State ex rel. Ferguson v. Court of Claims
| Decision Date | 16 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2002-1724.,2002-1724. |
| Citation | 2003 Ohio 1631,786 N.E.2d 43,98 Ohio St.3d 399 |
| Parties | The STATE ex rel. FERGUSON, Appellant, v. COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO, VICTIMS OF CRIME DIVISION, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Carl G. McMahon, Cleveland, for appellant.
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Martin D. Susec, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
{¶ 1} On November 20, 1999, appellant, John Ferguson, was the victim of a criminal assault in Wood County, Ohio. On January 18, 2000, Ferguson applied for a reparations award under the Victims of Crime Act, R.C. 2743.51 et seq.
{¶ 2} Following an investigation, appellee Ohio Attorney General recommended that Ferguson's application be denied under R.C. 2743.60(E) because he had engaged in felonious conduct within ten years prior to the criminally injurious conduct that gave rise to his claim. In February 2001, a single commissioner of appellee Court of Claims of Ohio, Victims of Crime Division, denied Ferguson's claim because of his "felonious conduct which occurred within ten years prior to the criminally injurious conduct." The commissioner noted that on May 17, 1994, while Ferguson was being arrested for certain traffic violations, he had engaged in conduct that would have constituted a felony offense of escape:
{¶ 3}
{¶ 4} Ferguson objected to the commissioner's decision, and in September 2001, a panel of three commissioners overruled Ferguson's objection and affirmed the denial of Ferguson's claim.
{¶ 5} Ferguson appealed the panel's order, and in February 2002, appellee Court of Claims Judge Fred J. Shoemaker denied Ferguson's claim and entered judgment for the state of Ohio. Judge Shoemaker held that Ferguson had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to an award of reparations.
{¶ 6} On March 13, 2002, Ferguson filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County. In his complaint, as subsequently amended, Ferguson sought a writ of mandamus to compel appellees, the Court of Claims of Ohio, Victims of Crime Division, Judge Shoemaker, and the Ohio Attorney General, to vacate the Court of Claims orders denying benefits to Ferguson and to pay him benefits. Appellees moved to dismiss Ferguson' complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
{¶ 7} In May 2002, a court of appeals magistrate recommended that the court of appeals grant appellees' motion and dismiss Ferguson's complaint. Ferguson objected to the magistrate's decision, and on August 20, 2002, the court of appeals overruled Ferguson's objection, adopted the magistrate's recommendation, and denied the writ of mandamus.
{¶ 8} This cause is now before the court upon Ferguson's appeal as of right.
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Standard
{¶ 9} Ferguson asserts that the court of appeals erred in granting appellees' Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion and dismissing his mandamus complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The dismissal was appropriate if, after all factual allegations of the complaint were presumed true and all reasonable inferences were made in Ferguson's favor, it appeared beyond doubt that Ferguson could prove no set of facts warranting the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus. State ex rel. Ragozine v. Shaker, 96 Ohio St.3d 201, 2002-Ohio-3992, 772 N.E.2d 1192, ¶ 7; State ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler, 96 Ohio St.3d 84, 2002-Ohio-3605, 771 N.E.2d 853, ¶ 20.
{¶ 10} In order to be entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus, Ferguson had to establish a clear legal right to the vacation of the Court of Claims' denial of his claim, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the Court of Claims, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. N. Olmsted v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 529, 532, 757 N.E.2d 314. These requirements would have been satisfied if the Court of Claims had abused its discretion in denying his application for crime-victim reparations. State ex rel. Jenkins v. Tyack (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 242, 17 OBR 479, 479 N.E.2d 267, syllabus; State ex rel. Bernard v. Kainrad (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 103, 104, 28 OBR 196, 502 N.E.2d 632.1 "`Abuse of discretion' implies an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude." State ex rel. Wilke v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 55, 61, 734 N.E.2d 811.
{¶ 11} For the reasons that follow, dismissal was warranted because Ferguson could not establish that the Court of Claims abused its discretion in denying his crime-victim reparations claim.
{¶ 12} The Court of Claims held that Ferguson's claim for benefits was barred by former R.C. 2743.60(E), which applied to his claim2 and provided that no award may be granted if a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the victim or claimant engaged in felonious conduct within ten years of the criminally injurious conduct giving rise to the claim:
{¶ 13} "(E) Neither a single commissioner nor a panel of commissioners shall make an award to a claimant if any of the following applies:
{¶ 14} "* * *
{¶ 15} "(3) It is proved by a preponderance of the evidence presented to the commissioner or the panel that the victim or the claimant engaged, within ten years prior to the criminally injurious conduct that gave rise to the claim or during the pendency of the claim, in conduct that would constitute a felony under the laws of this state, another state, or the United States." (Emphasis added.) 1996 Sub. S.B. No. 363, 146 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4371.
{¶ 16} Ferguson suggests in part that only a prior felony conviction within ten years of the criminally injurious conduct that is the basis for the claim can bar an otherwise meritorious reparations claim. In analyzing former R.C. 2743.60(E)(3), "we must first review the statutory language, reading undefined words and phrases in context and construing them in accordance with the rules of grammar and common usage." State ex rel. Portage Lakes Edn. Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 95 Ohio St.3d 533, 2002-Ohio-2839, 769 N.E.2d 853, ¶ 36. After so construing the pertinent language, it is evident that the statute requires only "conduct that would constitute a felony" and not a felony conviction. (Emphasis added.) If the General Assembly had intended to limit this bar to reparations to convictions, it could have readily done so with the appropriate language. In fact, it did so in former R.C. 2743.60(E)(1) and (2), which both required felony convictions within the applicable ten-year period.
{¶ 17} Ferguson asserts that the Court of Claims abused its discretion in relying on an unsworn police report to find the former R.C. 2743.60(E)(3) bar applicable. Ferguson claims that the report was inadmissible hearsay. Ferguson's assertion lacks merit. "The Ohio Rules of Evidence do not, of course, obtain in evaluations and hearings utilized in Victims of Crime reparations claims." In re Rea (1989), 61 Ohio Misc.2d 732, 739, 584 N.E.2d 1350. As the Court of Claims held in Rea:
{¶ 18} Id. See, also, In re Grow (1983), 7 Ohio Misc.2d 26, 28-29, 7 OBR 175, 454 N.E.2d 618.
{¶ 19} R.C. 2743.55(A) expressly provides: (Emphasis added.) See, also, the comparably worded former R.C. 2743.55(A), 1997 Sub.H.B. No. 478, 147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 4095.
{¶ 20} Therefore, the Court of Claims did not err in considering the unsworn police report in its determination of Ferguson's reparations claim.
{¶ 21} Ferguson next claims that because he was charged with only a minor misdemeanor arising out of his May 1994 traffic charges, res judicata barred the Court of Claims from considering conduct that would have constituted felony escape from his May 1994 arrest.
{¶ 22} Res judicata bars the litigation of all claims that either were or might have been litigated in a first lawsuit. State ex rel. Commt. for the Referendum of Lorain Ordinance. No. 77-01 v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 96 Ohio St.3d 308, 2002-Ohio-4194, 774 N.E.2d 239, ¶ 32.
{¶ 23} Res judicata did not, however, bar the Court of Claims from considering Ferguson's felonious conduct in assessing his reparations claim even though that prior conduct did not result in a conviction. As previously determined, the plain language of former R.C. 2743.60(E)(3) does not require a conviction.
{¶ 24} Moreover, there are qualitative differences between the previous criminal proceedings and the civil reparations action that prohibit the application of res judicata. For example, in Walden v. State (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 547 N.E.2d 962, at...
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