appended to this decision.
[Ohio App.3d 165] {¶ 3} As the magistrate's decision sets out more fully, attorney Jack Carney–DeBord submitted an application to the attorney general in May 2007 under R.C. 2743.65 requesting $1,485.75 in attorney fees for assisting Joseph Fletcher in processing Fletcher's reparations claim under the act. In October 2007, Carney–DeBord submitted a request to the attorney general for an additional $78 for work on Fletcher's reparations claim. The attorney general awarded attorney fees to Carney–DeBord in the amount of $1,020 and denied Carney–DeBord's request for additional monies.
{¶ 4} After the attorney general denied his request for reconsideration, Carney–DeBord appealed the attorney general's final decision to a panel of commissioners of the Court of Claims. The attorney general moved to dismiss Carney–DeBord's appeal, asserting that the commissioner panel lacked jurisdiction to review the attorney general's final decisions on attorney-fee applications filed under R.C. 2743.65.
{¶ 5} In an opinion and order denying Carney–DeBord's claim, the commissioner panel (1) determined it had jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 2743.53 and 2743.55 to hear Carney–DeBord's appeal of the attorney general's award of attorney fees and (2) affirmed the attorney general's final decision awarding attorney fees to Carney–DeBord in an amount totaling $1,020. In re Fletcher (Feb. 9, 2009), Ct.Cl. No. V2006–20836. The attorney general appealed the panel's decision on the jurisdictional issue to a Court of Claims judge, who affirmed the panel's decision in its entirety. In re Fletcher (July 2, 2009), Ct.Cl. No. V2006–20836.
{¶ 6} The attorney general's complaint requests that this court issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Court of Claims (1) to vacate the orders the court issued in Carney–DeBord's appeal in Fletcher and (2) to dismiss Carney–DeBord's appeal in Fletcher, because the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to consider and determine attorney fees in reparations cases. The attorney general also seeks a writ of prohibition ordering the Court of Claims to refrain from considering or deciding any pending or future appeals from final decisions of the attorney general on attorney-fee applications filed under the act.
{¶ 7} The Court of Claims moved to dismiss the attorney general's complaint, arguing that the claims are moot because the attorney general prevailed in the Court of Claims when the court affirmed the $1,020 in attorney fees that the attorney general had awarded. The Court of Claims further contends that (1) the attorney general lacks standing to request mandamus relief when he prevailed in the underlying case, (2) the attorney general's complaint seeks a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction for which this court lacks [Ohio App.3d 166] jurisdiction, and (3) the allegations of the complaint fail to satisfy the prerequisites for either a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition.
{¶ 8} The attorney general responded with a motion for summary judgment contending that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The attorney general asserts that the claims are not moot because even if the Court of Claims correctly decided the merits of Carney–DeBord's appeal in Fletcher concerning the amount of the award of attorney fees, the controversy here is whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction in reparations cases to review and decide issues involving attorney fees, a jurisdictional issue that the Court of Claims decided adversely to the attorney general.
{¶ 9} With respect to the jurisdictional issue, the attorney general notes that since July 2000, he has had sole authority to determine awards of attorney fees in reparations cases, and he therefore has standing not only to challenge the Court of Claims' actions in unlawfully assuming jurisdiction in Carney–DeBord's appeal but also to prevent the Court of Claims' unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction in other currently pending or future appeals of awards of attorney fees in reparations cases. Asserting both that he has satisfied the prerequisites for the requested writs of mandamus and prohibition and that he has no adequate remedy at law, the attorney general asserts that this court should grant the extraordinary relief he seeks.
{¶ 10} The magistrate determined that the attorney general's complaint actually seeks a declaratory judgment, over which this court lacks jurisdiction. She therefore concluded that neither mandamus nor prohibition relief is appropriate. The magistrate further concluded that even if this court were to consider the merits of the attorney general's claims, the attorney general did not establish that he is clearly entitled to the requested writs of mandamus and prohibition because he did not demonstrate that the Court of Claims patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to consider and hear appeals from the attorney general's decisions on applications for attorney fees filed under the act.
{¶ 11} In reaching her conclusions, the magistrate observed that “[n]othing in [R.C. Chapter 2743's] statutory provisions affirmatively grants or denies the Court [of Claims'] jurisdiction to hear appeals from awards of attorney's fees made by the attorney general.” She, however, not only determined that “it is clear that the court has jurisdiction to determine issues ‘relating to’ claims for reparations” but pointed out that “[t]he attorney general has conceded that determinations regarding attorney's fees and costs are matters ‘relating to’ claims for reparations.” Finally, the magistrate noted that the Court of Claims had [Ohio App.3d 167] exercised its jurisdiction to hear “numerous appeals from decisions of the attorney general regarding awards of attorney's fees” in crime-victims' reparations cases since the act was amended in July 2000. Based on those observations, the magistrate determined that this court should (1) deny the attorney general's motion for summary judgment and request for extraordinary relief and (2) grant the Court of Claims' motion to dismiss the attorney general's complaint.
{¶ 12} The attorney general filed the following objections to the magistrate's decision:
(1) The magistrate erred as a matter of law in finding that the case is more properly heard in declaratory judgment rather than in mandamus and prohibition.
(2) The magistrate erred as a matter of law in finding that the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to hear appeals from awards made by the Attorney General of attorney's fees under R.C. 2743.65.
(3) The magistrate erred as a matter of fact and law in finding that the Attorney General conceded jurisdiction in admitting that claims for attorney's fees are matters “relating to” claims for reparations.
(4) The magistrate erred as a matter of fact in finding that the Court of Claims, since statutory amendments made to R.C. 2743 in 2000, “has considered numerous appeals from decisions of the Attorney General regarding awards of attorney's fees.”
V. AnalysisA. Standard of Review
{¶ 13} The Court of Claims' motion to dismiss should be granted if it appears beyond doubt that after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the attorney general's favor, we conclude that the attorney general is not entitled to the requested extraordinary relief. State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 13; State ex rel. Ferguson v. Court of Claims of Ohio, 98 Ohio St.3d 399, 2003-Ohio-1631, 786 N.E.2d 43, ¶ 9. By contrast, if the uncontroverted facts indicate that the attorney general is entitled to the requested extraordinary writs under the standards noted below, we will grant the attorney general's motion for summary judgment and issue the requested writs. Sapp at ¶ 14.
[Ohio App.3d 168] B. First Objection—Nature of Action Filed in this Court
{¶ 14} The attorney general's first objection contends that the magistrate erred in determining that the complaint in actuality seeks declaratory relief rather than writs of mandamus and prohibition. In order to be entitled to the requested writ of mandamus, the attorney general must establish (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the governmental actor requested to perform the acts, and (3) lack of an adequate remedy in the...
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