State ex rel. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company v. Ellison

• Decision Date: 09 February 1915
• Citation: 173 S.W. 690,263 Mo. 509
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. JAMES ELLISON et al., Judges of Kansas City Court of Appeals
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

173 S.W. 690

263 Mo. 509

THE STATE ex rel. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. JAMES ELLISON et al., Judges of Kansas City Court of Appeals

Supreme Court of Missouri

February 9, 1915

STATEMENT.

This is a proceeding by certiorari to review and quash the judgment and decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals, in reviewing the case of Andrew J. Stark, Jr., by Guardian, v Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co., wherein the plaintiff recovered a judgment in the trial court for one thousand dollars for injuries caused by the fall of a loaded truck standing on the platform of the railroad station, against which plaintiff leaned, causing it to fall over and catch and break his leg, and inflicting other injuries. The truck fell because it had no proper support at one end -- a leg intended to support tat end was partly broken, and when the weight of plaintiff, a boy of fourteen, was applied to that end of the truck, it tipped and caused the injury. The truck had been loaded with sacks of flour by a shipper shortly before the accident. The boy was on the platform to meet his father expected to arrive on an incoming train. The Kansas City Court of Appeals, over the dissent of one of its members affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The proceeding by certiorari was begun here, upon the allegation in the petition therefor, that the opinion of the Kansas City Court of Appeals affirming the right of plaintiff to have a jury was in conflict with the ruling and decision of this court in Kelley v. Lawrence, 195 Mo. 75. The above facts are stated in the opinion of the majority of the Kansas City Court of Appeals, which opinion also expressly cited the decision of this court in Kelley v. Lawrence, supra, conceding its authority, but stating that it and other cases relied on by defendant below "are not in point. As was said in Winscott v. Railroad, 151 Mo.App. 378, we are not dealing with a case where the plaintiff, traveling on a way prepared only for travel and intended to be used for no other purpose, is injured on account of another use he makes of the place, but with an instance where the plaintiff is injured while using the place for the very purpose for which it was intended and prepared. Plaintiff's business was that of waiting, in a place provided by defendant for that particular use, and it was not to be expected that he would stand in one particular spot for fear of moving, or that he would regard every object on the platform that offered some means of rest or relaxation as being loaded with concealed danger. He had a right to assume that a truck loaded with freight was not a hair-trigger trap that would go off and kill or maim him if he but casually touched or leaned against it. The evidence of plaintiff tends to show that a negligent breach by defendant of its duty to exercise proper care to maintain the station platform in a reasonably safe condition was the proximate cause of his injury. The demurrer to the evidence was properly overruled."

Writ quashed.

John E. Dolman and O. E. Shultz for petitioner.

Respondents herein exceeded their jurisdiction in their acts and proceedings in the case of Stark v. Railroad for the following reasons: (1) Their ruling and decision that a loaded truck on a depot platform should be loaded in such a manner as to be safe to "lean or lounge" against by those waiting for a train on such platform, is in conflict with the decisions of this court. Kelley v. Lawrence, 195 Mo. 75. (2) It is not controverted that the truck was loaded and placed on the platform voluntarily by a third person without the knowledge of the railroad company or its agents and in less than an hour of the time of the injury complained of; however, respondents held as a matter of law that the railroad company knew that the truck was loaded and loaded in a dangerous manner, and that the question of notice of the defect by the company was not one to be submitted to the jury. This was in direct conflict with the decisions of this court. Crawford v. Stock Yards Co., 215 Mo. 414; Langan v. Railroad, 72 Mo. 398; Badgley v. St. Louis, 149 Mo. 134; Vonkey v. St. Louis, 219 Mo. 37; Goodrich v. Railroad, 152 Mo. 233.

Kendall B. Randolph, Edward G. Robinson, W. M. Williams, R. A. Mooneyham, Frank L. Forlow, E. P. Garnett, Atwood & Hill, and Park & Brown for respondents.

The Constitution of 1875 and the Amendment of 1884 repose in the Courts of Appeals final appellate jurisdiction. This court had no appellate jurisdiction over them. The remedial writs were provided to keep those courts within their proper jurisdiction, but not to correct their errors. Constitution, art. 6, secs. 2, 3, 12; R. S. 1909, pp. 88, 93, 94. The St. Louis Court of Appeals in those cases originating within its territorial jurisdiction in which the amount in dispute did not exceed two thousand five hundred dollars, not involving constitutional or federal questions, nor the revenue laws, nor the title to real estate, nor the title to any office under the State, and wherein a county or other political subdivision of the State or a State officer was not a party, and not cases of felony, had, confessedly, final, exclusive jurisdiction. There was no provision for certifying cases. Its errors, if any, in the cases above mentioned were incurable. So long as it proceeded within the bounds of its constitutional jurisdiction in those cases it was subject to review by no earthly power. This was the view taken of the powers and jurisdiction of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in 1876 when the purposes of the Convention and of the people were fresh in the minds of the citizens and the judiciary. Britton v. Steber, 62 Mo. 370; In re Garesche, 85 Mo. 469; State ex rel. v. Philips, 96 Mo. 570; State ex rel. v. Court of Appeals, 99 Mo. 216; State ex rel. v. Smith, 101 Mo. 174; State ex rel. v. Smith, 104 Mo. 419; State ex rel. v. Smith, 105 Mo. 6; State ex rel. v. Smith, 107 Mo. 527; State ex rel v. Rombauer, 125 Mo. 632; State ex rel. v. Smith, 129 Mo. 585; State ex rel. v. Rombauer, 140 Mo. 121; Smith v. Railroad, 143 Mo. 33; Schaffer v. Railroad, 144 Mo. 170; Morris v. Railroad, 58 Mo. 78; Hess v. Ganz, 145 Mo. 54; Railroad v. Smith, 154 Mo. 300; Bradley v. Ins. Co., 163 Mo. 553; State ex rel. v. Smith, 176 Mo. 90; State ex rel. v. Smith, 173 Mo. 399; Wilden v. McAllister, 178 Mo. 732; Clark v. Railroad, 179 Mo. 66; State ex rel. v. Smith, 188 Mo. 167; Sublette v. Railroad, 198 Mo. 190; State ex rel. v. Broaddus, 207 Mo. 107; Houck v. Waterworks & E. L. Co., 215 Mo. 475. The writ of certiorari has never been used in this State as a substitute for a writ of error or an appeal and never as a medium of acquiring jurisdiction to determine the merits or details of a controversy. In re Breck, 252 Mo. 323; State ex rel. v. Dobson, 135 Mo. 1; State ex rel. v. Wells, 210 Mo. 621; Ward v. Board of Equalization, 135 Mo. 309; State ex rel. v. Broaddus, 245 Mo. 136.

BOND, J. Brown, Bond and Walker, JJ., concur; Blair, J., concurs in result; Graves and Faris, JJ., dissent; Woodson, C. J., not sitting.

In Banc

Certiorari.

OPINION.

BOND J. (After stating the facts as above)

-- In the case of State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 257 Mo. 19 165 S.W. 729, it was ruled by the majority of this court that certiorari would lie to the Court of Appeals, for the purpose of quashing its judgment if based upon a decision in conflict with the last previous ruling of this...