State ex rel. Corrigan v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co.

• Decision Date: 25 March 1959
• Docket Number: No. 35819,CLEVELAND-CLIFFS,35819
• Citation: 157 N.E.2d 331,169 Ohio St. 42
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court
• Parties: , 8 O.O.2d 7 STATE ex rel. CORRIGAN, Pros. Atty., Appellee, v.IRON CO., Appellant.

Page 42

169 Ohio St. 42

157 N.E.2d 331, 8 O.O.2d 7

STATE ex rel. CORRIGAN, Pros. Atty., Appellee, v. CLEVELAND-CLIFFS IRON CO., Appellant.

No. 35819.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

March 25, 1959.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The words 'committee or organization' as used in Section 3599.03, Revised Code, refer only to a committee or organization which is an adjunct of a political party or is an association formed for substantially the same purposes or performing substantially the same functions as a political party.

2. Where a word in a criminal statute may reasonably have either a wide or a restricted meaning and there is doubt as to which meaning was intended by the General Assembly, such doubt should be resolved against the state.

3. The words 'partisan political purpose' as used in Section 3599.03, Revised Code, do not include purposes merely to advocate the adoption of a constitutional amendment or the passage of a bond issue or of a tax levy; and a committee organized for such purposes is not, within the meaning of that statute, a 'political party, committee or organization.'

4. A corporation may lawfully contribute to a committee organized and conducted merely for the purposes of advocating the adoption of a constitutional amendment and the passage of bond issues and tax levies. (Sections 3599.03, 5733.27 and 3517.12 and Title XXXV of the Revised Code, construed and applied.)

This action in quo warranto upon relation of the Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County originated in the Court of Appeals for that county with the filing of a petition against respondent, an Ohio corporation, alleging that 'during the year 1957 respondent did contribute, pay, and use its corporate money in an amount of not less than $500 for and in advocacy of certain propositions and issues submitted to the voters at the general election held in Cuyahoga county' in 1957; and that the 'acts' of respondent in doing so were 'in contravention of * * * [s] 5733.27 R.C., [s] 3517.10, R.C., [s] 3517.11, R.C., [s] 3517.12 R.C., and [s] 3599.03, R.C., and the provisions of Title XXXV of the Revised Code.' In its answer, respondent in effect admits the foregoing allegations of the petition with respect to the contribution, payment and use of $500 but denies that its acts in doing so were unlawful.

The Court of Appeals in its judgment found that 'respondent contributed $500 of its corporate funds to 'the Citizen's Committee FOR City and County Issues' * * * to be used in advocacy * * * at the general election * * * in Cuyahoga county' in 1957 of an amendment to the Constitution changing the procedures required to adopt a county charter, and of three county, a school district and five city bond issues and county, park district and school district levies; and it 'ousted and perpetually enjoined' respondent 'from contributing, paying, or using its corporate funds or property for or in advocacy of or in opposition to any proposition or issue submitted to the voters at any election to be held * * * in Ohio.'

The cause is now before this court on appeal from that judgment.

Jones, Day, Cockley & Reavis, Leslie Nichols and Seth Taft, Cleveland, for appellant.

John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., and Dennis J. McGuire, Cleveland, for appellee.

TAFT, Judge.

Since no question is raised as to the propriety of quo warranto as a remedy in the instant case, we will not consider that question in deciding this case.

In contending that the complained of payment and use of respondent's $500 were unlawful, relator must rely principally upon Section 3599.03, Revised Code, which reads so far as pertinent:

'(A) No corporation engaged in business in this state shall, directly or indirectly, pay, use, offer, advise, consent, or agree to pay or use the corporation's money or property [a] for or in aid of a political party, committee, or organization, or [b] for or in aid of a candidate for political office, or for a nomination thereto or [c] use such money or property for any other partisan political purpose, or [d] violate any law requiring the filing of an affidavit respecting such use of such funds.' (Emphasis added and portions in brackets added to enable ready reference in subsequent analysis.)

In the remainder of that statutory section, criminal penalties are specified for violations thereof.

There is no claim that the Citizens Committee FOR City and County Issues, hereinafter referred to as the citizens committee, did anything 'for or in aid of any candidate' or failed to file any affidavit required by law. Hence the above-quoted oprtions of the statute appearing after [b] and [d] are not involved.

