State ex rel. Crockett v. Ellison
| Citation | 196 S.W. 1140,271 Mo. 416 |
| Parties | THE STATE ex rel. GEORGE R. CROCKETT v. JAMES ELLISON et al., Judges of Kansas City Court of Appeals |
| Decision Date | 12 July 1917 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Record quashed.
Robert M. Reynolds and Virgil V. Huff for relator.
(1) This court will by certiorari review and quash the judgment and opinion of the Courts of Appeal in any cause, wherein it appears that said court in reaching and rendering such judgment and opinion, failed to follow the last previous decision of this court upon any question of law or equity arising therein. State ex rel. v. Broaddus, 238 Mo 189; State ex rel. v. Ellison, 256 Mo. 644; State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 257 Mo. 19; State ex rel. v. Robertson, 264 Mo. 661; State ex rel. v Reynolds, 265 Mo. 88; State ex rel. v. Ellison, 266 Mo. 604; State ex rel. v. Ellison, 268 Mo. 225. (2) This rule applies in cases of original writs and proceedings in such Courts of Appeal, as well as in other cases. The object of the rule is to secure harmony and uniformity in opinion. Ex parte Conrades, 185 Mo. 411; State ex rel. v. Robertson, 264 Mo. 661. (3) The laws as declared by this court is, that "in contests of this sort unless the father of the infant child is an unfit or incompetent person to have charge of it, or unless the welfare of the child itself, for some special or extraordinary reason demands a different disposition of it at the hands of the court, it is the duty of the court to award him the custody." In re Scarritt, 76 Mo. 565; Weir v. Marley, 99 Mo. 484. (4) The law presumes against the fact that a parent is an unfit and incompetent person to have the custody of his child, and also against the fact of the existence of any special or extraordinary reason demanding that the child be kept from the parent's custody, and the burden is upon the party resisting the parent's claim to show and make manifest to the court that he is an unfit or incompetent person to have the custody of the child or that some special or extraordinary reason does in fact exist demanding that for the best interest of the child it be kept from his custody, and until such matters are made to appear the parent is entitled to its custody, the presumptions in favor of his rights, including the presumption that it is for the best interest of the child becoming conclusive and binding upon the court. In re Scarritt, 76 Mo. 565; Weir v. Marley, 99 Mo. 484. (5) The law as declared by this court in those two cases is, that where the right of the parent is resisted upon the alleged ground of a gift of the infant by the parent or of a contract or agreement or arrangement whatever by the parent and another, by which the custody of the child is awarded or given to such other (except in cases of deeds of adoption or apprenticeship) the presumptions still obtain, notwithstanding such gift, contract, agreement or arrangement, that the best interest of the child is to be with the parent, and that he is the proper person to have it, and the right of custody is under the law with him. The father's right is paramount. In re Scarritt, 76 Mo. 565; Weir v. Marley, 99 Mo. 484. (6) The law as declared by this court in those two cases, is that: -- in all cases where the infant is weak and helpless, the presumption is that the best interest and welfare of such infant is best served by being in the custody of its parent, and that no status, under such circumstances of infancy, whether created voluntarily or involuntarily can be sufficient to overthrow such presumption, unless it be first made to appear that the parent is an unfit and incompetent person; and that the mere fact that some other party might be a proper party to have the custody of such child, and that the interests and welfare of such child would not thereby suffer, or would thereby be fully protected, is not a sufficient showing upon which to base a finding that the best interests of such child demand that the parent be deprived of its custody, or that the parent is an unfit and incompetent person for its custody. In re Scarritt, 76 Mo. 565; Weir v. Marley, 99 Mo. 484.
Com. P. Storts, John A. Rich, Duggins & Duggins and Perry S. Rader for respondents.