It is obvious that, in the abovequoted emphasized portion of the statute appearing after [a], the word 'political' modifies not only 'party' but also the words 'committee, or organization.' The words 'political party' have a well understood ordinary meaning. Those words describe an association of individuals whose primary purposes are to promote or accomplish elections or appointments to public offices, positions or jobs. Although the word 'political' may have a very broad meaning, its meaning may be considerably narrowed where it is thus used to modify the word 'party.' See Heidtman v. City of Shaker Heights, 163 Ohio St. 109, 126 N.E.2d 138. Obviously, in referring to 'a political party, committee, or organization' in this statute, the General Assembly intended by the words 'committee, or organization' to refer only to a committee or organization which is an adjunct of a political party or an association formed for substantially the same purposes or performing substantially the same functions as a political party.

It is contended however that the contribution to the citizen's committee is prohibited by the above-quoted words of the statute appearing after [c] as a payment 'for any other partisan political purpose.' This argument might have more force if the word 'partisan' had not been used by the General Assembly. See Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 281 Mass. 253, 183 N.E. 495, 85 A.L.R. 1141, where 'partisan' was not used to modify 'any political purpose whatever.' But see Heidtman v. Shaker Heights, supra (163 Ohio St. 109, 126 N.E.2d 138). Thus, although the words 'political purpose' may be given a broad construction as including any purpose related to the principles of civil government and the conduct of public affairs, they may also be given a much narrower construction as including only a 'partisan' political purpose. In the instant case, we must so limit those words because the General Assembly has used the word 'partisan' to limit them.

It is apparent from a consideration of the ratio decidendi in Heidtman v. Shaker Heights, supra (163 Ohio St. 109, 126 N.E.2d 138), that the words 'partisan political purpose' can reasonably be construed so as not to include a mere purpose to advocate the passage of issues such as the citizen's committee advocated in the November 1957 election.

All reasonable doubts in the interpretation of a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of the accused. See State v. Meyers, 56 Ohio St. 340, 47 N.E. 138; City of Cleveland v. Jorski, 142 Ohio St. 529, 53 N.E.2d 513. Where a word may reasonably have either a wide or a restricted meaning and there is reasonable doubt as to which meaning was intended by the General Assembly, such doubt, in the interpretation of a criminal statute, should be resolved against the state. See State v. Terre Haute Brewing Co., 186 Ind. 248, 115 N.E. 772.

In our opinion, therefore, the words 'partisan political purpose,' as used in Section 3599.03, Revised Code, do not include a purpose merely to advocate the adoption of a constitutional amendment or the passage of a bond issue or of a tax levy; amd a committee organized for such purpose is not, within the meaning of that statute, a 'political party, committee, or organization.'

This conclusion is fortified by considering the origin and history of Section 3599.03, Revised Code. The prohibitory provisions of that section were first enacted in 1908 as Section 1 of 'an Act to prevent the corruption of elections and political parties by corporations.' The somewhat modified provisions of section 2 of that act are now found in Section 5733.27, Revised Code, requiring a corporation to file with its returns, statements and reports to the Tax Commissioner 'an affidavit * * * setting forth that such corporation has not, during the preceding year, * * * paid, used or offered, consented, or agreed to pay or use any of its money or property [a] for or in aid of any political party, committee, or organization, or [b] for or in aid of any candidate for political office or for nomination for any such office, or [c] in any manner used any of its money or property for any political purpose whatever.' (Emphasis added and portions in brackets added to enable ready reference in subsequent analysis--the quoted portions after [a] were found in Section 1 of the Act of 1908 and apparently later used to replace the words originally in section 2 of that act and reading: 'To the funds of any political organization, committee or candidate, or used as money or property in violation of section 1 of this act.') Section 3 of the 1908 Act specified criminal penalties for violations of sections 1 and 2.

In the General Code of 1910, section 1 and the penalty provisions of section 3 became Sections 13320 and 13322, General Code, and section 2, with respect to filing the affidavit, became Section 8729 (repealed in 1927), and in 1911 section 2 also became Section 5522, General Code (now Section 5733.27, Revised Code).

In 1929, the General Assembly recodified the election laws and, in doing so, replaced Sections 13320 and 13322, General Code, with Section 4785-192, General Code, and changed the words 'for any political purpose whatever' to read 'for any other partisan political purpose.' Section 4785-192 also contained the provision now found in Section 3599.03, Revised...