(1) Only jurisdictional errors can be reviewed on this writ; and unless this court finds that the Court of Appeals in its opinion failed or refused to follow the last previous ruling of this court on some question of law or equity, this court has no jurisdiction of this cause. (a) The said Court of Appeals "shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus . . . and to hear and determine the same." Constitution, art. 6, sec. 12, R. S. 1909, p. 88; Constitution, Amend. 1884, sec. 4, R. S. 1909, p. 101. (b) Certiorari "only brings up the record, and can only reach errors or defects which appear on the face of the record of the tribunal to which it is issued and which are jurisdictional in their nature." State ex rel. v Smith, 173 Mo. 414; State ex rel. v. Broaddus, 245 Mo. 135; State ex rel. v. Dowling, 50 Mo. 136; State ex rel. v. Wiethaupt, 254 Mo. 329; State ex rel. v. Robertson, 262 Mo. 538, 618. (2) This court cannot by the writ of certiorari correct any error of a court of appeals unless it be error affecting its jurisdiction. Unless that court refuses or fails to follow the last previous ruling of this court on some question of law or equity, its errors in matters of which it otherwise has constitutional jurisdiction cannot be corrected by certiorari. State ex rel. v. Walbridge, 123 Mo. 532; State v. Broaddus, 216 Mo. 342; State ex rel. v. Smith, 173 Mo. 414; In re Breck, 252 Mo. 327; State ex rel. v. Robertson, 262 Mo. 541; State ex rel. v. Dobson, 135 Mo. 12. (3) The conflict in decisions must be upon a point of law. Upon a question of fact, or a conclusion drawn from acknowledged rules of law and facts in evidence, this court cannot take jurisdiction by certiorari. State ex rel. v. Ellison, 256 Mo. 666; State ex rel. v. Ellison, 263 Mo. 515; State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 265 Mo. 93; State ex rel. v. Ellison, 269 Mo. 156. If the substantive facts are undisputed the matter resolves itself into a question of law. Knorpp v. Wagner, 195 Mo. 662. (4) The conflict in decisions should relate to matters of real substance, and does not mean that the decision of the Court of Appeals shall conform to the rulings of the Supreme Court to the point of absolute harmony. State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 257 Mo. 35. (5) The evidence of facts of the case must be gathered from the opinion of the Court of Appeals. State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 257 Mo. 35; State ex rel. v. Robertson, 262 Mo. 539; State ex rel. v. Ellison, 263 Mo. 514. The legality of the writ must be adjudged from matters appearing on the face of the record. State ex rel. v. Patterson, 229 Mo. 368. The writ can be used only to bring up the record. In re Breck, 252 Mo. 318; State ex rel. v. Broaddus, 245 Mo. 136. (6) The decision in every case must depend upon its own facts. State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 241 Mo. 238; Bank v. Clifton, 263 Mo. 218; Epstein v. Railroad, 250 Mo. 39; Bender v. Weber, 250 Mo. 561. "General principles of law may not be applied mechanically, but, in order to produce a just result, they should be applied in accordance with their underlying reason and with an eye to the shifting circumstances in judgment." Knorpp v. Wagner, 195 Mo. 659; Greene County v. Lydy, 263 Mo. 91; Simpson v. Iron Works Co., 249 Mo. 399. And this rule applies when upon certiorari it is contended that the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with the last previous ruling of this court upon some question of law or equity. State ex rel. v. Ellison, 269 Mo. 159; State ex rel. v. Ellison, 192 S.W. 727. (7) Habeas corpus is a legal and not an equitable proceeding. 21 Cyc. 283; Kline v. Kline, 57 Iowa 386; Drumb v. Keen, 47 Iowa 436; Jennings v. Jennings, 56 Iowa 290; Kuhn v. Breen, 101 Iowa 668; Sumner v. Sumner, 117 Ga. 229; Torns v. Neely, 134 Ga. 274; Dunkin v. Dunkin, 123 Iowa 65; Lundstrum v. State, 140 Wis. 141; Ex parte Canova, 84 S.C. 473; Brown v. Robertson, 76 S.C. 152. (8) The proper disposition of the child in the habeas corpus case being a question of law, the findings or conclusion of the Court of Appeals cannot be reviewed by this court, if there was any substantial evidence to support that conclusion and that court acknowledged the rulings of this court as being the principles of law by which it should be and was guided. Rausch v. Miller, 192 Mo. 303; Brewing Co. v. St. Louis, 209 Mo. 607; Cole v. Mueller, 187 Mo. 640; Culbertson v. Hill, 87 Mo. 555. This court cannot interfere with the discretion of the Court of Appeals in reaching its conclusion unless there was an abuse of that discretion. Ingram v. State, 7 Mo. 294; Walton v. Walton, 19 Mo. 667; In re Wilson, 95 Mo. 184; State v. Sassaman, 214 Mo. 734. (9) The Constitution itself confines this court to a review of the law governing the case, and gives it no power to review the conclusions of the Court of Appeals if it rightly observed the law as previously declared by this court. (a) The Constitution, Article 6, Amendment of 1884, Sec. 6, R. S. 1909, p. 101, says that "the last previous rulings of the Supreme Court on any question of law or equity shall, in all cases, be controlling authority in said Court of Appeals." It does not include conclusions drawn from facts and correct legal principles. If the Court of Appeals followed the principles of law as laid down by this court, its application of them to the case in hand, or its conclusion in applying those principles to the facts, if wrong, would be mere error; and if the facts were diffierent from those in the Scarritt and Weir cases, this court has no jurisdiction to coerce it into reaching a different conclusion. (b) This court can review only errors of law in a law case, even on appeal. ...
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